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ABSTRACT
This thesis includes an introduction chapter and four essays on the ﬁeld of
public and welfare economics. The ﬁrst two essays are theoretical and the last
two essays are empirical. The theoretical part of this thesis studies the optimal
taxation in a setting where the social planner has different kinds of redistribu-
tive preferences and individuals differ in more than one background charac-
teristic. The empirical part of the thesis examines income distribution and the
consequences of public policies. The ﬁrst empirical essay studies top income
distribution over time and the second empirical essay evaluates the possibili-
ties for elderly workers to reduce work hours through a part-time retirement
scheme and how this possibility affects sickness and drug purchases.
The objective of the public sector is to maximize social welfare by taking
into account the efﬁciency of its policies and the equity perspectives. The main
tool used is redistributing income through taxes and income transfers. The
ﬁrst essay of the thesis studies the optimal structure of income taxation in the
Mirrleesian optimal taxation framework. The economy under study consists
of individuals with different abilities to acquire income but they also have
different preferences towards saving income for the future periods. The tax
planner wants to redistribute income based on the ability to pay but the unob-
served differences in saving preferences complicate the optimization problem.
It is observed that in this kind of economy capital income taxation belongs to
the optimal tax mix.
In the second essay optimal tax mix is studied in an economy where indi-
viduals differ with respect to their abilities and initial endowment or inheri-
tance received. The tax planner cannot observe either of the factors. The goal
is to redistribute income from those who have better ability and higher ini-
tial wealth towards the less skilled and less endowed. Several countries have
abolished inheritance taxation and for this reason the starting point in this es-
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say is that the tax planner can only use the non-linear labour income tax and,
if necessary, capital income tax. It is shown that non-linear capital income tax
belongs to the optimal tax mix. The essay also discusses the role of income
shifting in this type of economy.
The effects of redistribution and other policies are seen as changes in the
income distribution. The third essay in this thesis describes the Finnish in-
come distribution and the evolution of incomes during the period of 1995-
2012. The essay especially examines the top of the income distribution from a
gender perspective. While the income shares of the high-income individuals
grew rapidly at the end of the 1990s, this mostly beneﬁted men. The share of
women in the top incomes did not improve before the ﬁnancial crisis apart
from the top 1 percent, where the share improved throughout the period. In-
come mobility and income composition are also studied. Men’s income ranks
are more persistent than women’s. Women had a bigger share of capital and
business income but towards the end of the period the share of wages grew
for women.
Beside the tax and transfer policy, the public sector can affect the well-being
of citizens through different kinds of labour market and pension policies and
programs. The fourth essay studies the part-time pension program and how
it affected drug purchases and sickness. The part-time pension program re-
duced the hours worked but the combination of wages and pension reduced
disposable income only by a little. The eligibility age for part-time pension
programs was reduced in the year 1998, which enables the comparison of sim-
ilar groups, where in one the reduction in work hours happened at a younger
age than in the other. This research design makes it possible to evaluate the
causal effect of the reform. In the study an instrumental variable method is
also used to evaluate how moving to part-time pension affected drug pur-
chases, sickness absences and labour market exits. The study ﬁnds that on
average the age eligibility reform increased the purchases of drugs but for the
sickest subset the reduction of work hours decreased sickness absences and
drug utilization.
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TIIVISTELMÄ
Tämä väitöskirja koostuu johdantoluvusta ja neljästä julkis- ja hyvinvoinnin
taloustieteenalaan kuuluvasta tutkimuksesta. Kaksi ensimmäistä esseetä ovat
teoreettisia ja kaksi viimeistä esseetä empiirisiä. Väitöskirjan teoreettisessa
osiossa tarkastellaan optimaalista verorakennetta, kun julkisella vallalla on
erilaisia tulonjakotavoitteita ja yksilöt eroavat useamman taustamuuttujan suh-
teen. Väitöskirjan empiirisessä osiossa tarkastellaan tulojakaumaa ja julkisen
vallan politiikan seurauksia. Ensimmäinen empiirinen essee tarkastelee huip-
putulojen jakautumista ajan mittaan ja toinen essee arvioi ikääntyneiden työn-
tekijöiden työn vähentämistä osa-aikaeläkeohjelman kautta ja sitä miten tämä
vaikuttaa sairastavuuteen ja lääkeostoihin.
Julkisen sektorin tavoitteena on maksimoida yhteiskunnan hyvinvointia
huomiomalla politiikan tehokkuus- ja oikeudenmukaisuusnäkökulmat. Yksi
merkittävimmistä keinoista tämän tavoitteen saavuttamiseksi on tulojen uu-
delleenjako. Väitöskirjan ensimmmäinen essee tarkastelee vero- ja tulonsiir-
tojärjestelmän optimaalista rakennetta Mirrleesin (1971) optimituloverokehi-
kossa. Esseessä tarkastellaan taloutta, jossa yksilöillä on erilaiset tulonansain-
takyvyt sekä säästämispreferenssit. Julkinen valta haluaa uudelleenjakaa tu-
loa tulonansaintakyvyn perusteella, mutta havaitsemattomat säästämisprefe-
renssit hankaloittavat optimointiongelmaa. Esseessä havaitaan, että tällaises-
sa taloudessa pääomatulon verotus kuuluu optimaalisten veroinstrumenttien
valikoimaan.
Toisessa esseessä verotuksen rakennetta tarkastellaan Mirrleesin (1971) op-
timituloverokehikossa niin, että yksilöt eroavat tulonansaintakyvyn sekä al-
kuvarannon tai perinnön suhteen. Julkinen valta ei voi havaita kumpaakaan
tekijää. Tavoitteena on uudelleenjakaa tuloa niiltä, joiden tulonansaintaky-
ky on parempi ja joilla perintö on suurempi. Useat maat ovat poistaneet pe-
rintöverotuksen keinovalikoimasta ja tästä syystä esseen lähtökohta on, että
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julkinen valta voi hyödyntää vain epälineaarista työtulon veroa sekä mah-
dollisesti pääomatuloveroa. Esseessä näytetään, että pääomatulovero kuuluu
optimaalisten veroinstrumenttien valikoimaan. Esseessä keskustellaan myös
tulonmuunto-ongelmasta tällaisessa taloudessa.
Julkisen vallan uudelleenjakopolitiikan ja muun lainsäädännön vaikutuk-
set näkyvät muutoksina tulojakaumassa. Väitöskirjan kolmas essee kuvailee
Suomen tulojakaumaa ja siinä tapahtuneita muutoksia vuosien 1995-2012 vä-
lillä. Esseessä tarkastellaan tulojakauman huippua etenkin sukupuolten nä-
kökulmasta. 1990-luvun lopun suurituloisten tulo-osuuksien kasvu kohdis-
tui suurelta osin miehille. Naisten osuus tulohuipulla ei merkittävästi kasva-
nut ennen ﬁnanssikriisiä lukuunottamatta ylintä yhtä prosenttia, jossa nais-
ten osuus kasvoi läpi periodin. Esseessä tarkastellaan myös suurituloisten
tuloliikkuvuutta ja tulonmuodostusta. Miesten tuloasema huipputuloissa on
pysyvämpi kuin naisilla. Naisten huipputulot koostuvat enemmän pääoma-
tuloista mutta periodin loppua kohden palkkatulojen osuus kokonaistulosta
kasvaa.
Vero- ja tulonsiirtopolitiikan rinnalla julkinen valta voi vaikuttaa kansalais-
ten hyvinvointiin erilaisten ohjelmien avulla. Esimerkiksi työ- ja eläkelainsää-
dännöllä voidaan tavoitella työntekijöiden parempaa hyvinvointia. Neljän-
nessä esseessä tarkastellaan osa-aikaeläkejärjestelmän vaikutuksia lääkeostoi-
hin ja sairaspoissaoloihin. Osa-aikaeläke vähensi työn määrää mutta käytettä-
vissä olevat tulot pienenivät vain vähän. Vuonna 1998 osa-aikaeläkejärjestel-
mässä muutettin alinta ikärajaa, joka mahdollistaa muuten samankaltaisten
ryhmien vertailun, joista toisessa työn määrää voitiin vähentää nuorempana.
Tällainen tutkimusasetelma mahdollistaa ikärajareformin vaikutusten kausaa-
liarvionnin. Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan myös instrumenttimuuttujamenetel-
män avulla osa-aikaeläkkeelle siirtymisen vaikutuksia yksilöiden lääkeostoi-
hin, sairaspoissaoloihin ja työmarkkinoilta poistumiseen. Tutkimuksessa ha-
vaitaan, että ikärajan alentaminen kasvatti lääkkeiden ostoja mutta sairaim-
malle osajoukolle työmäärän vähentäminen vähensi sairaspoissaoloja ja lää-
kekäyttöä.
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1 INTRODUCTION
This thesis consists of four essays from the ﬁelds of public economics. Two of
the essays study a traditional public economics question of optimal taxation.
These essays study whether savings should be taxed when there are multidi-
mensional differences between agents (instead of only one-dimensional dif-
ferences in abilities or skills) and when we make different assumptions about
the social welfare function. The essays ask a positive research question of
whether savings ought to be taxed while keeping in mind the spectrum of
normative criteria the government might set for welfare maximization.
The focus in public economics is social welfare maximization through gov-
ernment interventions. Income distribution is the most visible way of de-
scribing the consequences of government actions. The direct effect of tax-and-
transfer system is transparent in the comparison of the factor and disposable
income distributions. The shape and evolution of the gross income distribu-
tion over time indirectly reveal the effects of changing market structures and a
broad set of policies implemented in the society. Analysing factors and char-
acteristics behind these evolutions has been an important research ﬁeld for
the past decade. The third essay in this thesis describes the Finnish income
distribution over time and focuses especially on the upper part of the income
distribution from the gender perspective.
The fourth essay in this thesis studies the effects of policy on individuals’
well-being and decision-making. The policy under study is the part-time re-
tirement program which enabled eligible individuals to reduce work hours at
the end of their career while the disposable income was barely affected. The
essay studies the effects on health-related factors, such as drug utilization and
sickness days, and early labour market exits.
These four essays add to the understanding in the ﬁeld of public eco-
nomics. The shared themes are equity and inequality, allocative efﬁciency
17
and the well-being of individuals and society.
1.1 Optimal taxation and redistribution
The ﬁrst two essays of this thesis consider optimal taxation. Optimal tax
theory is interested in ﬁnding conditions for tax rates which maximize so-
cial welfare. The social welfare is represented with social welfare function
and, by changing the form of this function, different normative concerns can
be considered. Modern tax theory also acknowledges the important role of
asymmetric information between the tax planner (principal) and the tax payer
(agent). Information is a main element in modelling optimal taxes and distor-
tionary taxes arise because of the information constraint. During the past two
decades optimal tax problems have incorporated more heterogeneity between
agents and this has lead to more realistic optimal tax models. This sort of mul-
tidimensionality requires numerical methods for solving the optimal tax rates
and optimal tax structure. These building blocks of optimal taxation models
are discussed deeper in the following subsections.
1.1.1 Optimal structure of income taxation
The basic theorem of welfare economics states that under a perfectly compet-
itive economy and full sets of markets, the allocation equilibrium is Pareto-
efﬁcient. However, Pareto-efﬁciency does not entail that the distribution is in
accord with the prevailing concepts of equity. One of the main activities of
the government is thus redistribution1. Non-distortionary taxes and transfers
are not available under redistributive preferences of the government and for
this reason a trade-off between equity and efﬁciency needs to be considered,
i.e. to what extent society is willing to suffer efﬁciency costs to obtain a more
equal income distribution.
The optimal taxation problem is to maximize society’s welfare by allocat-
ing bundles of consumption and leisure and using taxation as a tool to achieve
1Equity considerations are not the only reason for the case for redistribution. The common
assumption, that the marginal utility of income is higher for the lower-ability type, suggest
under aggregate welfare maximization that redistribution from high-ability individual to low-
ability individual is desirable.
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the optimal bundles. The modern theory of optimal taxation follows the semi-
nal work by James Mirrlees where the trade-off between efﬁciency and equity
and informational constraints are in a central role. In Mirrlees (1971) the gov-
ernment observes the income of individuals but the ability or efﬁcient hours
worked are not observed. On one hand the government wants to redistribute
from the high-ability types towards the low-ability types for the sake of equity.
However, if the government taxes too much, there is an incentive for the high-
ability type to not reveal his true type. Instead, the high-ability type mimics
the low-ability type for example by working fewer hours. This distorts the
efﬁciency and reduces social welfare.
In these early contributions, optimal income taxation was considered in a
static setting and the taxation problem focused on how to tax labour income.
In the rigorous analysis of Mirrlees (1971) the factors for which the optimal
tax rates are dependable were shown in general terms. These factors are the
shape of the social welfare function, the self-selection constraints caused by
the asymmetry of information, the distribution of ability and the production
process. The analytical results from the early Mirrleesian framework taught
that the marginal tax rate schedule is non-negative for most part of the dis-
tribution but zero for the highest ability type if skill distribution is bounded
(Sadka, 1976; Seade, 1977) and zero for the lowest ability type if all individu-
als work non-zero hours (Seade, 1977). Subsequent work continued with the
Mirrleesian framework with different assumptions about the skill distribution
and noticed that the zero tax results hold only under restrictive assumptions.
Beside optimal labour income tax, an important question in taxation liter-
ature has been whether mixed taxation, a combination of commodity and in-
come taxation, can achieve the same distributional objectives but with smaller
efﬁciency costs. Some important early contributions in the ﬁeld of commodity
taxation are works by Ramsey (1927) showing that commodity taxes should
be set to levels which cause a equiproportional shift in demands of each com-
modity, Corlett and Hague (1953) showing how optimal commodity taxes are
higher for products which are complementary to leisure and Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971a,b) who pondered the production efﬁciency under linear com-
modity taxation concluding that it is optimal to operate at the production-
possibilities frontier also under distortionary taxation.
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Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) combined the commodity taxation and in-
come taxation in their model, which in subsequent literature is known as the
Atkinson-Stiglitz result. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) show that under opti-
mal2 non-linear labour income taxation there is no need for indirect taxation
when preferences are separable between goods and leisure. Savings can be
thought of as a commodity since savings are consumed in the future period.
The Atkinson-Stiglitz result implies that savings should not be taxed for rea-
sons of redistribution. Later research on optimal capital income taxation has
presented various interesting cases where the Atkinson-Stiglitz result does
not hold3.
In the case of indirect taxation, the Atkinson-Stiglitz result does not hold4
if production technology is non-linear (Naito, 1999), when there are differ-
ences in the unobserved endowments (Cremer et al., 2001), differences in
preferences (Saez, 2002; Marchand et al., 2003; Blomquist and Christiansen,
2008) or when there is wage uncertainty (Cremer and Gahvari, 1995a,b). With
the direct application to capital income taxation the Atkinson-Stiglitz result is
shown not to hold with multidimensional individual heterogeneity which is
unobservable to government for example in the case of habit formation (Tuo-
mala and Tenhunen, 2013) and in the case of preference heterogeneity (Saez,
2002; Tenhunen and Tuomala, 2010; Diamond and Spinnewijn, 2011; Ravaska
et al., 2018). Also if there is a possibility to shift income between capital and
labour income tax base, capital income tax can be welfare-improving (Chris-
tiansen and Tuomala, 2008). The role of capital income taxation in these set-
tings is to mitigate the information asymmetry between the agent and prin-
cipal. Stiglitz (2018) also discussed the Atkinson-Stiglitz result in a dynamic
model and ﬁnds that there is a case for non-zero capital income tax.
2Kaplow (2006) showed that optimality of the labour income tax is not required for the
Atkinson-Stiglitz result to hold.
3The zero capital income tax result for the steady state is also derived by Chamley (1986)
and Judd (1985) under assumptions of representative individual who lives inﬁnitely or when
there is an inﬁnite dynasty. If in the Chamley-Judd setting households face tight borrowing
constraint or are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk, the zero-tax result is invali-
dated (Aiyagari, 1995; Conesa et al., 2009).
4The main assumption behind the Atkinson-Stiglitz result is that preferences over goods
demand and labour supply are weakly separable. However, there is empirical evidence that
this might not be the case (Browning and Meghir, 1991; Crawford et al., 2010; Pirttilä and
Suoniemi, 2014).
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The optimal tax theory suggests that the marginal income tax rates should
be higher for products and factors which have small behavioural elasticities.
Also, conditions in the tax problems clearly show that marginal tax rates are
higher if the government has stronger preferences for redistribution and for
the parts of the income distribution where there are fewer individuals. The
current knowledge from the theory of mixed optimal taxation points to the di-
rection that labour income should be taxed non-linearly and there should also
exist a non-zero tax on capital. The optimal tax theory does not rigorously an-
swer what the relation between marginal labour tax rates and marginal capital
income tax rates is. There are reasons to believe that the tax rates should not
be the same but to minimize income shifting they should be somehow related
(Banks and Diamond, 2010).
1.1.2 Social welfare function
In economics, social welfare is characterized with a real-valued welfare func-
tion which depends on variables that affect collective well-being. The nor-
mative part of the theory of optimal taxation can be reduced to the choice
of the social welfare function. The social welfare function expresses the soci-
ety’s values about equity and fairness. The common way of thinking about
social welfare is with the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function where
social welfare is aggregated in a certain manner from the individual utilities
(Tuomala, 2016). The objective of the society is to maximize this aggregated
welfare. This approach to social welfare is called welfarism. Equity consider-
ations are incorporated in the functional form of the social welfare function.
The commonly assumed property of the social welfare function is that it is
increasing in everyone’s utility and so it entails the Pareto principle.
Utilitarian social welfare function includes all individuals in the economy
while under Rawlsian or the maximin principle the objective function in-
cludes only the utility of the worst-off individual (or group). Different kinds
of redistributive preferences can be represented with the choice of social wel-
fare weights schedule5. Beside maximizing the chosen objective function, the
5In the last few years there has been an increase in the empirical applications which aim
to reveal the underlying social preferences with the help of the so called inverse optimal-tax
approach. Here the assumption is that the observed tax rates are optimal and then the optimal
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policy maker needs to consider the constraints in the optimization problem.
An important set of constraints are the self-selection constraints,6 which in-
centivize individuals to reveal their true types instead of mimicking another
type. While the social objective deﬁned as the maximin case does not include
the utility of the higher ability types directly in the objective function, natu-
rally these ability types need to be considered in the constraints.
The social welfare can also express other value judgements beside wel-
farism. In these cases the social welfare is not derived from individual prefer-
ences. For example, in the context of developing countries, poverty-minimiza-
tion is a common non-welfarist objective of the government where the social
welfare weight is zero for the income groups whose incomes are above the
level of poverty. Other types of non-welfarist objectives are based on inequal-
ity indices or capabilities.
There is much debate whether social objectives should equalize the utility
differences in the welfarist sense or aim towards reducing relative poverty.
Even when redistribution is dominantly preferred, the debate often gets stuck
on the welfare weights for different groups. While some argue for the utilitar-
ian case as fair and sufﬁcient option for the form of objective function, others
debate for the maximin case, that is focusing on the groups who are the most
vulnerable. While this normative debate cannot be solved with the tools of
economic theory there is a more attractive and less debated policy goal avail-
able, namely the equality of opportunity.
Equality of opportunity, the idea that individuals should have equal oppor-
tunities to support their own living, is popular among philosophers, politi-
cians and the general public. The equality of opportunity approach has roots
in the claim by Dworkin (1981a,b) that egalitarian redistribution should not
be implemented based on certain kind of preferences. Roemer (1998) formu-
lated the same idea by stating that factors inﬂuencing the outcomes should be
partitioned in terms of effort and circumstances and to recognize that some
income differentials are due to factors of choice and others on factors of cir-
cumstances. The individual choices, when assumed they are independent
tax formulas can be used in the inverted form to calculate the respective social welfare weights
schedule. This method has also been applied to evaluate the social welfare weights of political
parties towards different groups. See Jacobs et al. (2017) and the references therein.
6Also known as the incentive-compatibility constraint.
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of circumstances7, do not require governmental intervention in the form of
redistribution. However, the income differences based on the factors of cir-
cumstances that the individual cannot affect himself should be compensated.
These two points are known as the principle of responsibility and the princi-
ple of compensation (Roemer, 1998).
The principles of compensation and responsibility can be characterized
with an example of individuals who differ in their innate ability but also have
different preferences for work. This is realized as differences in income also
at the same ability level. While the ability differences are not under an indi-
vidual’s control, the government should redistribute from a high-ability type
towards the low-ability type. However, it is often assumed that effort or work
preferences are something that an individual can make active decisions on.
So, there is no equity argument for redistributing from the hard-working to-
wards the individual who puts less effort in work. Neither is there reason to
penalize the individuals who have lower effort as preferences are valued on
their own without moral judgements.
The equality of opportunity goal makes the optimal tax problems effec-
tively multidimensional. In recent years there have been several attempts to
empirically characterize inequality in terms of equality of opportunity (Roe-
mer and Trannoy, 2016; Ramos and Van de gaer, 2016). These applications
face difﬁculties because there is no clear distinction of which factors belong
to the group of responsibility of an individual and which are circumstances.
Theoretically one way to incorporate equality of opportunity is to put dif-
ferent weights for each group, even when there is no natural way to weight
preferences (Boadway et al., 2002).
A more agnostic way to incorporate equality of opportunity in the social
welfare function is by making a compromise between the two guiding prin-
ciples of responsibility and compensation. Roemer (1998) and Van de gaer
(1993) suggest that equality of opportunity social welfare function combines
the elements of maximin and utilitarian cases. The maximin element steps
into the picture in the form of high-inequality aversion applied along the di-
mension of circumstances and the utilitarian element shows up as the zero-
7For example Kanbur and Wagstaff (2014) point out that a clean separation between cir-
cumstances and effort is not always possible even conceptually. This observation implies that
the principles of responsibility and compensation are not adequate guidelines.
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inequality aversion in the dimension of responsibility. This approach was in-
corporated in the analysis by Ravaska et al. (2018). Fleurbaey and Maniquet
(2018) discuss extensively how other fairness principles can be incorporated
in the social welfare function.
1.1.3 Multidimensional optimal tax problems
The traditional Mirrleesian optimal tax models have assumed that individuals
in a given society have similar preferences between consumption and leisure,
but the innate ability, which is perfectly reﬂected by the wage rate, differs.
These preferences can be represented with the same utility function and this
has made the analytical solutions interpretable.
It is highly plausible that individuals differ in their preferences and/or also
in other relevant (for taxation) background characteristics which should be
taken into account in an optimal taxation problem. Individuals have for ex-
ample different work preferences, different timing preferences for consump-
tion and are endowed with different resources in the beginning of their life.
This type of multidimensional heterogeneity adds reality to the optimal tax
and transfer problems but at the same time complicates the analysis notably.
Increases in computational power have made it possible to solve these more
complex models numerically.
The technical difﬁculties caused by multiple dimensions of private infor-
mation are discussed in Armstrong (1996) and Rochet and Choné (1998). The
context in these papers is multiproduct nonlinear pricing schemes in microec-
onomic mechanism design problems. A similar kind of solution algorithm has
also turned out useful in the optimal taxation problem but with the additional
resource constraint that the government poses to the problem. Armstrong and
Rochet (1999) develop a simpliﬁed version of the multidimensional screening
problem where they consider the simplest non-trivial problem, which is with
discrete type space and where each type parameter comes from a binary dis-
tribution. This type of tractable model can provide a complete solution and
has also been used in the optimal taxation literature for example by Cremer
et al. (2001), Tenhunen and Tuomala (2010), Diamond and Spinnewijn (2011),
Tuomala and Tenhunen (2013) and Ravaska et al. (2018).
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The heterogeneous preferences and other type of multidimensional vari-
ability between individuals complicate the optimal tax analysis from at least
two points of view. Firstly, the common logic of incentives need not to work
anymore. For example, if individuals at the same ability level value work dif-
ferently, a policy maker cannot offer similar incentives to get these types to
work the same amount. The derivation of multidimensional taxation prob-
lem becomes more difﬁcult as there are more self-selection constraints to ac-
count for. The analytical results seldom reveal the binding constraints and for
this reason the analytical derivation of the problem might be fruitless. How-
ever, numerical simulation can reveal much more about the optimal tax-and-
transfer system.
The second complication is that, with more complex heterogeneity, deﬁn-
ing a social objective is more difﬁcult. In the case of homogeneous preferences,
the objective function makes interpersonal comparisons based on utilities dif-
fering by only the work effort (which depends on hours worked and produc-
tivity). Interpersonal comparisons of heterogeneous preferences is conceptu-
ally difﬁcult in the welfarist tradition since the interpretation of these utilities
is not impartial anymore.
Heterogenous working or consumption preferences have been introduced
in the optimal taxation model for example by Boadway et al. (2002), Cremer
et al. (2009), Tenhunen and Tuomala (2010), Diamond and Spinnewijn (2011),
Tuomala and Tenhunen (2013), Jacquet et al. (2013), Golosov et al. (2013),
Lockwood and Weinzierl (2015) and Ravaska et al. (2018). These papers have
solved the technical complexities differently. For example Boadway et al.
(2002) assumes a utilitarian social welfare function so that the government
chooses different weights for individuals with different preferences. They
also simplify the analysis by assuming the direction of binding self-selection
constraints. Cremer et al. (2009), Tenhunen and Tuomala (2010) and Tuomala
and Tenhunen (2013) on the other hand rely on numerical simulations and
remain agnostic about the appropriate cardinalization of the different prefer-
ences. Some papers avoid the technical difﬁculties by assuming multidimen-
sionalities can be represented with one-dimensional aggregation or that there
is perfect correlation between dimensions which also reduces the problem to
unidimensional (Lockwood and Weinzierl, 2015; Golosov et al., 2013; Choné
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and Laroque, 2010). In the case of capital income taxation one simpliﬁcation
has also been to consider linear capital income tax or subsidy8 (Diamond and
Spinnewijn, 2011).
1.1.4 Numerical methods
In the one-dimensional optimal income taxation model, analytical results pro-
vide qualitative characterization of the optimal shape of the marginal tax
schedule while numerical simulations can give indications also towards the
levels of tax rates. However, the difﬁculty to derive exact levels of optimal
tax rates is that much of the model parameters are unknown and hard to esti-
mate empirically. For example, optimal tax formulas include a parameter for
labour supply elasticity with respect to tax rate. These elasticities have been
estimated from speciﬁc quasi-experiments but in the end the external validity
toward general taxation purposes is debatable.
When tax problems get more complex, like in the case of multi-dimensional
heterogeneity between agents, the analytical results cannot always even re-
veal the sign of the optimal tax rates. In the more complex models the only
way to get intuition on the optimal structure of the system is to solve them
numerically with reasonable assumptions. Naturally the multidimensional
problems also face the difﬁculty that many of the parameters of the model are
unknown empirically.
For numerically deriving the optimal tax rates, one needs to specify four
key elements: an individual’s preferences, the shape of the ability distribu-
tion, social objectives and the revenue requirement. Social objectives and the
choice of welfare function was discussed in the section 1.1.2. The individual
preferences, presented in the form of the utility function, is a central ques-
tion because different utility functions imply different types of behavioural
responses. In the standard models the labour supply decision is based on
the balance between after-tax income, leisure and consumption. Taxation de-
creases effective wage and increases the amount of work through the income
effect. On the other hand, substitution effect decreases work amount as leisure
8Diamond and Spinnewijn (2011) also assume a four-type setting where only high-ability
types choose between jobs instead of hours resulting to reduction in the number of possible
binding self-selection constraints.
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is cheaper than without taxation. The total effect depends on the utility func-
tion. In the optimal taxation literature various forms of utility functions have
been tested.
The concept of distribution in optimal tax models refers to the ability distri-
bution as discussed in the previous sections. However, this is unobservable.
Assuming competitive labour markets where the wages are determined ac-
cording to the marginal productivities, the wage distribution would work as
an ability distribution. However, we do not observe the counter-factual distri-
bution which would occur without the intervening role of taxation. The sim-
plest way to get around this is to consider discrete types and a uniform distri-
bution (for example Stern (1982); Stiglitz (1982)). Mirrlees (1971) considered
log-normal ability distribution in the numerical calculations, and the subse-
quent analysis have for most part followed this approach. The log-normal
distribution ﬁts well in most parts of the empirical earnings distribution but
the ﬁt at the bottom and at the top of the earnings distribution is not so good.
The empirical top of the earnings distribution has heavier tail than the log-
normal distribution would indicate and at the bottom we see bunching.
Instead of ﬁxing the distribution beforehand, there are also methods de-
veloped for continuous cases to derive the underlying ability or skills dis-
tribution from the empirical income distribution. These sorts of calibration
exercises have been done by at least Saez (2001) and Kanbur and Tuomala
(1994). Saez (2001) backs out the ability distribution from the empirical earn-
ings distribution by assuming that the elasticity of labour supply is constant
and approximates the actual tax schedule with linear tax. An alternative ap-
proach was presented in Kanbur and Tuomala (1994), where non-linearities
of tax schedule is accepted together with utility functions which do not im-
ply constant labour elasticities. The skill distributions are chosen so that the
model produces the empirical distribution.
An example of an efﬁcient numerical computing environment for ﬁnding
the solution for optimization problems is Matlab. The ready made algorithms,
such as fmincon, solve multi-variable functions with constraints that may be
linear or non-linear and also inequality constraints can be included. The pro-
gram determines the binding inequality constraints so no a-priori assump-
tions need to be made. This is a convenient characteristic for the multidimen-
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sional optimal taxation applications since there is no theoretical guiding for
which of the constraints should be slack and which are binding. However,
researchers often also face technical difﬁculties in the numerical simulations,
for example that for some parameter values the problem is not solvable. For
this reason a set of sensitivity analysis needs to be conducted.
1.2 Top incomes
The third essay of this thesis focuses on the top incomes. While previously the
literature on economic inequality concentrated on documenting and explain-
ing the evolution of poverty, in the last decade inequality research has focused
more on top incomes. Top incomes have increased rapidly in most developed
countries which makes this ﬁeld one of the most dynamic research areas in
inequality literature. Studying top incomes in detail can also help interpret-
ing the evolution in the overall inequality. Top incomes affect the outcomes in
the other parts of the income distribution either through markets or through
political decision-making.
The shape of the income distribution has changed and the gap between the
very rich and the middle class is getting larger. The recent years, the studies
on top incomes have tried to ﬁnd explanations for the evolution of top in-
comes and broaden the literature also to include new perspectives, like the
issue of gender. In the following subsections I brieﬂy summarize the current
knowledge on top income shares, the research on the role of income mobility
and introduce the literature of gender and top incomes.
1.2.1 Top income shares: international perspective
Kuznets and Jenks (1953) constructed ﬁrst top income shares series. They
used the US income tax tabulations and computed the top decile income shares
series for the years 1913-1948. Based partly on these earlier ﬁndings, the fa-
mous Kuznets curve -hypothesis was articulated in Kuznets (1955). This hy-
pothesis states that income inequality follows an inverted U-shape along the
development: economic growth would ﬁrst raise the inequality and through
reallocation of workers to high-productivity sector, the inequality would even-
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tually decline. When top income shares are used as an inequality measure,
this hypothesis implies that in the beginning of economic development the
income concentrates at the top as they are driving the development with their
skills and productivity but in the long-term, as more people become educated
and more productive, the income shares at the top would decrease.
The theme of income distribution was mostly neglected by the economic
profession until the end of 1990s when it was brought "back in from the cold"
as suggested by Atkinson (1997). The international interest in top income lit-
erature was revived by Piketty and Saez (2003), who studied the evolution of
top incomes in the US since 1913. They showed that the share of total annual
income received by the top 1 percent had more than doubled from the 1970s
to 20 percent in 2011 indicating a reversal of the Kuznets hypothesis. This rise
has signiﬁcant effects on the overall income inequality as well (Atkinson et al.,
2011, pp. 10). After Piketty and Saez (2003) top income shares series have
been constructed systematically all over the world. Many of these studies are
collected in the volumes edited by Atkinson and Piketty (2007, 2010). Their
collection of data and studies aimed to provide a comparable, long-run and
high-quality data source on income distribution. The time-series constructed
for these volumes and for the subsequent database9 utilize similar methodol-
ogy cross-country making the data applicable for studying the explanations
behind the long-run inequality.
Development in the top income shares is in many aspects similar in the
Anglo-Saxon countries until the 1980s (Piketty, 2007; Alvaredo et al., 2013).
There was ﬁrst a secular decline in income inequality during the period of
1914-45. In the 1950s-60s inequality kept declining but at a slower pace in a
number of countries while in the post-1970s the divergent cross-country pat-
tern emerged. The US saw a rapid increase in the top income shares, the
UK and Germany a milder increase and in continental Europe the shares re-
mained fairly stable. Atkinson and Piketty (2010) included also Asian and
Nordic countries into the analysis. While in the Nordic countries the eco-
nomic inequality has been and still is very low, in the 1990s inequality growth
was faster than in other European countries. The explanation provided is that
while the wage income is relatively equally distributed, the capital income is
9World inequality database, https://wid.world
29
distributed more unequally (Jäntti et al., 2010; Roine and Waldenström, 2010;
Aaberge and Atkinson, 2010).
To gain a better understanding of the development of top incomes there
has also been a renewed interest in the decomposition of income inequality
into labour income and capital income components. Especially at the top,
interest income, rents and dividends form a signiﬁcant proportion of the total
personal income. The economic mechanisms behind these two components
can be different, though intersected, and thus it is important to observe them
separately in the attempt to ﬁnd explanations for rising top incomes. Labour
incomes are affected by the demand and supply of different kinds of skills as
well as labour market institutions and the bargaining power of the workers,
while the distribution of capital is more affected by credit constraints, capital
accumulation and wealth taxation. The declined trend of income inequality
in the period of 1914-45 was mostly driven by the fall of capital income. On
the other hand, the enormous increase in the US top income shares in the last
three decades has been more driven by increasing top executive wages while
in Europe the capital income has been a more important source of growing
top incomes. (Piketty, 2007, p.11).
Recently, with data matching business proﬁts with the business owners,
Fairﬁeld and Jorratt De Luis (2016), Wolfson et al. (2016) and Alstadsæter
et al. (2016) have shown that it is important to account for proﬁts inside a ﬁrm
when studying top income inequality. These accrued gains or business proﬁts
are often neglected due to data restrictions. As top income shares are often
calculated from the individual-speciﬁc tax registers, which exist for taxation
purposes and not originally for research purposes, the picture of top end in-
equality is underestimated. Personal tax registers report realized capital gains
which are very volatile for several reasons, one of which is changes in report-
ing behaviour due to tax reforms. When the retained earnings of ﬁrms can be
allocated to owners we gain a better understanding of the levels of top income
shares and changes in the personal top incomes10. However, the ownership
structures of different kinds of ﬁrms are complicated and there is a need for
improved data in order to fully allocate the accrued proﬁts to owners.
10For Norway allocating the corporate proﬁts to shareholders more than doubles the top
0.01% income share (Alstadsæter et al., 2016).
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Various explanations behind rising top incomes have been provided. For
example technological development have created polarized labour markets
where there is a low supply but high demand for high-productivity work-
ers, which increases the returns at the very top of the income distribution
(Autor, 2014). Alvaredo et al. (2013) however doubt that this cannot be the
sole explanation because high-income countries have similar technological
and productivity development but the patterns of top incomes vary. They
propose that institutional and policy differences play a role. They show that
there is a strong correlation between the reductions of top marginal income
tax rates and the increases in the top 1 percent share of total income11. Other
explanations for the rise in top incomes are the improved bargaining power
and rent-shifting possibilities of the top executive (Kleven et al., 2014; Bivens
and Mishel, 2013) for example due to globalization, increases in performance
pay (Lemieux et al., 2009), deregulation in the ﬁnancial sector (Philippon and
Reshef, 2012) and increases in the innovation intensity (Aghion et al., 2019).
Also, in line with "superstars" theory (Rosen, 1981)12, increasing inequality
in a few sectors can spill over to other sectors which then affects the overall
inequality at the top (Clemens et al., 2016).
Especially in Europe, the private wealth to national income ratios have
grown since the 1980s (Piketty and Zucman, 2014). The bequests, inheritances
and gifts inter vivos, have returned as a source of inequality. The inheritance
ﬂows are scarcely available in the datasets but indirectly some part of capi-
tal income represents bequests. The most recent contribution to top income
literature has been to study the association between capital and earnings dis-
tributions with copulas13 (Aaberge et al., 2018). The joint distribution is an
important future research avenue for two reasons. Firstly, it is important
11Marginal tax rate reductions can increase the top incomes by incentivizing the top man-
agers to bargain for higher wages and away from compensation in the form of company perks
(Piketty et al., 2014). Tax avoidance and evasion is another explanation for the negative correla-
tion between the top marginal tax rates and top income shares. The change in top incomes can
so partly stem from the tax avoidance behaviour instead of true changes in the concentration
of income (Slemrod, 1996).
12Superstar theory explains how small differences in skill result in large differences in in-
come.
13The rising top incomes can stem from rising earnings, rising capital or the increasing as-
sociation of the two marginal distribution. Copulas are functions that deﬁne the bivariate
distributions, here total income distribution, with the ranks of the marginal distributions of
capital and earnings income separately.
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to understand whether the working-rich will strengthen their position in the
top incomes through capital and wealth accumulation. This ampliﬁes the in-
equality process further. A second important research question is to ﬁnd out
whether bequests and high capital shares when young are associated with top
labour earnings in prime-age, and what are the role of family wealth, family
connections or intergenerational skills transfer in this process.
1.2.2 Income mobility at the top and lifetime income inequality
For a long time the information we had about inequality was based on an-
nual cross-section data. This data restriction made it impossible to account
for income mobility which is crucial in order to understand the patterns of
more permanent inequality. The expansion in the availability of longitudi-
nal datasets has increased the number of studies taking into account income
mobility. Nowadays in many cases we can follow the same individuals for
decades, and in some cases from the cradle to the grave.
Averaging individual income over several periods reduces some volatility
of incomes and so reveals a more permanent inequality within a society. This
measure is indicative of long-term inequality but is limited to describing it
at the aggregate level. Income mobility measures reveal whether individuals
move downwards or upwards in the income ranks over time.
Mobility can be studied within a person’s lifetime (intragenerational mobil-
ity) or between generations (intergenerational mobility). Shorrocks (1978, pp.
378) deﬁnes intragenerational income mobility as "the extent to which the in-
come distribution is equalised as the accounting period is extended”. The cho-
sen time period matters in measuring income mobility. Short-term intragen-
erational mobility is captured when this year’s income position is compared
to the next year’s income position while a longer term mobility measure can
include the whole lifetime or some other timespan. Intergenerational mobility
looks at how a parent’s and their children’s income positions are associated.
The multiple ways of measuring income mobility is summarized in Jäntti and
Jenkins (2015).
Income mobility is preferred14 as it signiﬁes a more dynamic economy with
14Mobility is not socially desirable if it only represents transitory shocks in income, that is
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social mobility and meritocracy compared to the case of no mobility15. Annual
income inequality is less of a concern if there are mechanisms which make it
possible for a low-income family member to move up in the income ladder.
That is, income mobility is preferred for its instrumental reasons while on its
own it is not important (Jäntti and Jenkins, 2015).
One mobility measure is to see how persistently individuals stay in a cer-
tain income group over time. Individuals at the top of the income distribution
have more transitory income ranks compared to the middle of the distribu-
tion. For example, reaching the top 0.1% requires extremely high incomes
which are transitory in nature stemming from the selling of a ﬁrm or win-
ning the lottery. Only a few individuals can maintain extremely high earning
capacities year after year. Rather than pointing out the level of persistence,
focus should be put on the evolution of persistence as this reveals the trend in
permanent inequality and mobility. For example Kopczuk et al. (2010) report
that the probability to stay in the top 1 percent in U.S has changed little over
the past decades.
The interpretation of top income mobility with general mobility measures
is somewhat more limited because by deﬁnition from the top groups one can
move only towards the lower income ranks. Also the group sizes vary if a re-
searcher focuses solely on the top and looks at mobility within the top decile,
top 1% and so forth. In these cases it is better to divide the top into equal
group sizes or use other more general measures, for example the income mo-
bility curve (Aaberge et al., 2013). Aaberge et al. (2013) apply the income
mobility curve for the top incomes and take into account the extent of income
changes together with changing income ranks. The former point is especially
important in cross-country comparisons because in a country with more equal
income distribution, a small income increase can change the income rank sub-
stantially and thus show high mobility.
The tax reforms that induce changes in income reporting affect mobility
measures. Just like with calculating the top income shares, the preferred in-
income uncertainty, which has a welfare decreasing effect (Shorrocks, 1978).
15Immobile society would be a consequence of an economy where incomes perfectly repre-
sent ability year after year and transmission of skills between generations were perfect. How-
ever, it is more plausible that for example institutions and public policies matter because there
are large differences in mobility between similar countries. For a comparison of the US and
Canada see Corak (2013).
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come concept include all income sources in order to get a full picture of the
persistence of the top income receivers. A study by Alstadsæter et al. (2016)
note that linking business proﬁts or retained earnings to the owners stabilized
the movement out of the top income groups. This indicates that part of the
mobility observed in the personal tax base can be caused by the responses to
changes in the legislative environment.
The intergenerational mobility of top incomes is a less studied topic be-
cause the datasets linking generations and covering the top are limited. How-
ever, this is possible for few countries. For Canada and the US, Corak and
Heisz (1999) and Corak (2013) illustrate that there are non-linearities in the
intergenerational mobility. Sons whose fathers are in the top decile are more
likely to be top income receivers in adulthood, more so for the US, and this
correlation is stronger at the very top. The strong link from a parent’s earn-
ings rank to a son’s earnings rank can be due to skill transmission through ge-
netic factors, or indicating better education, employment opportunities and
networks for the children of the wealthy parents. Corak and Piraino (2011)
document that for Canada 7 out of 10 sons shared the same employer as their
father who was in the top 1% of the earnings distribution. This raises a ques-
tion whether the sons have an advantage because of acquired ﬁrm-speciﬁc
skills from their father or whether nepotism is taking place.
Non-linearities of income mobility are also shown for Nordic countries in
Bratsberg et al. (2007) and Suoniemi (2017). With Swedish data Björklund et al.
(2012) can focus especially on the intergenerational mobility of the top 0,01%.
While the Swedish intergenerational mobility is high in general, the mobility
at the very top is weaker. The correlation between the father’s and son’s total
income rank is especially strong for the top income distribution, nevertheless
the mobility gets weaker at the top of the labour earnings distribution as well.
The authors also study the mechanism behind the income transmission and
it seems that wealth is a likely explanation instead of skills measured as IQ,
education or non-cognitive skills.
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1.2.3 Gender and the top income distribution
Wage inequality is a traditional gender economics question. We know that on
average the raw wage gap has reduced over time and controlling for differ-
ences in schooling, work experience, industry, occupation, union status and
hours worked reduces it further. However, there is still a large unexplained
part in the total wage gap, which has remained fairly stable. For the top of the
earnings distribution, it has been observed that pay gap has declined much
more slowly than for the average worker and the unexplained part is largest
at the top of the wage distribution. (Blau and Kahn, 2017).
The latest addition in the studies of high-skilled women and men has been
to expand the view from earnings to total incomes. Total incomes include,
alongside wage income, self-employment income, capital income and trans-
fer income. In recent years there have been attempts to characterize the top
income distribution also from a gender perspective. It has been observed that
under-representation of women at the top is quite a common phenomenon
on across developed countries and there are clear gender differences in the
income composition and income mobility. (Roine et al., 2017; Atkinson et al.,
2018; Ravaska, 2018)
As the largest fraction of individual total income comes from wages, the
under-representation of women in the total income distribution can be partly
derived back to the wage gaps. Despite the advancements in labour mar-
ket progress over the last decades, women are under-represented in high-
earnings and high-status occupations. A recent study suggests that much of
the overall gender pay gap can be explained by the missing women at the
very top of the earnings distribution (Fortin et al., 2017). Despite the persis-
tent under-representation in both the top income and top earnings distribu-
tion, the women’s share has improved over time (Guvenen et al., 2014; Roine
et al., 2017; Ravaska, 2018; Atkinson et al., 2018).
Many different explanations exist for the gender wage gap and for why
women are not well represented in the upper part of the earned income lad-
der. The literature related to this is well summarized in Blau and Kahn (2017).
Concerning the top incomes, the under-representation of women might oc-
cur because the women are newcomers in the high productivity jobs. It takes
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time to move to the company’s boards and manager positions and accumu-
late enough savings from earnings to accrue high capital incomes. This ex-
planation is called a pipeline argument in the gender wage gap literature.
Another explanation is that there is an invisible barrier, the so called glass
ceiling, which could occur because discrimination or other more subtle barri-
ers which either make women less productive or less eager to get to the top
positions. For example, combining family and household work with market
work might push women to pursue less ambitious careers16. According to
the evidence from the US this is true for an average high-skill woman since
availability of substitutes for household production increased the number of
women entering occupations with high returns for long working hours. At
the top decile, however, the availability of substitutes for household work did
not affect women’s career progress. (Cortés and Pan, 2019). This indicates
that there are other factors beside working hours affecting women’s move to
the top. One such factor could be differences in preferences concerning career
paths and success but the empirical evidence is still lacking.
Public policies have aimed to improve the career possibilities of women
through three instruments. Firstly there are "the equal pay for equal work"
initiatives to abolish gender based discrimination as well as codes to promote
gender equality. The second important instrument concerns family policies in
the form of child-care services. The third instrument, more directly applicable
to the top of the skill distribution, is gender quotas or voluntary codes pro-
moting higher female representation in the boards of companies. While the
two ﬁrst instruments have improved the overall representation of women in
the labour markets, the effect for the highest skill-level is unclear. The effect
of gender quotas or codes is still ambiguous, however the evidence from Nor-
way is discouraging: the binding gender quotas have not affected the overall
gender pay gap or the representation of females in other parts of the income
distribution than at the very top (Bertrand et al., 2019).
Beside the earnings differences between genders, the differences in invest-
16A related observation is that there is a high and increasing (over time) return to working
long hours or particular hours of the day. Due to household work and childcare, women are
more likely to be in a disadvantaged position in occupations where long working hours are
required for high returns. Industries which have incorporated more workplace ﬂexibility have
also witnessed a shrinking gender wage gap. (Goldin, 2014).
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ment decisions and opportunities show up as varying capital income. Atkin-
son et al. (2018) observe that in Norway the association between being at the
top of the capital income distribution and top of the earnings income distribu-
tion is much stronger for men. This observation can stem from the mechanism
that women at the top of the income distribution tend to inherit the wealth
which generate top incomes (Edlund and Kopczuk, 2009). However, the gen-
der differences in investment and capital income are still under-studied and
not much can be said. This would be a fruitful future research avenue.
1.3 Effects of work hours on well-being
A principle in economic modelling is that an individual’s well-being increases
with consumption of goods and leisure and decreases with hours spent at
work. In health economics the workhorse model by Grossman (1972) on
health demand starts by assuming a trade-off between investing time in one’s
health and allocating it elsewhere. These two modelling frameworks suggest
that work hours and ill-health are positively associated. However, the empir-
ical applications on this relationship are scarce. The fourth essay in this thesis
evaluates this relationship in the context of the elderly workforce.
Analysing the health or well-being effects of work are difﬁcult because of
the asymmetry of information. Individuals have heterogeneous preferences
towards work and choose occupation and work hours accordingly. Hours
spent at work affect health differently in different occupations. Also there
is reverse causality: health affects the work hours decision. To estimate the
causal relationship, either an experiment or a quasi-experiment is required. In
the next subsections I will discuss the literature on the theoretical modelling
of health and estimating the causal effects in this context.
1.3.1 Health stock model
The human capital model assumes that the investments in knowledge raise
productivity and this leads to increases in the monetary returns in the labour
markets. For this reason, an individual has an incentive to allocate time and
resources into education, either in the form of formal schooling or in on-the-
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job training. If the expected returns are higher than the direct costs and the
opportunity cost of time spent studying, the individual invests in acquiring
education. The optimal quantity of investment varies in different phases of
life and between individuals of the same age but with varying abilities. A
similar kind of modelling can be extended to health.
We can think of "good health" as a commodity which is demanded. Each
individual has an initial stock of health when they are born. The health stock
produces healthy time which increases well-being. However, this health stock
is depreciating with age but an individual can make investments which in-
crease the stock. Investments are not costless and their (shadow) price is as-
sumed to be increasing with age. This leads to different amounts of health
(and medical care thereof) demanded at different points of the life-cycle. The
shadow price for health is affected by many factors, like the price of medical
care and the cost of exercise. (Grossman, 1972).
In this modelling framework initiated by Grossman (1972) health is de-
manded because it is on one hand a direct source of utility but also an in-
vestment commodity which makes more healthy time available for market
and non-market activities. Unlike in the human capital investments, the in-
creases in the stock of health does not only affect the productivity and the
wage rates but health also affects the time constraint one can spend in market
or household production. This is an important difference between the health
stock model and the human capital formation. As an example, an individual
working as an economist is usually considered a high-productive worker who
has invested a lot in the human capital formation. However, the initial health
stock and the depreciation rate of this stock affect how well those returns can
be collected in the form of wages. The economist’s number of projects con-
ducted are dependent on this health constraint.
The work itself can also affect the stock of health and the depreciation rate.
While this latter point is more discussed for example in the ﬁeld of sociol-
ogy, economists have just recently started to explore the effects of work on
health (see chapter 5 and references therein). In the Grossman model the to-
tal amount of time in any period is divided between time at work (market
production), time at leisure, time producing health and time lost from mar-
ket and non-market activities due to sickness. If the time producing health
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increases, for example because work hours are reduced, keeping other inputs
like income ﬁxed, the model predicts improving health. However, one can
also argue that reduced working hours can increase leisure activities which
deteriorate health. To my knowledge, this type of mechanism has not been
incorporated in the Grossman model. Finally, this is an empirical question.
1.3.2 Causal inference between work hours and health
It is particularly challenging to identify causal effects between work charac-
teristics and health. Work characteristics are endogenous to the underlying
health stock. In the example of work hours’ effect on health, there is reverse
causality when health affects the decision of working hours. Experiments or
quasi-experiments are required in order to reveal the causal effects between
work and health.
The methods for policy evaluation are reviewed in Abadie and Cattaneo
(2018). In the ex-post programme evaluation the goal is to ﬁnd exogenous
variation. If a randomized experiment is run, exogenous variation comes di-
rectly from the setting and treatment effect comes from the comparison of
the treatment and control groups. Unfortunately, running randomized ex-
periments is seldom available and sources of exogenous variation need to be
looked at from the social environment.
One popular method in programme evaluation is using a difference-in-
differences approach. To use this method we need to ﬁnd a treatment group,
whose work hours changed exogenously, and a control group, who do not
experience any shock in their working hours. For example such a setting took
place in France in the 1990s when statutory weekly work hours were reduced
by employer characteristics (Bietenbeck and Berniell, 2017).
An important question in the difference-in-differences setting is to what
extent the control group is credible17. Naturally, we want to compare in-
dividuals who are as similar as possible to the treatment group. Otherwise
we do not have a counterfactual with which to compare the outcomes of the
treatment group. Beside difference-in-differences approach, policy evaluation
17A necessary condition for difference-in-differences method to work is the parallel trends
assumption before the treatment. However, this is not a sufﬁcient condition.
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have used for example regression discontinuity design and instrumental vari-
ables successfully.
Instrumental variables (IV) have been widely used both in randomized
and quasi-experiment evaluation when there is imperfect compliance. The
idea behind instrumental variables is to use the variation in the explanatory
variable that is caused by the instrument. That is, in the ﬁrst-stage the ex-
planatory variable is regressed against the instrument. If the instrument is
associated with the explanatory variable and does not affect the outcome vari-
able of interest directly (exclusion restriction assumption), in the second stage
one utilizes the ﬁrst-stage’s predicted values of the explanatory variable with
the controls to get a causal estimate for the explanatory variable.
The commonly used instruments in studies exploring the effect of retire-
ment or reduced working hours include the statutory work-week regulation
(Cygan-Rehm and Wunder, 2018; Ahn, 2016) or statutory retirement ages
(Kantarci, 2016). Recently, in the health economics literature, the instrumen-
tal variables have been accompanied with ﬁxed effects if panel data is avail-
able (Cygan-Rehm and Wunder, 2018; Ahn, 2016). Fixed-effects instrumen-
tal variable estimation has the advantage that it removes the time-invariant
unobserved variables while taking into consideration the endogeneity of the
explanatory variable.
The aim of the programme evaluation is to give some recommendations
to the policy makers. The object of interest in experiments is often the aver-
age treatment effect (ATE). ATE represents how the average outcomes differ
in the whole population if we could move everybody from the inactive to
active treatment. A some-what more limited effect is the average treatment
effect for the treated (ATET). (Abadie and Cattaneo, 2018). In the difference-
in-differences setting the effects are average treatment effects for the treated
if all study units take-up the treatment. This means that with the example of
work hours reduction policies, all individuals need to actually reduce hours
worked. However, it is seldom that the effects can be interpreted this way.
Many treatments often have only partial compliance to the assignment and so
the effects are intention-to-treat (ITT) effects. For some policy evaluation this
is enough because the policy maker is interested in knowing whether provid-
ing an access to a certain policy is beneﬁcial.
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Especially with IV estimates, the effects often lack the external validity
and are instead interpreted as local average treatment effects (LATE) (Angrist
et al., 1996). LATEs mean the effect on the sub-population of compliers who
change their behaviour because of the instrument or the average effect for
those who would always be in compliance regardless of the treatment. So
these effects cannot be extrapolated to other parts of the population. The re-
searchers should carefully consider what sort of effects they are observing and
what kind of policy advice they can draw from those effects.
1.4 Summaries of the essays
1.4.1 ESSAY 1: On the optimal lifetime redistribution and social
objectives: a multidimensional approach
In the ﬁrst essay, which is a joint work with Sanna Tenhunen and Matti Tuo-
mala, we study the optimal redistribution over the life-cycle in an economy
where individuals differ with respect to their abilities and their discount rates.
Both sources of heterogeneity are unobservable to the government. The het-
erogeneity in discount rates means that individuals value the future consump-
tion differently. Some individuals are more patient and save for the retirement
period while others prefer consuming relatively more at a younger age. The
heterogeneity in time preferences towards consumption adds a second dimen-
sion to the classical optimal tax problem where individuals only differ with
respect to abilities. We study the optimal structure of taxation and focus espe-
cially on whether capital income should be taxed or not.
For the social objectives we incorporate a novel type of social welfare func-
tion which applies a compromise between the principles of compensation and
responsibility much discussed in the equality of opportunity literature. We
call this social objective as the Roemer social welfare function. In a two-period
model where individuals work in the ﬁrst period and are retired in the second
period, we show that two-dimensional heterogeneity between agents results
in optimality of non-zero capital income tax. The analytical results show that
the "no distortion at the top" -result with respect to the ability does not hold
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under the preference heterogeneity. Numerical simulations reveal that the
levels of marginal tax rate can change dramatically between different social
objectives. From the numerical simulations we also observe that the correla-
tion between preference towards the timing of consumption and ability plays
a crucial role.
1.4.2 ESSAY 2: On optimal income taxation when inherited wealth
differs
In the second essay, which is a joint work with Matti Tuomala, we study the
optimal taxation of capital and labour income when individuals differ in their
productivities and initial wealth. Both sources of heterogeneity are unobserv-
able to the government. The initial wealth is exogenous, and in the ﬁrst pe-
riod individuals need to decide how much of the wealth is consumed and
how much saved. In the second period individuals supply labour effort and
consume the returns of savings and income from work. In the ﬁrst case the
government observes the savings from the ﬁrst period to the second and the
labour income and aims to build an efﬁcient tax-and-transfer system which
induces individuals to reveal their true type. In this setting we study whether
non-linear capital (savings) tax belongs to the optimal tax mix. We also ex-
tend the model to include income shifting. In this extension the government
does not perfectly observe the labour income or savings but relies on income
reporting from the individuals. This induces some individuals to shift income
from labour to capital income tax base. Taking this into account, we study the
optimal tax mix.
We analytically solve two- and three-type models and numerically solve a
four-type model. Our analytical ﬁndings, assuming the direction of binding
self-selection constraint, suggest that if there are wealth differences and pro-
ductivity differences between individuals, the optimal tax system includes a
non-linear capital income tax. The income shifting also supports including a
non-linear capital income tax. In the numerical solutions to the 4-type econ-
omy we do not assume a priori the binding self-selection constraints. In all
of the numerical simulation undertaken there is a role for capital income tax.
Numerically we also study the effect of different redistributive preferences,
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the role of wealth inequality and the correlation between ability and wealth.
1.4.3 ESSAY 3: Top incomes and income dynamics from a gender
perspective: Evidence from Finland 1995-2012
In the third essay I study Finnish top incomes. I will ﬁrst update the earlier
analyses of the overall top income shares until the year 2012 using individual
income concepts. My main contribution is to study the top incomes from a
gender point of view. I use a unique dataset without top-coding and a repre-
sentative sample of 10 % of the Finnish population. The data cover the years
1995-2012 and I am especially interested in the development measured over
time in female representation, mobility and income composition.
I ﬁnd that women are noticeable under-represented at the top of the income
distribution. In the top 10% of the income distribution, excluding realized
capital gains, only one in four is a woman and the share has increased only
after the ﬁnancial crisis. Nonetheless, the share of women in the top 1% has
improved within the observed 18 years. Also the income composition reveals
that at the end part of the observation period women have accrued higher
returns from the labour markets as their wage share has increased. The per-
sistence to stay in the top groups is slightly lower for women than for men.
I also study the gender-speciﬁc income distributions. The gender-speciﬁc
income shares reveal that incomes are less dispersed among women. Fitting
Pareto-tails to the top of the gender-speciﬁc distributions shows that while
men’s income distribution can be assumed Paretian for the whole observation
period, this is not the case for the early observation years for women. For
women, the assumption of Pareto tail gets more support after the year 2000.
The female top income receivers have caught up with top earning men over
time.
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1.4.4 ESSAY 4: The effects of working hours reduction on health and
labour market exits: Evidence from the Finnish part-time pension
program
In the fourth essay I study the effects of working hours reduction on the health
outcomes and the labour market exits in the elderly workforce. I focus on the
subgroup of individuals who have taken part-time pension during years 1998-
2005. The part-time pension program provides an interesting research design
because it certainly reduced the hours worked, which is not the case in many
voluntary partial retirement schemes. Also the Finnish part-time retirement
usually meant that individuals continued in their career jobs so we can conﬁ-
dently infer that the results are not driven by the changes of work place and
work community. This is a clear advantage since many countries, for exam-
ple the US, have different types of jobs offered for the elderly workforce who
are searching to reduce their work burden. Also the Finnish part-time pension
scheme was very generous, which meant that the disposable income was only
slightly affected and so the effects are not driven by income.
I study the question from two points of view. Firstly I study a reform in
year 1998 which lowered the eligibility age for part-time retirement. Using
a difference-in-differences approach, where I have a treatment group whose
eligibility age was 56 and a control group who were eligible at the age of 58,
I study the reform effects on purchase of drugs and sickness absence days.
These results reveal on average what kind of intention-to-treat effects this re-
form had in the eligible population. The ﬁndings suggest that on average
the reform increased the drug purchases but might have had a decreasing
effect on the sickness absences, however these results are rather imprecise.
The second approach looks at the effects of taking part-time pension in a sub-
group of part-time pensioneers. Here I utilize the eligibility ages as instru-
ments and study, with ﬁxed effects instrumental variables estimation, how
being on part-time pension affects the health-outcomes and labour market
exits. These effects suggest that reducing work hours decreases the drug pur-
chases and early labour market exit risk within the subgroup of compliers,
who compared to non-compliers have worse health outcomes before the part-
time pension spell. The essay also discusses the robustness of the results and
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the heterogeneity of the effects.
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Abstract
We characterise1 optimal redistribution policy when there are differences not only in
individuals’ productivities but also in their tastes towards the timing of consumption,
i.e. some are patient and others impatient in consumption over the life-cycle and this
preference together with productivity is non-observable to government. We consider
different social objectives and incorporate a novel approach taken in the spirit of Roe-
mer (1998) and Van de gaer (1993). This approach applies a compromise between
the principle of compensation and the principle of responsibility. We derive analytical
expressions which describe the optimal distortion (upward or downward) in saving.
As the multidimensional problems become very complicated, to gain a better un-
derstanding, we also numerically examine the properties of an optimal lifetime re-
distribution policy. We ﬁnd support for a non-linear tax/pension program in which
1Funding from the Strategic Research Council of Academy of Finland, No. 293120 (STN-
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impatient types are taxed at the margin and patient low ability types are subsidized
in their retirement consumption. Numerical simulations show quite big differences
in terms of the levels of marginal tax rates between different social objectives, indicat-
ing that the optimal income taxation results are sensitive for the choice of the social
planner’s goals.
Keywords: Optimal taxation, Lifetime redistribution, Heterogeneous time pref-
erences
JEL classiﬁcation: H21, H55, D71
2.1 Introduction
The assumption that differences in lifetime earnings can be completely ex-
plained by time preferences, is obviously an unrealistic one, just as it would
be a simpliﬁcation of reality to explain them as a result of differences in abil-
ity. A more realistic model should take both into account. There are well-
known technical difﬁculties related to incentive constraints to study multi-
dimensional optimal tax problems including both of the elements. Another
problem is how to incorporate heterogeneous preferences into a social welfare
function (SWF) in analysing optimal tax policy. Social welfare functions can be
quite straightforwardly parameterized when individuals have identical pref-
erences represented by a utility function. In the case of a one-dimensional
population, there are two possible ways to observe differences in economic
outcomes. Namely, if people have identical preferences but they differ in abil-
ities, we are back in the Mirrlees (1971) model. In the opposite case, the diver-
sity of preferences is the sole source of inequality.
In the case of diversity in preferences some people would, however, say
that if individuals have the same opportunities while their choices may dif-
fer, there is no ethical basis for redistributive taxation. According to this view
individuals should be compensated for circumstances which they have no
control of, such as their family background or disability at birth. On the other
hand, individuals should be held responsible for circumstances which they
can control, such as how many hours or weeks they work. Hence, no redis-
tribution should take place based on such choices. The former is referred to
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as the principle of compensation and the latter the principle of responsibility (see
Fleurbaey (1994); Roemer (1998)). By the principle of compensation, it is fair
to redistribute from high ability to low ability individuals. By the principle
of responsibility, it is unfair to redistribute from the consumption lovers to-
ward the leisure lovers. In the one dimensional population, those principles
are easy to apply. For example, if individuals differ only according to their
earnings ability (wage rate) and not in their preferences, then the principle
of compensation reduces to a maximin criterion whereby the tax and transfer
system should provide as much compensation as possible to the worst off peo-
ple. If individuals differ solely in preferences, the principle of responsibility
calls for no redistribution at all because everybody has the same opportuni-
ties. It would be unfair to redistribute based on tastes. The standard welfarist
approach can obtain this result only in the case where social marginal utilities
of net income are the same across individuals (absent transfers).
In a multidimensional world the problem of choosing different utility func-
tions for representing non-identical preferences is more complex. If individu-
als have different preferences, it isn’t clear in which way to weight their util-
ities in a social welfare function. It can be argued that the fundamental dis-
tinction is not so much between earning abilities and preferences but between
those factors which are beyond the control of individuals, and those which
are purely a matter of individual choice. That means redistribution policies
should aim to eliminate disparities in matters beyond individual control, but
should be neutral about those matters which are within their control. How
to apply these two principles? There is a fundamental conﬂict between these
principles. Namely, even in a world of perfect information with lump sum
redistribution tools the government cannot generally satisfy these two princi-
ples at the same time.
This paper studies the optimal lifetime redistribution policy within a co-
hort with heterogeneity in earnings ability and preferences. The heterogeneity
in preferences arises because tastes towards the timing of life-cycle consump-
tion differ between individuals; some individuals are more present-oriented
in consumption and so save less for the retirement period. These prefer-
ences are parametrized with different discount rates2 meaning that the more
2One interpretation for the differences in discount factors beside consumption preferences
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present-oriented consumer has a higher discount rate and thus a lower dis-
count factor in his/her utility function. The differences in preferences differ
from the myopic consumers because myopic consumers ex-post prefer sav-
ing more in the earlier periods and this justiﬁes government interventions.
However, in our paper there is true variation in tastes towards timing of con-
sumption.
Adding preference heterogeneity raises the difﬁculty of how to choose the
appropriate social welfare function. One way is to assume a paternalistic gov-
ernment as with myopic consumers (Cremer et al. (2009); Tuomala and Ten-
hunen (2013)). With genuine differences in preferences, there are some recent
contributions that incorporate heterogeneous time preferences into optimal
tax analysis while remaining agnostic about the appropriate cardinalization
(Cremer et al., 2009; Tenhunen and Tuomala, 2010; Tuomala and Tenhunen,
2013). There is also a growing body of literature which studies the multi-
dimensional optimal tax problem by avoiding the technical complications by
assuming multidimensionalities can be represented with one-dimensional ag-
gregation of the multidimensional characters (e.g Chone and Laroque (2010);
Lockwood and Weinzierl (2015) for labour income taxation). The papers clos-
est to ours are by Golosov et al. (2013) and Diamond and Spinnewijn (2011).
The ﬁrst one studies savings taxation and preference heterogeneity under
the assumption that there is perfect correlation between the two dimensions,
which effectively makes the problem one-dimensional. Diamond and Spin-
newijn (2011) consider a model with jobs and differences in savings prefer-
ences. They simplify the analysis by studying linear capital tax. In this paper
we consider two-dimensional heterogeneity including non-linear tax instru-
ments in a discrete type setting and the analysis is completed with numerical
simulations.
In the spirit of Roemer (1998) and Van de gaer (1993)3our approach applies
a compromise between the principle of compensation and the principle of
responsibility. For individuals with the same discount rates but different wage
could be that there are individuals who expect to live shorter lives and therefore emphasize
the ﬁrst period consumption. Fleurbaey et al. (2014) study these kind of longevity differences
and redistribution.
3Bossert (1995) and Fleurbaey (1994) have studied the idea of compensating inequalities
due to circumstances only, while leaving other inequalities untouched.
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rates, the maximin criterion is applied. Thus we have a social ordering over
each discount rate group. Then we aggregate over discount groups so that the
minimum utility levels for different discount groups are averaged. The least
well off of each preference groups are added together. In other words, a zero
aversion of inequality can be applied along the dimension of responsibility (in
our case time preference) whereas a high aversion to inequality is acceptable
along the dimension of circumstances (in our case skill)4.
Our model consists of two periods, where individuals work only during
the ﬁrst period and decide how much to save for the second period. Our fo-
cus is on the distortions in savings decisions. The paper continues the research
done by Tenhunen and Tuomala (2010) and Tuomala and Tenhunen (2013)5 by
introducing the Roemer social welfare function (RSWF) which, to our knowl-
edge, has not been studied previously. This representation of the social goals
takes into account the principles of compensation and responsibility as noted
above. Since the aim is to model an economy with multidimensional hetero-
geneity, the analytical results no longer reveal the signs of the distortions. For
this reason numerical methods are used. Our results can also be interpreted
in absence of private savings. In this case the second period consumption is
publicly provided pension and thus we can extend our analysis into studying
the optimal retirement plans in our model economy.
The contribution of this paper is to study optimal lifetime redistribution
problem under heterogeneous preferences and introduce the RSWF as social
goals. The main ﬁnding is that in the full 4-type model the saving decisions of
the patient low-ability type and the impatient high-ability type are distorted
at the margin. The numerical simulations show that the size of the distor-
tions depend upon the correlation between ability and preferences. The im-
patient high-ability type has a positive marginal tax on savings. The patient
low-ability type has a negative marginal tax (subsidy) when the correlation
4Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) advocate a social welfare function based on fairness prin-
ciples that puts a greater weight to "working poors" if preferences differ towards leisure. In
an intertemporal model like ours this could mean that the more patient poor should have a
greater weight. However, as discussed, we are more agnostic about this normative dimension
and instead use the Roemer social welfare function as described in the next paragraph.
5Tenhunen and Tuomala (2010) studied optimal life-time redistribution in 4-types setting
where government’s objective is either utilitarian or paternalistic and consumer preferences are
approximated with Cobb-Douglas utility function. Tuomala and Tenhunen (2013) studied how
habit formation affects the optimal tax and pension scheme under heterogeneous preferences.
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between ability and preferences is below 0.5. For greater correlations the im-
patient low-ability type faces a positive marginal tax while the patient low-
ability type has a zero marginal tax. Our results also show that governments
with more redistributive goals need to make sure that the patient high-ability
individuals do not mimic the low-ability type while for governments with
utilitarian social objectives this incentive-compatibility constraint is not bind-
ing.
The structure of the paper is the following. In the ﬁrst section we present
the benchmark model where the time preference and ability are perfectly cor-
related. Then in section 2.3 we extend the model to include three types, ﬁrst
by pooling the low-ability types into one time preference group and in an-
other case by pooling the high-ability types into one time preference group.
In section 2.4 we include all the four types in the model. Analytically the di-
rection of distortions cannot be determined so in the end of each section we
show with numerical simulations what kind of distortions occur for each type.
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 A benchmark model
2.2.1 Two types with a positive correlation between skill and discount
factor
Unlike in the original Mirrlees model, we assume that individuals differ not
only in productivity but also in time preference6. As a benchmark we use a
simple two-type model, similar to the much used two-type model ﬁrst intro-
duced by Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982). Each individual has a skill level
reﬂecting his/her wage rate, denoted by n, and differences in time prefer-
ences are represented by a discount factor, denoted δ. We denote low skill
and low discount factor by the superscript L and high skill and high discount
factor by the superscript H. The assumption of positive correlation implies
that δL < δH. The proportion of individuals of type i in the population is Ni,
6Sandmo (1993) considers a case where people differ in preferences, but are endowed with
the same resources. Tarkiainen and Tuomala (1999, 2007) also consider a continuum of taxpay-
ers simultaneously distributed by skill and preferences for leisure and income.
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with ∑Ni = 1.
As is well known, due to the results of Atkinson & Stiglitz (1976), under
a mild separability assumption income taxation does not need be supple-
mented by other taxes. Saez (2002) argues that the Atkinson-Stiglitz result
of commodity taxes holds only when each individual has identical discount
rates. He argues that individuals with higher earnings save relatively more
which suggests that high-skilled individuals are more likely to have higher
discount factors and thus there is a role for taxing savings beside labour taxa-
tion. In this case, the discount factor is positively correlated with productivity
level. Diamond and Spinnewijn (2011) study heterogeneous discount factors
and capital taxation and show that perfect correlation between ability and dis-
count factor isn’t necessary required in order to derive the result of positive
capital taxation for the high-skilled type. However, this result is more robust
if there is positive correlation between skill and discount preference. We also
assume in our benchmark model that the high-ability individuals have higher
discount factors.
Thus, we take as a starting point a separable utility with positive correla-
tion between discount factor and productivity.7 This assumption is relaxed in
the subsequent sections.
The life-time utility of an individual of type i is additive in the following
way:
Ui = u(ci) + δiv(xi) + ψ(1− yi), (2.1)
where c and x denote consumption when young and old respectively and y
is labour supply when young8. Utility function is increasing in c and x and
decreasing in y and it is strictly concave, i.e. u′, v′, ψ′ > 0, u′′, v′′, ψ′′ < 0. We
also assume that all goods are normal. Without government intervention, in-
7Alternatively the same outcome could be reached by assuming homothetic preferences
and linear Engel curves.
8Another speciﬁcation for utility function could be Ui = u(ci)/δi + v(xi) + ψ(1− yi) which
would imply that the ones with higher savings rate are less willing to increase work for addi-
tional money. We justify our choice for the utility representation as we are considering lifetime
redistribution where the timing of the retirement consumption is a far-off event instead of a
nearby event, and in this kind of setting the representation in the text is standard. We also
want to compare our results to earlier studies, which are done with this speciﬁcation. It is
obvious that a different choice of utility representation will engender a different optimal solu-
tion and affect our results. Effectively the problem is reversed and different IC constraints are
binding than in the current setting. See also discussion in Diamond and Spinnewijn (2011).
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dividuals choose their consumption level for both periods and labour supply
by maximizing the utility function (1) subject to their budget constraint.
To introduce returns to capital and the possible taxation thereof, it is neces-
sary to consider a two-period model. Individuals are free to divide their ﬁrst
period income between consumption, c, and savings, s. Each unit of savings
yields an additional 1+ θ units of consumption in the second period after-tax
income, x. As a further simpliﬁcation we assume that the return on savings,
θ, is ﬁxed, which may be justiﬁed by assuming that we consider a small open
economy facing a world capital market. Consumption in each period is given
by ci = niyi − T(niyi)− si and xi = (1+ θ)si, i = L, H.
The government wishes to design a lifetime tax system that may redis-
tribute income between individuals in the same cohort. There is asymmetric
information in the sense that the tax authority is informed neither about in-
dividual skill levels, labour supply nor discount rates. It can only observe
before-tax income, ny. In this setting, where tax on both earnings and savings
income are available, we examine whether or not savings ought to be taxed.
The separability assumption makes it possible to isolate the signiﬁcance of
variations in time preferences.
In the government’s problem the control variables are ci, xi and yi. If we
assume that there are no private savings, we have a model of labour income
taxation in the ﬁrst period and public provision of pension in the second pe-
riod. In a case with perfect correlation between skills and discount factors,
Roemer’s and Van de Gear’s approaches are equivalent with the maximin
social welfare function. Here the government maximizes the welfare of the
worst-off group:
UL = u(cL) + δLv(xL) + ψ(1− yL), (2.2)
subject to the revenue constraint
∑Ni(niyi − ci − rxi) = R, (2.3)
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where r = 11+θ and the self-selection (i.e. incentive-compatibility) constraint
9
u(cH) + δHv(xH) + ψ(1− yH) ≥ u(cL) + δHv(xL) + ψ(1− n
L
nH
yL). (2.4)
Multipliers λ and μ are attached to the budget constraint and the self-selection
constraint, respectively. The Lagrange function of the optimization problem
and the ﬁrst-order conditions are presented in the appendix A.
Our main interest is in the marginal taxation of savings10. For this purpose
the ﬁrst-order conditions are written in the form ( ucvx )
i = δ
i
r (1 − di), where
the left hand side is individual i’s marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption in the ﬁrst and in the second period and di is the distortion. A
positive (negative) di implies that type i should have an implicit tax (subsidy)
on savings. It is useful to deﬁne a relative difference in discount factors as
Δij ≡ δi−δj
δj
for any pair of discount factors. The ﬁrst-order conditions (pre-
sented in Appendix A equations A.2-A.7) imply that
dL = (ϕ1 − 1)ΔHL
dH = 0,
(2.5)
where ϕ1 = N
L
NL−μHL . The returns to savings of type i should not be taxed when
di is zero. As dH = 0, the optimal implicit marginal tax rate for the high-skill
type is zero. When we assume, empirically plausibly, that δH > δL, we have
dL > 0 implying implicit taxation of savings for the low-skilled type. This is
the same result as in utilitarian case by Diamond (2003).
As a result of the two-dimensional heterogeneity, a tax on capital income is
an effective way to relax an otherwise binding self-selection constraint. This is
9The direction of the binding self-selection constraint is assumed to be, following the tradi-
tion in the one-dimensional two-type model, from high-skilled individual towards low-skilled
individual. This pattern is also conﬁrmed in the numerical simulations.
10In the numerical solution we also consider the marginal labour income tax rates. As has
become conventional in the literature we may interpret the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween gross and net income as one minus the marginal income tax,
ψ
′
(
ny
n )
nuc = 1− T′(ny),
which would be equivalent to the characterization of the labour supply of an agent facing an
income tax function T′(ny). As in our model the heterogeneity shows up in the discount factor
of the second period instant utility, the analytical results do not differ for the optimal labour
income tax for the two distinct preference groups. The marginal labour income tax rates satisfy
the usual properties; T(nLyL) > 0 and T(nHyH) = 0.
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Table 2.1 Parameterization.
Fraction of individuals in each group Ni = 0.5 for i = L, H
Discount factor δL = 0.6, δH = 0.8, r = 0.95
Productivities (wages) nL = 2, nH = 3
because even under separability the mimicker and the individual mimicked
do not save the same amount. A high-skilled individual choosing to mimic
the low-skilled type values savings more than a low-skilled individual, since
discounting of the future is less for the patient high-ability mimicker. Thus,
taxing savings relaxes the self-selection constraint. Or put in another way: dis-
tortions generate second-order efﬁciency costs but ﬁrst-order redistributional
beneﬁts.
2.2.2 Numerical simulations
Adding multidimensionality to a constrained optimization problem causes
that the directions of the distortions cannot be determined from the analytical
results. To gain information on the properties of the optimal redistribution
policy we rely on numerical simulations11. These simulations reveal the bind-
ing incentive-compatibility constraints and so we can determine the alloca-
tions that make the agents reveal their true characteristics.
In the numerical examples we assume the following separable form of util-
ity function: Ui = − 1ci − δi 1xi − 11−yi (CES) and parameterize the model as
shown in table 2.1. No a priori assumptions of the binding self-selection con-
straints are made in the numerical simulations.
In the benchmark model, with perfect positive correlation between the skill
and time preferences, numerical simulation veriﬁes the assumption that the
only binding self-selection constraint is type H considering mimicking type
L12. Table 2.2 presents the optimal consumption, labour and utility levels, the
marginal tax rates for savings and labour and the replacement rate (x/ny).
The additional results are presented in appendix B tables B1 and B2.
11The numerical procedure is described in Tenhunen and Tuomala (2010) Appendix B.
12The slackness of the other self-selection constraints is also checked by calculating the dif-
ference in utilities when mimicking and when not.
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Table 2.2 Consumption in period 1 and 2 (c and x), labour supply (y), utility level (U), marginal tax rates
on labour income and savings (T′ and d), replacement rate (x/ny).
maximin c x y U T′ d x/ny
Type L 0.67 0.41 0.38 -4.58 29.43 41.71 53.07
Type H 0.75 0.69 0.57 -4.79 0 0 40.62
utilitarian
Type L 0.67 0.51 0.50 -4.67 6.30 6.72 51.20
Type H 0.79 0.72 0.54 -4.56 0 0 44.40
The results presented in table 2.2 show that in an optimal solution the re-
placement rate decreases in earnings, meaning that the optimal pension sys-
tem is progressive. There is a positive distortion i.e. marginal saving tax for
the low-productivity type13. Compared to the case where there are no differ-
ences in preferences (and all have a high discount factor) the replacement rate
in the current case is much lower for the low-productivity worker. This is be-
cause the level of the second period consumption is much smaller due to the
lower discount factor.
The heterogeneity in preferences impacts the optimal distortions signiﬁ-
cantly as without the difference in the discount factor the optimal distortion
is zero irrespective of the social welfare function. As the labour supply y could
also be interpreted as the length of career, it means that the different discount
factors lead to much shorter careers for the low-productivity worker com-
pared to the case with the same discount factor. The high-productivity type is
relatively less affected from introducing the differences in preferences to the
economy.
Compared to the utilitarian social welfare function (weighted sum of low
and high types’ utility functions) the numerical simulations show that the
levels of marginal tax rates differ signiﬁcantly between the two types of ob-
jective functions. The average net taxes (shown in Appendix B) also show
that there is a great difference between the maximin and utilitarian cases. In
the maximin case, the government aims to improve the wellbeing of the low-
productivity type by signiﬁcant subsidies and by distorting the labour supply
13In the case of perfect negative correlation, numerical simulations show that L’s distortion
is a marginal subsidy. See ﬁgure 2.1 in section 4 for results with varying correlation.
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Table 2.3 Types of individuals.
low-skilled, nL high-skilled, nH
low delta, δL Type 1 Type 3
high delta, δH Type 2 Type 4
and savings decision relatively more than in the utilitarian case. Also if we
interpret y as a length of career or retirement age, we notice that in the max-
imin case the length of career is much shorter for the low-productivity worker
(reduces by approximately 24 % from utilitarian case) but the labour supply
decision for high-productivity worker is much less affected by changing the
social preferences to maximin (labour supply increases by approximately 5%).
2.3 A three-type case
In this and the next sections we generalise the previous model by giving up
the assumption that productivity and time preferences are perfectly corre-
lated. In general, there are now four types of individuals who differ both
in productivity and time preferences numbered as in table 2.314.
2.3.1 Low-ability types have same time preference
To maintain the tractability, we ﬁrst simplify the model further by assuming
that there are actually only three types. First we explore the case where the
low-productivity types all have a low discount factor, δL, and are indexed as
type 1. It can be justiﬁable to think that the low-productivity types are pooled
together either because they have homogeneous preferences towards savings
or because their saving ability is constrained i.e. heavier time discounting is
forced. High-productivity types with a low discount factor are denoted as
type 3 and high-productivity workers with a high discount factor as type 4.
We also assume that utility is given by Eq. (2.1), so we have the the same
14In the case of one-dimensional heterogeneity types are ordered usually with respect to
their income, consumption or utilities but in a two-dimensional world the ordering is not self-
evidently clear.
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additively separable form as in the two-types case.
With more than two types there are several possibilities for mimicking.
Which of the self-selection constraints bind depends on the interaction be-
tween individual preferences and the distributional preferences of the gov-
ernment, which hinge on the time preferences and skill level. A priori no
binding constraints are forced but they are determined in the numerical sim-
ulation. To shorten the notation, the analytical results are shown only with
the binding constraints.
When the government has maximin goals, the government’s problem re-
duces to maximising the welfare of the low-ability type as
N1[u(c1) + δLv(x1) + ψ(1− y1)] (2.6)
subject to budget constraint and, without any assumptions of the mimicking
behaviour, there are six possible self-selection constraints given by
u(ci) + δiv(xi) + ψ(1 − yi) ≥ u(cj) + δiv(xj) + ψ(1 − njni yj) for i, j = 1, 3, 4
and i = j. As before, to solve the distortions for savings we rewrite the
ﬁrst-order conditions (presented in appendix A equations A.9-A.17) in form
uic
vix
= δ
i
r (1− di), i = 1, 3, 4, where the distortions are given by (exploiting the
binding incentive-compatibility constraints from numerical solution)
d1 = 0
d3 =
μ43
μ31 − μ43Δ
HL
d4 = 0,
(2.7)
where ΔHL = δ
H−δL
δL
> 0. Equation 7 implies that the saving decision of type
3, high-productivity impatient individual, is now distorted and thus the "no
distortion at the top" (with respect to skill) result holds no more. This results
from the fact that in a model with given binding self-selection constraints (4,3)
and (3,1) a distortion on savings decision helps to mitigate otherwise binding
self-selection constraints. Here the low-skilled type 1 is left undistorted. This
implies the following proposition:
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Proposition 1
When time preferences differ only among the high-ability type and there is only down-
ward binding incentive-compatibility constraints, the savings decision of type 1 and
type 4 are not distorted and hence not taxed at the margin. Type 3 faces a distortion
at the margin which can be positive or negative.
The sign of the distortion cannot be determined from the analytical results but
numerical solution provides the binding incentive-compatibility constraints
and their levels. The solution for numerical simulation15 is given in table 2.4
and additional results are presented in appendix B table B3. The effects of
changing the parameter values are shown in subsection 2.3.3.
Numerical solutions show that the analytically ambiguous sign of the dis-
tortion d3 is positive, implying a tax at the margin and the replacement rate
imply a progressive pension scheme. The distortion for the impatient high-
productivity worker is helping to relax the incentive for patient high-produc-
tivity worker to mimic the impatient one. In this 3-type model the impatient
high-productivity worker is relatively better off even though his/her replace-
ment rate is much lower than for the other types. This occurs as (s)he con-
sumes more during the ﬁrst period as (s)he prefers. Compared to the model
where all agents have identical preferences about the timing of the consump-
tion, including impatient workers in the model increases the labour supply of
low-productivity workers. The numerical solutions also reveal that the intu-
ition from one-dimensional world does not extend to two-dimensional case
since the type 3 has a higher utility than type 4 even though the constraint
(4,3) is binding.
In the utilitarian case (analytical results presented in appendix in the equa-
tions A.19-28 and additional numerical results in table B5) the main difference
from the maximin model is that the labour supply or the length of career are
closer between types. Intuitively in the model, where more weight is given
to the low-skilled type, this type is better off with the cost of high-skilled
type. More importantly the numerical simulations show that the differences
between the two cases in the levels of marginal tax rates are signiﬁcant. This
is also seen in the average net tax rates (shown in Appendix B tables B3 & B5).
15Due to solvability problem the results with CES utility functions are given with parametric
values N1 = 0.5, N3 = 0.254 and N4 = 0.246.
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Table 2.4 Consumption in period 1 and 2, labour supply, utility level, marginal tax rates on labour income
and savings, replacement rates; low-skilled grouped together.
maximin c x y U T′ d x/ny
Type 1 0.59 0.47 0.41 -4.67 37.07 0 57.44
Type 3 0.83 0.56 0.52 -4.35 0 27.38 36.05
Type 4 0.77 0.70 0.56 -4.71 0 0 41.92
utilitarian
Type 1 0.65 0.51 0.50 -4.73 8.88 0 51.00
Type 3 0.83 0.64 0.52 -4.22 0 7.73 41.26
Type 4 0.80 0.73 0.54 -4.53 0 0 44.97
2.3.2 High-ability types have same time preference
Alternatively, suppose the kind of 3-type model where the high-productivity
individuals have the same time preference. Now type 1 has individuals with
low discount factor and low productivity, type 2 include individuals with
high discount factor and low productivity and type 4 includes all high-produc-
tivity individuals with high discount factor. Here the maximin social welfare
function cannot be applied as it is not self-evident which group is the worst
off and thus we introduce for the ﬁrst time the Roemer social welfare func-
tion as discussed in the introduction. The government maximises the Roemer
social welfare objective function
N1[u(c1) + δLv(x1) + ψ(1− y1)] + N2[u(c2) + δHv(x2) + ψ(1− y2)] (2.8)
subject to the same budget constraint and self-selection constraints as earlier.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are presented in appendix A (equations A.30-38).
In this case the distortions are (exploiting the binding incentive-compatibility
constraints from numerical solution)
d1 =
μ21 + μ41
N1 − μ21 − μ41Δ
HL
d2 = d4 = 0
(2.9)
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Table 2.5 Consumption in period 1 and 2, labour supply, utility level, marginal tax rates on labour income
and savings, replacement rates; high-skilled grouped together.
RSWF c x y U T′ d x/ny
Type 1 0.68 0.43 0.41 -4.57 24.73 37.08 52.6
Type 2 0.56 0.51 0.41 -5.04 43.3 0 63.2
Type 4 0.76 0.7 0.56 -4.73 0 0 41.7
utilitarian
Type 1 0.67 0.52 0.51 -4.68 3.7 5.32 51.0
Type 2 0.62 0.57 0.51 -5.07 12.4 0 55.7
Type 4 0.79 0.73 0.54 -4.55 0 0 44.7
Now only the saving decision of the impatient low-productivity type is dis-
torted.
Proposition 2
When time preferences differ only among the low-ability type and there is only down-
ward binding incentive-compatibility constraints, the savings decision of type 2 and
type 4 are not distorted and hence not taxed at the margin. The saving decision of
type 1 is distorted at the margin. This distortion can be positive or negative.
The binding incentive-compatibility constraints are (2,1), (4,1) and (4,2). Ta-
ble 2.5 presents the results with the RSWF and utilitarian social welfare func-
tion (additional results are found in appendix B table B.4 and B.6 and sensitiv-
ity analysis with different parameter values are shown in the next subsection).
The numerical solutions reveal that type 1’s distortion is positive, so there
is a tax at the margin and this distortion is quite signiﬁcant. However, when
comparing this distortion to the case of perfect correlation between prefer-
ences and productivities, the distortion is not as large. It seems that introduc-
ing some patient low-productivity workers to the model facilitate to soften
the distortion for the impatient ones in a signiﬁcant way.
In the RSWF case it is also noticeable that in the optimal solution type 1
and 2 work the same amount, thus the different time preference only leads
to different divisions of consumption between periods. The same pattern ap-
plies also to the utilitarian case. Here the pattern of replacement rates implies
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again a progressive pension system, and also indicates that in the optimum
the government distorts the patient low-productivity type’s work incentives
signiﬁcantly. As before, the most striking difference between the different so-
cial goals are in terms of the levels of distortions and the length of the career
or retirement age thereof. The average tax rates (shown in Appendix B) also
support this difference. In utilitarian case the labour supply is closer to similar
between types.
We can conclude from both of the 3-type cases that the saving decision
of the less patient individual are distorted in margin. In the case where high-
productivity types have the same time preference, the low-productivity types’
labour decisions are the same but due to the differences in their time prefer-
ences for consumption, the overall utility differs.
2.3.3 Comparative statistics
In order to see what kind of effects the parameters have for the numerical re-
sults, in this section we let them vary. Table 2.6 presents the case for varying
discount factor in the case of pooling the low-productivity workers. In bench-
mark those are set to 0.6 and 0.8 respectively for low- and high-productivity
type. The distortion for saving is getting smaller as the discount factor is get-
ting closer to the higher discount factor. In the absence of private savings
the replacement rates are increasing for types 1 and 3 the closer we get to
the higher discount factor. When the discount factors are the same for low-
productivity and high-productivity workers, there is no distortion for saving’s
decision. The large distortions in the RSWF case can be thus accounted for
by differences in time preferences. Also the simulation suggests that 0.6 is a
lower bound with respect to the time preference for our model, as below that
the solver either does not ﬁnd a solution or there are no binding constraints.
Another case is to vary the sizes of the different types. Table 2.7 present
these comparisons. The ﬁrst thing to notice is that in the RSWF optimization
a small size of the low-productivity workers means relatively more redistri-
bution to their end. The replacement rates for high-productivity types are
nearly the same in every case. The large marginal labour tax rates make sure
that the high-productivity types do not mimic the low-productivity type. The
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Table 2.6 Comparison of the solutions with different discount rates, low-ability types pooled together.
δL 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75
Type 1 3 4 1 3 4 1 3 4 1 3 4
U -4.7 -4.4 -4.7 -4.8 -4.4 -4.7 -4.9 -4.5 -4.7 -4.9 -4.6 -4.7
T
′
37 0 0 38 0 0 38 0 0 38 0 0
d 0 27 0 0 19 0 0 13 0 0 6 0
x/ny 57 36 42 59 38 42 60 39 42 61 41 43
Table 2.7 Comparison of the solutions with varying group sizes, low-ability types pooled.
Ni 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.25 0.375 0.375 0.3 0.35 0.35
Type 1 3 4 1 3 4 1 3 4
U -4.3 -4.3 -4.6 -4.4 -4.3 -4.6 -4.5 -4.3 -4.7
T
′
48 0 0 40 0 0 38 0 0
d 0 28 0 0 28 0 0 28 0
x/ny 137 37 43 100 37 43 81 37 43
Ni 0.35 0.325 0.325 0.4 0.29 0.31 0.45 0.295 0.255
Type 1 3 4 1 3 4 1 3 4
U -4.5 -4.3 -4.7 -4.6 -4.3 -4.7 -4.6 -4.3 -4.7
T
′
35 0 0 32 0 0 30 0 0
d 0 28 0 0 26 0 0 24 0
x/ny 72 36 42 65 36 42 60 36 43
distortion for savings is not much affected by varying the sizes of the groups.
In the second case, where the high-productivity types are pooled together,
solving the maximization problem with different discount factors is much
more complex.16 Table 2.8 presents the results which show that the replace-
ment rates are increasing for type 1 when his/her patience increases but this
does not signiﬁcantly affect other types’ replacement rates. Also the size of
the discount factor seems to have quite signiﬁcant effect on the level of the
marginal savings tax.
16In fact, with the CES function, in order to see what kind of effects the discount rates have
for the results, the size of the groups needs to be modiﬁed: the sizes of the groups in this
exercise are set to N1 = 0.2, N2 = 0.3 and N3 = 0.5.
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Table 2.8 Comparison of the solutions with varying discount factors, high-ability types pooled.
δL 0.6 0.65 0.7
Type 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4
U -4.6 -5 -4.7 -4.7 -5 4.7 -4.8 -5 -4.7
T
′
24 42 0 28 41 0 31 40 0
d 36 0 0 29 0 0 20 0 0
x/ny 53 63 42 55 63 43 57 62 42
2.4 Roemer social welfare function and 4 types
Finally we include all four types in our model. Now in the economy there
are both impatient and patient high-productivity workers as well as impa-
tient and patient low-productivity workers, labelled as in table 2.3. In order
to study optimal taxation in the RSWF framework we make a compromise be-
tween the principles of compensation and responsibility by ﬁrstly computing
the minimum within each responsibility group (discount rates here) and then
applying the utilitarian criterion. This means that for individuals with the
same discount rates but different wage rates the maximin criterion is applied
and thus we have a social ordering over each discount group. Then these
minimum numbers are added together17. Now we have
N1[u(c1) + δLv(x1) + ψ(1− y1)] + N2[u(c2) + δHv(x2) + ψ(1− y2)]. (2.10)
The government maximizes now Eq. 2.10 subject to self-selection con-
straints (without any assumptions of the mimicking behaviour there are twelve
possible self-selection constraints) given by
u(ci) + δiv(xi) + ψ(1− yi) ≥ u(cj) + δiv(xj) + ψ(1− njni yj) for i, j = 1, .., 4 and
i = j, and the budget constraint ∑Ni(niyi − ci − rxi)− R ≥ 0.
Speciﬁcations with CES function in this 4-type case turn out to be harder to
solve numerically than the earlier cases18. The binding constraints ((3,1), (3,2),
(4,2) and (4,3)) are exploited in deriving the ﬁrst-order conditions (Appendix
17Or we can ﬁrst calculate the average utility in each skill group and then apply the maximin
criterion to such average ﬁgures.
18For example there is no binding constraints in the zero correlation case.
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A equations A.39-51) and distortions. The distortions are
d1 = 0
d2 =
μ32
N2 − μ32 − μ42Δ
LH
d3 =
μ43
μ32 + μ31 − μ43Δ
HL
d4 = 0.
(2.11)
Proposition 3
When individuals differ in both productivity and time preferences and there are only
downward binding incentive-compatibility constraints, then savings decisions for
type 2 and type 3 are distorted at the margin. The distortions can be negative or
positive. There is no distortion for the types 1 and 4. The size and direction of the
distortion depends heavily on the correlation between skills and preferences. The "no
distortion at the top" (w.r.t ability) result does not hold anymore.
Figure 2.1 shows the simulation results with varying correlation between
productivity and preferences. From the simulation results we notice that type
3 has a positive marginal tax. Type 2 has a negative marginal tax when the cor-
relation between productivity and time preferences is below 0.5. Also an in-
teresting feature occurs when there is strong correlation between preferences
and productivity. Here the type 1 faces a positive tax but the patient type is
not distorted.
From ﬁgure 2.1 we see that the problematic points in numerical simulations
arise when we come closer to the zero correlation (i.e. group sizes are equal for
all 4 types). This is intuitive because moving to either end of the correlation
line we come closer to the two-type kind of economy which is generally easier
to solve. Studying the optimal bundles in the case that is as close as possible
to zero correlation we can conclude that interestingly the labour supplies of
impatient and patient low-productivity workers are nearly the same. In the
RSWF case this occurs because the saving decision of the patient individual
is heavily subsidized and this leads to the situation that type 2’s replacement
rate is also high. Introducing the impatient high-productivity worker to the
74
Figure 2.1 Marginal tax on saving and correlation between time preference and ability. Linearly interpo-
lated values are drawn with lighter colour.
model leads to signiﬁcantly higher marginal tax rates on labour compared to
the three-type model. Interpreting the results without private savings, it can
be noticed that the pension system is progressive, i.e. the replacement rates
are smaller for high-productivity workers.
In the case of utilitarian social welfare function the binding self-selection
constraints are (3,1), (3,2) and (4,3). With our parametrization it seems that
only when the social goals are more redistributive does the government need
to take care that the patient high-ability individual does not mimic patient
low-ability type. Compared to the RSWF case, the distortions are signiﬁcantly
smaller and the labour supply of the low-productivity type is greater, which
is in line with the earlier results.
Figure 2.1 also provides information of the robustness of the earlier results
with different distribution of types. The lighter values are linearly interpo-
lated values as the program cannot solve the optimization problem in certain
cases. In the ﬁgure we can see that the savings decision of type 2 is heavily
subsidised when there is stronger negative correlation between time prefer-
ence and ability. On the other end of the correlation line, type 3’s saving de-
cision is heavily distorted downward at the margin. Type 4 is undistorted in
every correlation. Compared to Tenhunen and Tuomala (2010) which studies
the similar kind of economy but with utilitarian government, the shape of the
curve is similar but here the absolute values of marginal taxes and subsidies
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are greater. Also, here the taxes for type 1 become non-zero with slightly
smaller correlations. To summarize brieﬂy the results about the marginal
labour income tax rates we can say that for different correlations both low-
skilled types are taxed at the margin in the optimal result. The levels of these
taxes are relatively high and stable in different correlations points.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have continued and extended the work of Tenhunen & Tuo-
mala (2010) and Tuomala & Tenhunen (2013) by introducing the Roemer social
welfare function. Instead of solely examining an economy where the govern-
ment is utilitarian, we have considered an economy where the social pref-
erences aim to maximize the welfare of those who have lower productivity
while respecting the individuals’ true discount rates for future consumption.
The multidimensionality stemming from the differences in preferences and
productivities makes it unfeasible to fully satisfy these principles of respon-
sibility and compensation at the same time but we have offered one way to
derive a compromise of the principles into the social welfare maximization
problem.
In the context of a two-period model, we mainly studied the savings dis-
tortions and the optimal redistribution policy within a cohort. The results are
derived analytically and numerically in several three- and four-types settings.
The numerical simulations are done without simplifying the problem to one-
dimensional. Also with numerical simulations we do not need to make a pri-
ori assumptions about the binding incentive-compatibility constraints. The
three-type settings are somewhat easier to solve compared to the four-type
models and they can also be used as an insight for the robustness of the four-
types results. The numerical solutions help to reveal the sign of the distortion
(upwards or downwards) in savings and labour supply behavior compared to
the ﬁrst-best case. The numerical results are compared to the utilitarian one
to determine how the objective function affects the results. We have implicitly
assumed that the government can commit to a lifetime tax in order to carry
out the optimal redistribution policy.
In the lifetime context of labour supply we ﬁnd that retirement age (length
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of career) is much lower (shorter) in the RSWF case. The results also indicate
that irrespective of the goals of the government the pension system is progres-
sive, i.e. the replacement rates decrease with income. We have considered
a case where the differences in preferences are true in a sense that the social
planner has no reason to correct for these differences. We learn that in this set-
ting asymmetric information and heterogeneity lead to the savings distortion
for impatient individuals at the margin. We have also relaxed the common
assumption of positive correlation between skills and time preferences. The
correlation between skills and preferences is in an important role. At the mar-
gin the patient low-type is subsidized until the correlation gets large and then
the low-ability impatient type is taxed at the margin.
The ﬁnal lesson from our work is that the different goals of the government
in welfare maximization cause large differences in the implicit distortions and
labour market outcomes. This demonstrates that the government’s goals do
not only have secondary effects on the optimal taxation results but have an
important role in consideration of the levels of distortions.
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Appendix A: First-order conditions
To shorten the notation, we denote the partial derivatives as follows:
du(ci)
dci = u
i
c,
dv(xi)
dxi = v
i
x and
dψ(1−yi)
dyi = ψ
′i
Two types
The Lagrange of the optimization problem is
L = NL[u(cL) + δLv(xL) + ψ(1− yL)] + λ[∑Ni(niyi − ci − rxi)− R]
+ μHL
[
u(cH) + δHv(xH) + ψ(1− yH)− u(cL)− δHv(xL)− ψ(1− n
L
nH
yL)
]
.
(A.1)
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to ci, xi and yi, i = L, H are
NLuLc − λNL − μHLuLc = 0 (A.2)
NLδLvLx − λrNL − μHLδHvLx = 0 (A.3)
−NLψ′L + λNLnL + μHL n
L
nH
ψ
′L = 0 (A.4)
−λNH + μHLuHc = 0 (A.5)
−λrNH + μHLδHvHx = 0 (A.6)
λNHnH − μHLψ′H = 0 (A.7)
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Three types: Low-productivity workers pooled
Using the information of the binding self-selection constraints provided by
numerical solution, the Lagrange function in the case of maximin objective
function can be written as
L = N1[u(cL) + δLv(xL) + ψ(1− yL)] + λ[∑Ni(niyi − ci − rxi)− R]
+ μ43[u(c4) + δHv(x4) + ψ(1− y4)− u(c3)− δHv(x3)− ψ(1− y3)]
+ μ31[u(c3) + δLv(x3) + ψ(1− y3)− u(c1)− δLv(x1)− ψ(1− n
L
nH
y1)] (A.8)
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to ci, xi and yi, i = 1, 3, 4 are given by
N1u1c − λN1 − μ31u1c = 0 (A.9)
N1δLv1x − λrN1 − μ31δLv31x = 0 (A.10)
N1ψ
′ − λN1nL − μ31 n
L
nH
ψ
′31 = 0 (A.11)
−λN3 − μ43u43c + μ31u3c = 0 (A.12)
−λrN3 − μ43δHv43x + μ31δLv3x = 0 (A.13)
−λN3nH − μ43ψ′43 + μ31ψ′31 = 0 (A.14)
−λN4 + μ43u4c = 0 (A.15)
−λrN4 + μ43δHv4x = 0 (A.16)
−λN4nH + μ43ψ′ = 0 (A.17)
In the utilitarian case, the Lagrange function with binding incentive-compatibility
constraints can be written as
L =∑Ni[u(ci) + δiv(xi) + ψ(1− yi)] + λ[∑Ni(niyi − ci − rxi)− R]
+ μ43[u(c4) + δHv(x4) + ψ(1− y4)− u(c3)− δHv(x3)− ψ(1− y3)]
+ μ31[u(c3) + δLv(x3) + ψ(1− y3)− u(c1)− δLv(x1)− ψ(1− n
L
nH
y1)].
(A.18)
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The ﬁrst order condition with respect to ci, xi and yi, i = 1, 3, 4 are given by
N1u1c − λN1 − μ31u1c = 0 (A.19)
N1δLv1x − λrN1 − μ31δLv31x = 0 (A.20)
N1ψ
′1 − λN1nL − μ31 n
L
nH
ψ
′31 = 0 (A.21)
N3u3c − λN3 − μ43u43c + μ31u3c = 0 (A.22)
N3δLv3x − λrN3 − μ43δHv43x + μ31δLv3x = 0 (A.23)
N3ψ
′3 − λN3nH − μ43ψ′43 + μ31ψ′31 = 0 (A.24)
N4u4c − λN4 + μ43u4c = 0 (A.25)
N4δHv4x − λrN4 + μ43δHv4x = 0 (A.26)
N4ψ
′4 − λN4nH + μ43ψ′43 = 0 (A.27)
The distortions in this case are
d1 = 0
d3 =
μ43
N3 + μ31 − μ43Δ
HL
d4 = 0.
(A.28)
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Three types: high-productivity workers pooled
Using the information of the binding self-selection constraints provided by
numerical solution, the Lagrange function can be written as
L = N1[u(c1) + δLv(x1) + ψ(1− y1)] + N2[u(c2) + δHv(x2) + ψ(1− y2)]
+ λ[
n
∑
i=1
Ni(niyi − ci − rxi)− R]
+ μ21
[
u(c2) + δHv(x2) + ψ(1− y2)− u(c1)− δHv(x1) + ψ(1− y1)
]
+ μ41
[
u(c4) + δHv(x4) + ψ(1− y4)− u(c1)− δHv(x1) + ψ(1− n
L
nH
y1)
]
+ μ42
[
u(c4) + δHv(x4) + ψ(1− y4)− u(c2)− δHv(x2) + ψ(1− n
L
nH
y2)
]
(A.29)
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect ci, xi and yi, i = 1, 2, 4 are given by
N1u1c − λN1 − μ21u1c − μ41u1c = 0 (A.30)
N1δLv1x − λrN1 − μ21δHv1x − μ41δHv1x = 0 (A.31)
−N1ψ1y + λN1nL + μ21ψ1y + μ41
nL
nH
ψ1y = 0 (A.32)
N2u2c − λN2 + μ21u2c − μ42u2c = 0 (A.33)
N2δHv2x − λrN2 + μ21δHv2x − μ42δHv2x = 0 (A.34)
−N2ψ2y + λN2nL − μ21ψ2y + μ42
nL
nH
ψ2y = 0 (A.35)
−λN4 + μ42u4c + μ41u4c = 0 (A.36)
−λrN4 + μ42δHv4x + μ41δHv4x = 0 (A.37)
−λN4nH − μ42ψ4y − μ41ψ4y = 0 (A.38)
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Four types
Using the information of the binding self-selection constraints provided by
numerical solution, the optimization problem can be written as
L = N1[u(c1) + δLv(x1) + ψ(1− y1) + N2[u(c2) + δHv(x2) + ψ(1− y2)
+ λ[
n
∑
i=1
Ni(niyi − ci − rxi)− R]
+ μ31
[
u(c3) + δLv(x3) + ψ(1− y3)− u(c1)− δLv(x1) + ψ(1− n
L
nH
y1)
]
+ μ32
[
u(c3) + δLv(x3) + ψ(1− y3)− u(c2)− δLv(x2) + ψ(1− n
L
nH
y2)
]
+ μ42
[
u(c4) + δHv(x4) + ψ(1− y4)− u(c2)− δHv(x2) + ψ(1− n
L
nH
y2)
]
+ μ43
[
u(c4) + δHv(x4) + ψ(1− y4)− u(c3)− δLv(x3) + ψ(1− y3)
]
(A.39)
The ﬁrst-order conditions w.r.t ci, xi, and yi for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are
N1u1c − λN1 − μ31u1c = 0 (A.40)
N1δLv1x − λrN1 − μ31δLv1x = 0 (A.41)
−N1ψ1y + λN1nL + μ31
nL
nH
ψ1y = 0 (A.42)
N2u2c − λN2 − μ32u2c − μ42u2c = 0 (A.43)
N2δHv2x − λrN2 − μ32δLv2x − μ42δHv2x = 0 (A.44)
−N2ψ2y + λN2nL + μ32
nL
nH
ψ2y + μ
42 n
L
nH
ψ
′2
y = 0 (A.45)
−λN3 + μ31u3c + μ32u3c − μ43u3c = 0 (A.46)
−λrN3 + μ31δLv3x + μ32δLv3x − μ43δHv3x = 0 (A.47)
−λN3nH − μ31 n
L
nH
ψ3y − μ32
nL
nH
ψ3y + μ
43ψ3y = 0 (A.48)
−λN4 + μ42u4c + μ43u4c = 0 (A.49)
−λrN4 + μ42δHv4x + μ43δHv4x = 0 (A.50)
−λN4nH − μ42ψ4y − μ41ψ4y = 0 (A.51)
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Appendix B: Additional results from the numerical
simulations
Table B1 Lagrange multipliers and average tax rates for two-type model, maximin case. Binding
constraints in optimum are bolded. For non-binding constraint the value of the constraint
(Uij −Ui) is given in paranthesis.
λ μLH μHL Type L Type H
0.984 0 (-4.53) 0.278 Average tax rate -40.5 17.0
Table B2 Lagrange multipliers and average tax rates for two-type model in utilitarian case. Binding
constraints in optimum are bolded. For non-binding constraint the value of the constraint
(Uij −Ui) is given in paranthesis.
λ μLH μHL Type L Type H
1.87 0 (-2.69) 0.08 Average tax rate -16.5 8.1
Table B3 Lagrange multipliers and average tax rates for three-type model in maximin case. Pooling of
low-ability types. Binding constraints in optimum are bolded. For non-binding constraint the
value of the constraint (Uij −Ui) is given in paranthesis.
λ μ13 μ14 μ31 μ34 μ41 μ43
1.02 0 (-2.15) 0 (-3.6) 0.33 0 (-0.07) 0 (-0.07) 0.15
Type 1 Type 3 Type 4
Average tax rate -26.4 12.7 14.6
Table B4 Lagrange multipliers and average tax rates for three-type model in maximin case. Pooling of
high-ability types. Binding constraints in optimum are bolded. For non-binding constraint the
value of the constraint (Uij −Ui) is given in paranthesis.
λ μ12 μ14 μ21 μ24 μ41 μ42
1.03 0 (-0.07) 0 (-3.8) 0.02 0 (-3.3) 0.12 0.18
Type 1 Type 2 Type 4
Average tax rate -32.7 -27.4 15.2
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Table B5 Lagrange multipliers and average tax rates for three-type model in utilitarian case. Pooling of
low-ability types. Binding constraints in optimum are bolded. For non-binding constraint the
value of the constraint (Uij −Ui) is given in paranthesis.
λ μ13 μ14 μ31 μ34 μ41 μ43
1.85 0 (-1.97) 0 (-2.65) 0.11 0 (-0.04) 0(-0.08) 0.04
Type 1 Type 3 Type 4
Average tax rate -17.9 3.4 3.7
Table B6 Lagrange multipliers and average tax rates for three-type model in utilitarian case. Pooling of
high-ability types. Binding constraints in optimum are bolded. For non-binding constraint the
value of the constraint (Uij −Ui) is given in paranthesis.
λ μ12 μ14 μ21 μ24 μ41 μ42
1.92 0(-0.03) 0 (-2.8) 0.02 0 (-2.65) 0.12 0.18
Type 1 Type 2 Type 4
Average tax rate -19.6 -19.3 4.7
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3 ON OPTIMAL INCOME TAXATION WHEN
INHERITED WEALTH DIFFERS
Terhi Ravaska, University of Tampere & Labour Institute for Economic Research,
Helsinki, Finland
Matti Tuomala, University of Tampere, Tampere , Finland
Abstract
In this essay1 we study a multidimensional optimal taxation problem when individ-
uals have differences in skills and in initial wealth. In a two-period model with one
cohort we derive the optimal distortions for the saving decision in two- to four-types
economies. The government aims to redistribute income from the high-income and
high-inheritance type towards the low-income and low-inheritance type and to set
up a tax system that creates incentives for agents to reveal their true types. Nu-
merical methods are used for solving the binding incentive constraints and optimal
consumption-saving-and-work bundles. We also extend the model to include income
shifting.
Our ﬁndings support the view that there should be non-linear capital income tax.
In the simplest case of two-types, the saving decisions of the low-ability and low-
wealth type is taxed at the margin. In the 3- to 4-type settings high initial wealth
types are subsidized at the margin. The subsidy relax the self-selection constraint
which prevent the high-wealth types mimicking to be low-wealth types. For the type
of low-wealth and high-productivity the marginal distortion on the saving decision
depends upon the degree of correlation between ability and initial wealth and the cho-
sen social welfare function.
1We thank Albert Jan Hummel for the comments for the earlier version of this paper. We
also thank the seminar participants in the IIPF conference 2016 in Lake Tahoe and at the Tam-
pere Allecon meeting in 2016.
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3.1 Introduction
In many developed countries one highly signiﬁcant phenomenon in recent
years has been the ending of the downward trend in wealth concentration.
Piketty and Zucman (2014) have estimated wealth-to-income ratios for eight
advanced economies and their estimates reveal some striking trends. Wealth
to income in these nations climbed from a range of 200 to 300 percent in 1970
to a range of 400 to 600 percent in 2010. The wealth differences for any given
cohort will reﬂect income differences if individuals save for life-cycle smooth-
ing purposes and everyone has the same preferences. However, this is not the
only way in which people receive capital since some people inherit it. Hence,
capital income inequality stems from differences in wealth due to past sav-
ing behaviour, inheritances received, and in rates of return that have varied
dramatically over time and across assets.
Mirrlees (1971) states that "In an optimum system, one would no doubt
wish to relate tax payments to the whole life pattern of income, and to ini-
tial wealth". In practice, taxation is not based on life-cycle but on annual in-
comes and initial wealth differences are only partly accounted in inheritance
taxation. Especially the initial wealth differences have received only little at-
tention as a source of heterogeneity in the optimal income taxation literature.
Most of the optimal income taxation literature has focused solely on differ-
ences in productivities, and only recently has heterogeneity in other dimen-
sions2 been incorporated into the models.
In the optimal inheritance taxation literature the center of interest is to de-
termine how to tax the bequests left behind usually by parents to their chil-
dren. This is a one-off occasion from the perspective of taxation. There is
an ample set of models studying this issue, taking into account different as-
2For example time preference differences have been incorporated into optimal taxation
models by Tenhunen and Tuomala (2010) and Diamond and Spinnewijn (2011), myopia by
Cremer et al. (2009) and differences on disutility of labour by Boadway et al. (2002).
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sumptions about preferences for saving and bequest (see Kopczuk (2013) and
Piketty and Saez (2013) and the references therein). In these studies the opti-
mal tax rates vary considerably from zero to extreme high. However, in this
paper we are not interested in taxation of this kind of one-off event but instead
focus on the question how initial wealth affect the structure of income taxation
under different redistributive preferences. Especially we study whether sav-
ings should be taxed or not. This approach is also motivated by the empirical
fact that inheritance tax is one of the least popular forms of taxes and many
countries have abolished it all together with other net wealth taxes (Drometer
and Frank, 2018).
In our paper, people differ in terms of productivity and in initial wealth
which are both unobservable to the policy-maker3. Initial endowments put in-
dividuals in a different starting point in their life already before the productivi-
ty-type is revealed. In a world without initial wealth differences, redistribu-
tion would occur only between productivity types but with initial endow-
ments the direction of redistribution between types is ambiguous. To learn
more about the direction of redistribution we solve numerical examples.
We study optimal taxation in a static setting in a sense that we take the
endowment or initial wealth as exogenous. This means that we study only
one cohort who are entitled to a bequest from the previous cohort but leave no
bequest. The focus is put on the optimal distortion for savings and hence for
the question whether or not to tax capital income but we also comment on the
optimal levels of the labour supply distortions in the numerical simulations.
We contribute to the earlier literature by studying non-linear savings tax and
extend the model to include also income shifting.
Our analytical results (assuming the direction of binding self-selection con-
straints) and numerical solution reveal that the saving decision is distorted at
the margin if there are differences in initial wealth between individuals. The
common pattern in most speciﬁcations is that there is a tax at the margin for
the individuals with low initial wealth and a subsidy for the individuals with
high initial wealth. In the numerical simulations we also consider the role of
wealth inequality, correlation between ability and wealth and different social
3In reality some of the bequests are observable to the government but there are also transfers
that are either unobservable or unidentiﬁable.
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objectives. Wider wealth inequality requires less distortions for the saving
decision. The correlation between the unobserved factors affect the optimal
distortion in a non-monotonic way and the social objectives matter for which
type is distorted at the margin.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2 we discuss
the earlier literature. In section 3.3 we introduce the benchmark model. In
section 3.4 we extend the type-space to three and four types and discuss the
numerical simulations. In section 3.5 we extend the model to include income
shifting. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Earlier literature
For a recent review of the literature of capital taxation see Bastani and Walden-
ström (2018). Wealth or inheritance differences between agents have mainly
been discussed in the literature of optimal inheritance taxation. This litera-
ture provides inconclusive results whether and how inheritances should be
taxed. It seems that the motive of bequest is central and whether bequest is
voluntary or accidental.
The Atkinson-Stiglitz result (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976) says that by as-
suming a mild separability between consumption and labour supply, the non-
linear labour income tax does not need to be supplemented with other taxes,
like savings tax. There are very few papers on the role of capital income taxa-
tion in the Atkinson-Stiglitz type of economy with differences in unobserved
inherited wealth. Such economies are studied in Boadway et al. (2000) and
Cremer et al. (2003). Boadway et al. (2000) study overlapping generations
model where savings tax is linear and labour income tax non-linear. They
show that with accidental bequests, tax on the interest income can indirectly
tax the unobserved inherited wealth and is thus desirable. Cremer et al. (2003)
derive the same result with another bequest motive, ’joy of giving’. They con-
clude that capital income tax can be a desirable additional instrument to bring
more information about the unobserved inheritances. With positive correla-
tion between inherited wealth and productivity, marginal tax rate on capital
income is likely a positive one.
Many countries have abolished wealth and inheritance taxes (Drometer
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and Frank, 2018). This motivates us to study initial endowment differences
also in a framework where the focus is on one cohort. The same kind of econ-
omy is studied for example in Cremer et al. (2001) and Christiansen and Tuo-
mala (2008). These papers study whether linear capital income tax should be
added to the optimal tax mix. Our study differs from these two studies by
studying non-linear capital income tax.
Non-linear capital income taxation is relatively understudied. Capital in-
come taxation is often studied in the framework of commodity taxation and
for many commodities the non-linear taxation is impractical for the tax arbi-
trage reasons. However, we argue that non-linear capital income taxation is
possible especially in developed countries where income is often reported by
third-parties. Several countries have tax policies that effectively vary the cap-
ital income tax rate based on the total income (USA) or annual capital income
(Finland). This makes our case for studying this tax instrument. For other
studies on non-linear capital income taxation, see for example Golosov et al.
(2013).
3.3 Benchmark model
We assume that individuals differ in their productivity and in their initial
wealth level. First we consider a simple two-type economy where produc-
tivity and initial wealth are perfectly correlated. Table 3.1 shows evidence for
Finland that wealth and capital income indeed are strongly correlated and the
correlation has got stronger over time making this a reasonable assumption
for the benchmark model. In later parts this assumption of perfect correlation
is relaxed.
Table 3.1 Correlation between income items and net wealth. Data sources:Wealth Study Statistic Fin-
land. Source Riihelä et al. (2007), updated.
Correlations in 1987 Correlations in 2013
Net Labour Capital Net Labour Capital
wealth income income wealth income income
Net wealth 1.000 1.000
Labour income 0.219 1.000 0.106 1.000
Capital income 0.360 0.145 1.000 0.743 0.060 1.000
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In our model the initial wealth is exogenous lump-sum, which is received
in the ﬁrst period before labour supply decisions are made. Types are ex-
ogenous and the distribution is known by the tax planner. This exogeneity
assumption is done to simplify the exposition and notation without loss of
generality. There is asymmetric information in a sense that the tax authority
can observe neither the endowments, productivities nor labour supply and
this rules out ﬁrst best taxation. Tax authorities can observe the savings from
the ﬁrst period to the second period and the earned income in the second pe-
riod. These assumptions are made in order to study a fully non-linear tax
system.
The government wants to create a lifetime tax system which redistributes
income between the individuals in the same cohort and we assume it can com-
mit to the chosen tax-and-transfer system. The government can now use both
labour income tax and capital income tax. In this setting we study whether
capital income tax is needed in the optimal tax mix.
3.3.1 Individuals
Each individual has a skill level, ni, reﬂecting his wage level and an ini-
tial wealth level, ei reﬂecting the consumption potential in the ﬁrst period.
Low-skilled and/or low-endowed are denoted with superscript L and high-
skilled and/or high-endowed are denoted with superscript H. The bench-
mark assumption of the positive correlation implies that we have two types
of (eH, nH) and (eL, nL). The proportion of each type i in the population is
Ni ≥ 0 and ∑Ni = 1.
We consider a two-period model. In order to say something about the
Atkinson-Stiglitz result, the life-time utility of an agent i is separable and ad-
ditive in the following way:
Ui = u(ci) + δv(xi) + ψ(1− yi), (3.1)
where c and x denote consumption in the ﬁrst and the second period, respec-
tively, and y is the labour supply during the second period. δ denotes the
discount factor. It is assumed that U is a strictly concave, continuously differ-
entiable and utility is strictly increasing in c and x, and strictly decreasing in
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y, and (partial derivatives) u′, v′, ψ′, ψ′′ > 0 and u′′, v′′ < 0. We also assume
that all goods are normal and technologies are linear, that is one extra unit
of labour produces one unit of commodity good. Markets are assumed to be
competitive.
In the ﬁrst period individuals divide the initial wealth between consump-
tion, c, and saving, s. Each unit of savings yields an additional 1+ θ units of
consumption in the second period. We simplify the analysis by considering
a small open economy facing world capital markets which implies that the
return to savings, θ, is ﬁxed. Consumption in the ﬁrst period is ci = ei − si
and in the second period xi = (1+ θ)si + Bi, where after-tax labour income is
denoted by Bi = niyi − T(niyi). The inter-temporal budget constraint then is
ci + rxi = ei + rBi, where r = 11+θ .
Individual’s problem is to maximize inter-temporal utility with budget
constraint:
max u(ci) + v(xi) + ψ(1− yi)
s.t.
ci + rxi = ei + rBi.
(3.2)
Without distortive taxation the well-known Euler equation emerges from the
ﬁrst order conditions:
u′
v′
=
δ
r
. (3.3)
We can also solve the familiar formula for marginal labour income tax:
ψ′
δnv′
= 1− T′. (3.4)
3.3.2 Government
The government has aversion towards inequality so it creates a tax-and-transfer
system which redistributes income from better-off towards worse-off. In this
setting individuals state their initial wealth and productivity type to the gov-
ernment and the government offers them a bundle of gross and net incomes.
The self-selection or incentive constraints make sure that the individual weakly
prefers the bundle aimed at him over all the other bundles.
In the benchmark case we assume that there is a perfect correlation be-
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tween productivity and endowment received. Here the single-crossing prop-
erty holds and the only binding self-selection constraint is from the direction
of high-type towards low-type. In preceding sections, when the perfect cor-
relation assumption is relaxed, numerical methods are used for determining
the binding self-selection constraints. The incentive constraints which prevent
the mimicking behaviour are written as:
u(cH) + δv(xH) + ψ(1− yH) ≥ û(cL) + δv(xL) + ψ(1− n
L
nH
yL) ≡ Uij, (3.5)
where hat denotes mimicking behaviour and speciﬁcally û(cL) = u(eH − sL).
That is, in the case of mimicking the mimicker would enjoy higher ﬁrst period
consumption than truly low-ability type.
In the case of utilitarian social objective function government’s problem is
to
max︸︷︷︸
ci ,xi ,yi
G(U) =
N
∑
i=1
Ni(u(ci) + δv(xi) + ψ(1− yi))
subject to
N
∑
i=1
Ni(niyi + (1+ θ)(ei − ci)− xi) ≥ G
UH ≥ UHL,
(3.6)
where the ﬁrst constraint is the resource constraint and second the aforemen-
tioned incentive constraint. An alternative social objective function is max-
imin, where government maximizes only the welfare of the low-ability type
(deﬁned as the individuals with low inheritance and productivity).
3.3.3 Analytical results
We can now derive the ﬁrst order conditions by forming a Lagrangian of the
government’s problem. The multiplier for the resource constraint is λ and for
the self-selection constraint μHL. The Lagrangian expression is:
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L =
N
∑
i=1
Ni[u(ci) + δv(xi) + ψ(1− yi)]
+ λ[
N
∑
i=1
Ni(niyi + (1+ θ)(ei − ci)− xi)− G]
+ μHL[u(cH) + δv(xH) + ψ(1− yH)− û(cL)− δv(xL)− ψ(1− n
L
nH
yL)].
(3.7)
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to ci, xi and yi are given by
∂L
∂cL
= NLu′ − λNL(1+ θ)− μHLû′ = 0 (3.8)
∂L
∂xL
= NLδv′ − λNL − μHLδv′ = 0 (3.9)
∂L
∂yL
= −NLψ′ + λNLnL + μHLψ′ n
L
nH
= 0 (3.10)
∂L
∂cH
= NHu′ − λNH(1+ θ)− μHLu′ = 0 (3.11)
∂L
∂xH
= NHδv′ − λNH − μHLδv′ = 0 (3.12)
∂L
∂yH
= −NHψ′ + λNHnH − μHLψ′ = 0. (3.13)
In the case of maximin social objective function the last three equations be-
come:
∂L
∂cH
= −λNH(1+ θ)− μHLu′ = 0 (3.14)
∂L
∂xH
= −λNH − μHLδv′ = 0 (3.15)
∂L
∂yH
= λNHnH − μHLψ′ = 0. (3.16)
It should be noted that the consumption of the mimicker is Δe + cL, where
Δe = eH − eL. Deﬁne then the inter-temporal marginal substitution as u′iv′i and
rearrange to get for the high-ability type
u′
v′
=
δ
r
, (3.17)
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that is, the saving decision is not distorted at the margin even when there
are differences in initial wealth. However, for the low-ability type, the sav-
ing decision is not distorted only in the case where there is no differences in
initial endowments (and so u′L = û
′) or when incentive-constraint μHL is not
binding. We can see this by rearranging the ﬁrst order conditions as before:
NLu′ − μHLû′
v′(NL − μHL) =
δ
r
. (3.18)
Rearranging equation 3.18 to u
′
v′ =
δ
r (1 − dL) and solving for dL, we get the
marginal distortion on the low-types saving decision (assuming the only bind-
ing constraint is from high-type towards the low-type):
dL =
μHL
NL
(1− r
δ
û′
v′
). (3.19)
While equation 3.19 does not instantly reveal the sign of the distortion, we
know that mimicker’s marginal utility of consuming during the ﬁrst period is
smaller than for the true low ability types. In order to prevent the mimicker
for consuming too much during the ﬁrst period, we need to distort the low-
ability types saving decision which would make mimicking behaviour less
beneﬁcial. That means that the distortion is positive in the current case.
Solving for the optimal marginal labour tax reveals the typical result that
the high-ability type’s labour decision is not distorted at the margin. As the
labour supply decision is independent of the endowment we know that the
common case of positive marginal labour income tax takes place for the low-
ability type. This distortion equals
T′L =
μHL(1− nLnH )
N1 − μHL . (3.20)
We can state the following proposition:
Proposition 1
In the two-type economy
(i) Both in utilitarian and maximin cases if eL = eH and if preferences of individuals
are additively separable, then there is no taxation of capital income at the optimum.
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Low-ability type faces a positive marginal labour income tax.
(ii) If eL < eH and if preferences of individuals are additively separable and the single-
crossing condition holds, then there is a case for taxing capital income at the optimum.
The low-ability type faces a positive capital income tax at the margin for both utili-
tarian or maximin social objectives. Low-ability type faces also a positive marginal
labour income tax.
3.4 Extenstion to type-space
Relaxing the assumption of perfect correlation between productivity and ini-
tial wealth leads to four-type economy as in the table 3.2. With zero corre-
lation, there are equal amount of individuals in each type and for imperfect
correlation cases the sizes of the types vary. Including more types leads to
larger set of potentially binding self-selection constraints. In the next subsec-
tion we study 3-type case by assuming some of the binding constraint while
the subsequent subsection utilizes numerical methods for the 4-type model.
The government’s objective is either utilitarian or maximin with respect of
productivity.
Table 3.2 Deﬁnition of types by initial wealth and productivity
eL eH
nL 1 2
nH 3 4
The Lagrange function in general form is:
L =
N
∑
i=1
Ni(u(ci) + δv(xi) + ψ(1− yi)) + λ[
N
∑
i=1
Ni(niyi + (1+ θ)(ei − ci)− xi)− G]
+
N
∑
i,j=1,i =j
μij[u(ci) + δv(xi) + ψ(1− yi)− û(cj))− δv(xj)− ψ(1− n
i
nj
yi)]
+
N
∑
i,j=1,j =i
μji[u(cj) + δv(xj) + ψ(1− yj)− û(ci)− δv(xi)− ψ(1− n
j
ni
yj)]
(3.21)
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The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to ci, xi and yi are
∂L
∂ci
= Niu′ − λ(1+ θ)Ni +
N
∑
i,j=1,i =j
μiju′ −
N
∑
i,j=1,i =j
μji û′ = 0 (3.22)
∂L
∂xi
= Niδv′ − λNi +
N
∑
i,j=1,i =j
μijδv′ −
N
∑
i,j=1,i =j
μjiδv′ = 0 (3.23)
∂L
∂yi
= −Niψ′ + λNini −
N
∑
i,j=1,i =j
μijψ′ +
N
∑
i,j=1,i =j
μjiψ′ = 0. (3.24)
For the maximin social objectives the ﬁrst term drops out for types 3 and 4.
In this setting the distortions depend on which self-selection constraints are
binding. Note particularly that the single-crossing property does not neces-
sarily hold meaning that the self-selection constraint can bind towards both
directions simultaneously. Whenever there is at least one binding self-selection
constraint between types with different initial wealth, there is a distortion for
the saving decision compared to the ﬁrst best. Formally we see this from the
condition
(Ni +∑Ni,j=1,i =j μij)u′ −∑Ni,j=1,i =j μji û′
(Ni +∑Ni,j=1,i =j μij −∑Ni,j=1,i =j μji)v′
=
δ
r
(3.25)
for all i in the case of utilitarian social objectives and for the types 1 and 2 in
the case of maximin social objectives. For types 3 and 4 under maximin the
condition is:
∑Ni,j=1,i =j μiju′ −∑Ni,j=1,i =j μji û′
(∑Ni,j=1,i =j μij −∑Ni,j=1,i =j μji)v′
=
δ
r
. (3.26)
3.4.1 3-type model
In the four-type model we cannot state which of the self-selection constraints
are binding. It is especially difﬁcult to prove whether the constraint between
types 2 and 3 is binding upwards or downwards, or both ways. To get fur-
ther insight from the analytical results we study a 3-type case where economy
consists low-ability and low-wealth individuals (type 1) and high-ability indi-
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viduals with varying initial wealth levels (types 3 and 4). We assume that the
binding self-selection constraint are from types with higher resources towards
types with lower resources meaning μ41, μ43, μ31 > 0.
Now we can solve the distortions for savings:
d1 =
μ41 + μ31
N1
(1− r
δ
û′
v′
) > 0 (3.27)
d3 = 0 (3.28)
d4 = 0. (3.29)
Distortions are the same under maximin social objectives4. That is with wealth
heterogeneity the marginal tax on capital income is positive for the low-ability
type in order to relax the otherwise binding self-selection constraints.
The optimal marginal labour income tax is non-zero for low-ability type
and 0 otherwise, indicating that there is no distortion at the top. Speciﬁcally
the marginal labour income tax for type 1 is:
T′1 =
(μ41 + μ31)(1− nLnH )
N1 − (μ41 + μ31) nLnH
(3.30)
We can state the following proposition:
Proposition 2
In the three-type economy, where low-ability types have low initial wealth and the
wealth level varies within the high-ability type, only the saving decision of the low-
ability type is distorted at the margin both in the utilitarian and the maximin cases.
The result hinges on the assumption that self-selection constraints are binding along
decreasing resources (combining productivity and initial wealth). The "no distortion
at the top" result holds.
4Note that the levels of marginal distortions vary between the social objectives because the
optimal bundles of consumption and leisure differ.
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3.4.2 Numerical illustration
For the full four-type model we solve some numerical examples. We choose a
Cobb-Douglas utility function and parameter values following Cremer et al.
(2001). The utility function is separable and represented in the following way:
Ui = logci + δlogxi + log(1− yi). The parameters for the baseline case are as
in the table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Parameters for the numerical simulations, baseline
Fraction of individuals in each group Ni = 0, 25 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4
Endowments eL = 2, eH = 10
Discount rate δ = 0.9 and r = 0.95
Productivities nL = 6, nH = 9
Table 3.4 shows the optimization result in a baseline case. The upper panel
is for the utilitarian social objective function and lower panel for the maximin
case. For the benchmark we report the distribution of savings, labour income,
lifetime consumption and the distortions for saving and labour income. The
seventh column also presents the life-time utility. The binding self-selection
constraints are also listed. In the last column we also show a simple inequality
measures which are calculated by taking the absolute difference between the
extreme types (types 1 and 4).
For the baseline model in the utilitarian case the only slack self-selection
constraints are μ12, μ13 and μ23 and for the maximin case μ12, μ13, μ23, μ34 and
μ43. This demonstrates that the intuition from the one-dimensional case does
not hold in a multidimensional screening problem.
For example constraint μ34 binds even though type 4 has a higher dispos-
able income potential in the ﬁrst best case without distortive taxation. Also
it is interesting that μ41 binds as it links the extreme types and indicates that
type 1 is taxed at the margin partly to prevent the high-ability high-wealth
type from pretending to be both low-ability and low-wealth. Difference in
the after-tax incomes between these two types can be reduced only until the
self-selection constraint becomes binding.
Turning to the optimal distortions, the simulation exercise suggests that
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the saving decision is distorted with a positive tax for the low-wealth types at
the margin. Types with high-wealth types are instead subsidized. The tax on
type 1 relaxes all the self-selection constraints towards the type 1. The subsidy
for high wealth types helps to mitigate the binding self-selection constraint
as now the potential mimickers do not want to meet the high-wealth types’
savings level.
The marginal distortion for the labour supply are somewhat surprising,
however, not uncommon in the multidimensional tax problems (Cremer et al.,
2001). We observe that the negative marginal tax rates occur to the high-ability
and high-wealth type. Comparing the social objectives tells that the saving
distortion for type 1 and 4 are substantially affected by changing the redis-
tributive preferences to maximin.
Table 3.4 Baseline model simulation
Utilitarian s ny c + x d T′ lifetime U
Type 1 0,55 2,06 2,24 29,0 35,3 -0,25
Type 2 1,90 1,07 9,48 -17,2 32,3 2,18 difference in lifetime consumption: 8,72
Type 3 0,28 6,0 3,96 0,5 0 0,17 difference in lifetime utility: 2,65
Type 4 1,73 4,05 10,96 -24,0 -34,3 2,40
Binding SS 14, 21, 24, 31, 32, 34, 41, 42, 43
Maximin s ny c + x d T′ lifetime U
Type 1 0,7 2,22 1,86 45,3 47,4 -0,71
Type 2 1,66 1,74 9,28 -22,5 57,2 1,71 difference in lifetime consumption: 8,7
Type 3 0,53 5,94 3,19 0 0 -0,21 difference in lifetime utility: 2,67
Type 4 1,52 5,04 10,56 -12,8 -12,5 1,96
Binding SS 14, 21, 24, 31, 32, 41, 42
Table presents in the baseline model the optimal savings s, labour income ny, lifetime consup-
tion c+ x, saving distortion d, marginal labour income tax T′ and lifetime utility U. Differences
in lifetime consumption and utility are calculated as absolute difference between the extreme
types, i.e. 1 and 4. The binding self-selection constraints listed at the bottom.
The impact of wealth inequality
Next we will explore the role of wealth inequality. The overall wealth in the
economy is kept constant but the distribution is changed. Other parameters
are as in baseline case. The results on the variables we are the most interested
in are shown in table 3.5.
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It appears that the saving distortion increases for type 1 and 3 as the wealth
inequality is reducing. At the same time the subsidy provided for the high-
wealth types increases. In the utilitarian case the marginal labour income
tax for the type 1 is minimally affected with decreasing wealth inequality.
For high-initial-wealth types the optimal labour supply distortions are non-
monotone.
Generally, as the wealth differences are narrower, the marginal distortions
get larger.
Table 3.5 Impact of wealth inequality
Utilitarian
eL eH d1 d2 d3 d4 T1 T2 T3 T4
2 10 29,0 -17,2 0,5 -24,0 35,3 32,3 0 -34,3
3 9 41,9 -27,3 2,5 -28,3 45,1 33,2 -0,02 -46,2
5 7 59,8 -73,6 16,6 -51,0 52,4 18,0 -24,4 -34,4
6 6 0 0 0 0 23,15 23,15 0 0
Maximin
2 10 45,3 -22,5 0 -12,8 47,3 57,3 0 -12,5
3 9 65,2 -45,2 0 -25,3 70,4 45,2 0 -9,7
5 7 68,8 -67,3 14,3 -48,9 63,3 37,3 -7,9 -9,8
6 6 0 0 0 0 43,3 43,3 0 0
Correlation between ability and wealth
In table 3.6 we explore how the correlation between ability and wealth affects
the optimal distortions keeping the wealth inequality and other parameters in
the baseline speciﬁcation. The above analysis have assumed zero correlation.
Correlation 1 corresponds to the case discussed in section 3.3 and veriﬁes that
the only binding constraint is towards the low-ability and low-wealth type.
In the two-type case the government can recognize the true type more easily
than in a case where the is less than perfect correlation5. For this reason the
distortion for the type 1 is smaller than with the zero or positive correlation
cases. Compared to the linear tax case studied in Cremer et al. (2001), there
are remarkable differences in the ﬁndings. While with linear savings tax and
5The perfect negative correlation is not shown because with this speciﬁcation neither of the
self-selection constraint is binding and so one cannot solve for the optimal distortion.
102
unobservable savings increasing the correlation indicates a higher tax, with
the non-linear case there is no clear pattern but only that the distortions are
non-monotone.
Table 3.6 Impact of correlation between ability and wealth
utilitarian
Correlation d1 d2 d3 d4 T1 T2 T3 T4
1 22,9 0 0 0 11,7 0 0 0
positive 37,7 -20,2 0 -22,3 52,9 23,7 0 -32,4
0 29,0 -17,2 0,5 -24,0 38,3 32,3 0 - 35,0
negative 12.0 -11.0 2.1 -29.4 10.5 39.0 -1.45 -36.4
maximin
1 52,6 0 0 0 35.9 0 0
positive 63,1 -25,3 6,8 -9,8 62,2 54,7 -3,7 -6,7
0 45,3 -22,5 0 -12,8 51,5 57,2 0 -7,1
negative 0 -14,3 0 -18,5 38,4 55,2 0 -7,2
3.5 Including income shifting
Lastly, we extend our model to include income shifting. The same question
with similar model has been studied in Christiansen and Tuomala (2008) but
with a linear capital income tax. They study income shifting in a two-type
and two period model when there is a perfect correlation between productiv-
ity and initial wealth. They solve the optimal tax rate analytically. For now,
we will also consider a two-type model with perfect correlation and leave
the numerical results and other cases of correlations for future. We are in-
terested in whether the results from Christiansen and Tuomala (2008) extend
to an economy where government can also tax savings with a non-linear tax
schedule.
Earlier we assumed that government can observe savings and income from
labour. However, now we shift our focus on more realistic environment where
savings and labour income are reported to the government. So, from the point
of view of the government, the savings and income are only partially ob-
served. It is costly for government to monitor if incomes are reported truth-
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fully. This creates an incentive to shift part of the labour income to capital
income if there are differences in the tax rates.
To model income shifting, we assume that individuals shift an amount of
Δ of labour income to capital income tax base at a cost of k(Δ). We restrict
only to the case where k(Δ) > 0 and so rule out the income shifting from
capital income to labour income. The cost is increasing and convex in Δ, i.e
k′(Δ) > 0, k′′(Δ) > 0. Individual report labour income zR while the true
labour income equals to z = zR + Δ. Individual’s actual labour supply is
y = z
R+Δ
n . Individuals shift capital income as long as the marginal saving in
tax is larger than the cost of transforming one unit of labour income to capital.
Each type chooses how much to report as savings, how much to save from
the ﬁrst period and the labour supply to maximize his utility. To character-
ize Pareto efﬁcient second best taxes, we set the government problem as to
maximize
max︸︷︷︸
ci ,xi ,yi
G(U) =
N
∑
i=1
Ni(u(ci) + δv(xi) + ψ(1− yi))
subject to
N
∑
i=1
Ni(niyi + (1+ θ)(ei − ci)− xi) ≥ G
UH ≥ UHL,
(3.31)
where self-selection constraint are (assuming only μHL binds)
u(cH) + δv(xH) + ψ(1− yH) ≥ û + δv̂ + ψ(1− n
L
nH
yL) ≡ Uij. (3.32)
As before û denotes the mimickers ﬁrst period utility at u(cL + eH − eL).
The new type of mimicking in this context is that the high-ability type may
want to mimic the low-ability type and in reality have larger second period
consumption due to the income shifting. In this case the second period util-
ity equals to v̂(xL + (ΔH − k(ΔH)− (ΔL − k(ΔL))). Both types of mimicking
behaviour needs to be accounted.
Solving the ﬁrst order conditions and rearranging the terms as before for
the saving distortion we notice that the high-ability and high-wealth type
faces zero distortion as before but for the low-ability and low-wealth type
104
the distortion is:
NLu′ − μHLû′
NLv′ − μHLv̂′ =
δ
r
. (3.33)
If there is no wealth differences, the nominator becomes (NL − μHL)u′. The
denominator takes into account the income shifting. Because v̂′ < v′ (assum-
ing that high-ability individual shifts more income), the denominator is larger
and the marginal rate of substitution between the two periods is smaller than
without income shifting. This indicates that there is a positive marginal tax
for the low-ability -type. If there are differences in the initial wealth, the sign
of the distortion is ambiguous since nominator and denominator is working
in opposite directions. This requires numerical simulations and are left for the
future versions of the model.
3.6 Conclusions
Rising inequality is often (too often) discussed in differences in labour income.
The standard optimal income tax analysis is also based on differences in earn-
ings capacity. The wage distribution is certainly important but people differ
also in wealth they have. Increasing wealth inequality has motivated us to
study the non-linear taxation of labour and capital income in a two period
model where agents differ in their earnings capacity and in their initial wealth
levels.
Given the Atkinson-Stiglitz result capital income tax might be unnecessary
in a setting where non-linear labour income tax is available. We have shown
that there may, however, be a role for taxing savings. Non-linear marginal
savings tax schedule alleviates the informational constraints. Our ﬁnding in-
dicates that low-wealth types’ savings are taxed at margin while the high-
wealth type’s saving decision is distorted upwards. This reveals that there is
a case for non-linear capital income tax in the optimal tax instrument mix.
Because multidimensional problems can be difﬁcult to grasp without nu-
merical simulation, in particular because the analytical results turns out to be
ambiguous, several model economies are set up for the numerical examples
in this paper. We have studied the effect of wealth inequality on the optimal
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savings and labour supply distortion. We have also characterized the effect
of correlation between ability and wealth. Lastly, we have studied the role of
income shifting in an analytical framework.
We motivated the study with the observation that wealth and inheritance
taxes have been going out of favour in many developed country. While we
have shown that the capital income tax belongs to the optimal tax mix, the
extent of redistribution changes little between the maximin and the utilitarian
social objectives. This might suggest that initial wealth might be easier to
target with wealth taxation.
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4 TOP INCOMES AND INCOME DYNAMICS
FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE:
EVIDENCE FROM FINLAND 1995-2012
Terhi Ravaska, Labour Institute for Economic Research, Helsinki, Finland
Abstract
In this essay1 I study Finnish top incomes from a gender perspective using the Finnish
register-based panel data over the period of 1995-2012. I ﬁnd that that the under-
representation of women at the top has been quite persistent in the overall top but
the proportion of women in the top 1% has increased over 18 years. Women’s wage
share at the top has increased while the self-employment income has decreased. The
top income females more often have an entrepreneurial background and are more often
sharing a household with a high-income spouse.
The gender-speciﬁc income distributions show that female incomes are less dis-
persed. In this study I also test whether top incomes can be assumed to be Pareto
distributed. While the joint and men’s top income distributions can be approximated
with Pareto distribution throughout the observation period, the Pareto assumption
gets more support for women after the year 2000. The female top income receivers
have caught up with top earning men over time but I also show that females are more
likely to move downwards from the top than men.
1I thank Ilpo Suoniemi and Matti Tuomala for the valuable comments as well as the seminar
participants in STN-WIP 2017 seminar in Helsinki, EQINEC 2017 in New York, IIPF 2017 in
Tokyo and Winter School in Inequality and Social Theory 2018 in Albi di Canazai. I also thank
Joni Laukkarinen for the proofreading. Financial support from Palkansaajasäätiö is greatly
acknowledged.
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4.1 Introduction
The gender wage gap is a widely researched topic. There are much less stud-
ies on gender differences in the total incomes. Since the work by Piketty (2003)
and Piketty and Saez (2003), inequality research has paid a lot of attention to
the top incomes but little is known about the top income distribution from a
gender perspective. While top incomes complement the traditional inequality
analysis which focuses on the middle of the distribution and poverty, the gen-
der perspective in the top incomes complements the analysis of overall gen-
der inequality. This paper aims to bring these two perspectives together with
empirical evidence from Finland. Finland performs relatively well in gender-
equality (OECD, 2017) so this paper provides insight from a new perspective
that can be useful for countries where similar steps towards gender-equality
have not been taken.
Women at the top of the earnings distribution have been studied in many
papers and from many perspectives (Albrecht et al., 2003; Guvenen et al.,
2014; Bertrand et al., 2010; Fortin et al., 2017)2 and this literature has sum-
marized that the wage gap increases and women’s presence decreases in the
upper tail of the earnings distribution. A large part of the overall wage gap
is also explained by the missing women at the top (Fortin et al., 2017). How-
ever, women and top incomes have been analysed only in few papers. Stud-
ies by Atkinson et al. (2018) and Roine et al. (2017)3 show that women are
under-represented at the top of the income distribution. The share of women
decreases steadily further up in the distribution all over the world.
There are many explanations why the top of the income distribution has
2There is at least one paper also studying women in the wealth distribution by Edlund and
Kopczuk (2009). This paper shows that big part of the wealth held by women is inherited in
the US.
3Atkinson et al. (2018) study 8 countries which are Denmark, Norway, Spain, United King-
dom, Australia, Canada, Italy and New Zealand while Roine et al. (2017) provide evidence
from Sweden.
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so few women. For example, we know the gender wage gap is largely ex-
plained by the fact that on average women work in industries with lower
wages and work fewer hours than men. Partly these observations can be at-
tributed to chosen education paths. Lower earnings also lead to less saving
opportunities for women and thus bigger gender based differences in capital
income. However, if women’s education and ﬁelds of work explain much of
the gender gap, we should see more women at the right end of the income
distribution over time as women have become more educated and shifted to
work in the traditionally more male-occupied ﬁelds. Otherwise the persistent
under-representation at the top of the income distribution may be due to a
glass-ceiling effect4.
In many international comparisons, Finland and the other Nordic coun-
tries, outperform in the women participation in the labour markets, education
and politics and these countries are widely recognised as the most advanced
countries in terms of gender equality at work (OECD, 2017). In Finland,
women’s share of the labour force has been over 45 % for three decades, the
employment rates by gender are almost the same (in 2016 67,6 % compared
to men’s 69,8%5) and the education level is higher among women (Pietiläi-
nen, 2013)6. How has this increase of educated women in the labour markets
transformed the income distribution and its gender composition? The evi-
dence from Sweden suggests that women have improved their representation
at the top of the income distribution but still have more transitory incomes
and more capital income than men (Roine et al., 2017). This study looks into
the Finnish data to see whether Finland follows similar trends.
In this paper, I will study the Finnish top income distribution closely from
a gender perspective. Firstly, I will explore the representation of women in the
top income distribution, and study the income composition and background
differences between men and women. I will show that there are clear gender
differences between the top income receivers. At the very top, women tend
to have larger capital income share than men and the share of wage income
4The term glass ceiling is used to deﬁne an unseen barrier that keeps women out of the top
regardless of their qualiﬁcations.
5Statistics Finland Ofﬁcial Statistics on Employment.
6Women have completed more university degrees than men since 1985 (Pietiläinen, 2013,
p. 18) and the gap has widened over time.
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has only increased after the ﬁnancial crisis. Compared to the men’s income
composition at the very top, the female share of capital income indicates that
becoming rich by working is less common among women. This is veriﬁed
by the fact that upper management positions are more common among male
top income receivers while a large part of the women in top incomes have
entrepreneurial backgrounds especially in the late 90s and early 00s.
Secondly, I will study the shape of the top income distribution by gender
and show that the common distributional assumption of Pareto Type I does
not hold. From the gender perspective we do not have any strong reason
to assume that the male and female top incomes can be characterized with
the same Pareto model. Even for the joint distribution the assumptions of
Pareto distribution have rarely been questioned. The recent contribution by
Jenkins (2017) shows that Pareto Type II model is more appropriate at least
for the heavy tail in British income distribution. Instead of assuming that top
incomes for both genders are Pareto distributed, I also tests this assumption
for the Finnish top incomes. This can be seen as a contribution in its own right.
In this part I will also compute the top income shares from the gender-speciﬁc
distributions.
Thirdly, I will answer the question of how income mobility and income
dynamics differ between genders. Annual cross-section measures do not give
the full picture on income inequality. The income mobility between years con-
tribute to the lifetime income differentials. For this reason I also extends the
analysis by taking into account income mobility. From the top of the income
distribution, individual can move only to the lower income groups and so
the income mobility is measured as the persistence to stay in the top group
over different periods. The question is, does this persistence differ between
genders?
The analysis is based on the Finnish population’s register data for the years
1995-2012. In the data the panel attrition occurs only due to death or emigra-
tion. Therefore long time periods of an individual’s life can be observed. The
panel structure of the data is used by extending the analysis of annual incomes
to include average income for longer periods. The data is without top-coding
so it is particularly well tailored to studying top incomes. There is a rich set of
background variables included in the data from several ofﬁcial registers. The
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tax register data enables the decomposition of the sources of income. The tax
unit in Finland is individual, however, the data includes a household identi-
ﬁer so family characters and spouse income can be used when studying the
background of top income receivers. The main contribution of the study is to
analyse top incomes from a gender perspective in detail with very extensive
micro data.
The paper is structured in the following way: Section 4.2 introduces the
data and income deﬁnitions. In section 4.3 I show time-series evidence on
the overall top incomes and focus on the share of women in different top
groups and how the incomes are composed. The subsection 4.3.3 discusses
the background of the individuals in the top groups. Section 4.4 ﬁts Pareto
model separately for genders at the top of the income distribution. Section 4.5
presents the results with respect to income dynamics and gender. Section 4.6
concludes.
4.2 Data and income concepts
The data used in this study comes from the Statistics Finland’s collection
of administrative data for income distribution statistics. The dataset is con-
structed by taking a 10 percent representative sample of the Finnish popu-
lation (approximately 500 000 individuals) and follows the individuals over
time between years 1995-2012. Individuals exit the data if they emigrate or
die. The individuals without address or who are institutionalized in any of
the observation years are not included in the data.
The data includes a rich set of variables. The underlying register data orig-
inates from Population Register Center, Tax Administration, The Social Insur-
ance Institution of Finland, National Institute for Health and Welfare, Finnish
Centre for Pensions, the Register of Completed Education and Degrees and Fi-
nancial Supervisory Authority. The data includes among other variables wage
income, self-employment income7, capital incomes (dividends and other cap-
ital income) and realized capital gains. The data also includes those with zero
7Self-employment income here refers to entrepreneurial income from agriculture, forestry
or copyrights, and entrepreneurial income from business activity where the ownership is active
on contrary to the passive owning of business which is taxed under capital income taxation
rules.
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incomes. The inﬂation is taken into account by deﬂating all income compo-
nents to 2008 prices with Finnish consumer price index. The data also have a
rich set of background variables, such as completed education, type of work,
industry, day of birth and death, age in the end of the year, as well as infor-
mation on the household type. There is no top-coding in the data.
In this study I concentrate on the adult population and thus exclude indi-
viduals below the age of 20. The tax unit in Finland is individual. There are
some minor exemptions and subsidies that are family- or spouse based. An
example of such an item is capital loss credit. The individuals with negative
gross incomes are removed from the data (0.01% of the observations). The
main analysis is complemented by also using three-year average incomes to
reduce the effect of temporary income shocks. Here I have removed those
observations that have gaps in the previous 3-year-periods (around 1,7 % of
the observations over the years). I have winsorized the outlier observations,
i.e individuals with very high incomes representing top 0.01% or higher, from
the data. This is done due to the privacy restrictions set by the data provider
but also to reduce the potential problems in interpretation of the results8.
As the data is based on administrative records, it is more reliable than sur-
vey estimates of the top incomes. However, registers do not include all in-
come sources. Such missing incomes are almost all interest income (which are
taxed at source), some inter-household income transfers (for example child
support is missing until 2010) and imputed rent for home-ownership. Also
noticeable is that the income concept was updated in 2010 by including more
accurate forestry income and child support income. For this reason the time-
series before and after are not completely comparable. However, the effect is
small. For example, the average equivalent income for the top decile was 0,5
% smaller than with the earlier income concept in 2013 (Statistics Finland).
The main income concept used is individual gross income excluding real-
ized capital gains. The individual gross income is factor income with income
transfers such as pensions or sickness beneﬁts. The composition of these in-
come items is shown in the appendix. The Finnish micro data on incomes is
rich enough to build the series for both including and excluding realized capi-
8Winsorizing ensures that none of the data points is based on less than 30 individual obser-
vations.
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tal gains. However, it is not clear if the realized capital gains are a good proxy
for the accrued capital gains as tax changes affect the timing of selling assets
as demonstrated in Burkhauser et al. (2015) and Armour et al. (2013). Also
it has been noticed that top income shares are biased downward if accrued
business income is not included (Alstadsæter et al., 2016).
Finland has a dual income tax system, where income from wealth (e.g. div-
idends, property rents and capital gains) are under capital income taxation
and labour earnings or self-employment incomes are taxed under a progres-
sive schedule. The capital income tax rate was ﬂat until 2011 and since then
there have been two tax brackets. The major tax reform in Finland, intro-
ducing the dual tax system occurred in the year 1993 so two years before the
observation period starts in this study. There are smaller tax reforms possibly
affecting the top incomes during the observation period and these are listed
in the appendix.
Table 4.A1 in the appendix shows descriptives statistics separately for each
year and gender. From these summary statistics we can conclude a few points
about the changes in the overall income distribution over the years. The gross
income distribution has become more dispersed for both genders but more
so for men. Also the average gross income has increased for women during
the observation period but for men the ﬁnancial crisis lowered the average
income. Also over time the mean absolute income gap between men and
women has increased. The average size of capital income and capital gains
have increased for women since the 90s.
4.3 Top incomes and women between 1995-2012
This section starts with the overall review of the top income shares in Finland
over time. This step is taken in order to place the gender-speciﬁc analysis into
context. After this the female representation and income composition at the
wider top are analysed. In the third subsection simple probability models are
run in order to determine what kind backgrounds women and men at the top
of the income distribution have.
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4.3.1 Trends in overall top incomes
Trends in the top incomes over the world, including Finland, is summarized
in Atkinson et al. (2011). In international comparison Finnish top income
shares are low but differ from continental Europe by showing a clearer up-
ward since the mid 90s. The Finnish top incomes have been studied by Jäntti
et al. (2010) in more detail until the year 2004. The stark ﬁnding is that the top
incomes increased rapidly in the late 90s. Here I extend this analysis to the
year 2012 by calculating the income shares based on the individual income
and conclude that the top income shares are still at similar levels as in the
beginning of the 2000s.
The median individual income without realized capital gains was approx-
imately 17,600€in 1995. 18 years later it had increased 35 percent to 23,700€.
The median income in the top 10% group grew around 43 percent from the
44,000€in 1995. In the top 1% and top 0.1% the income growth was 62 and 85
percent in the same period, respectively. The faster income growth in the top
incomes has widened the income distribution.
Figure 4.1 shows the lower thresholds and income shares for selected top
income groups based on the individual income9. The top 10% income thresh-
old was approximately 36,000€and the threshold 18 years later approximately
50,000 €. To be included in the top 1% one needed to have over 71,800 €of
income in the beginning of the observation period compared to 111,000 €in
2012. This translates to 54 % higher income requirement in 2012 in order to be
in the top 1%. In the very top, above 99.9 percentile, the income requirement
grew even more, nearly 85 percent. The income shares for these groups in-
creased rapidly in the late 90s but in the 00s there has been little changes. The
top 1% received 5 percent of the total income in 1995 and approximately 7 %
in the 2012.
About 75 percent of the income of the top 10% is wage income (ﬁgure 4.2).
Over the years the share of capital income has increased from 3 % to 8 % but
9Inequality is preferably studied with equivalised household income but since I am study-
ing top incomes by gender, the individual income is used. While the trend qualitatively is the
same whether the top income shares are measured by individual income or equivalised house-
hold income, the levels differ. Hence note that the ﬁgures here are not comparable to Jäntti
et al. (2010).
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Figure 4.1 The annual income thresholds for incomes above different income percentiles (left panel) and
income shares (right panel).
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Notes: Income measure is gross individual income excluding realized capital gains. Incomes
deﬂated to 2008 euros.
most visible is the important role of capital in the top 1% or higher groups.
In these groups it is also clear that the role of capital became more important
in the end of the 90s and early 00s. At the very top, the self-employment
income was replaced by the capital income. An explanation for this is the
income shifting caused by the tax reform in 1993 which created incentives
for entrepreneurs to report their income as capital income rather than self-
employment income (Selin and Pirttilä, 2011).
The years when the share of capital income grew corresponded with the
years when the top income shares grew the fastest. On average 38 % of total
income is capital income in the top 0.1% and during the years of high stock
market returns capital share is as high as half of the income (excluding real-
ized capital gains).
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Figure 4.2 The annual income composition for selected top income groups
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Just as the annual income from the capital is concentrated to the top, also
the realized capital gains are targeted to the top. Over the years, 11 to 14
percent of all realized capital gains are received by the richest 1%. Figure 4.3
presents the income composition with realized capital gains. In the groups
below 99th percentile, the capital gains have relatively little inﬂuence on to-
tal income during the observation period as income is composed mainly by
the wage income. However, the pattern is totally different in the high income
groups where beside annual income stemming from wealth the active selling
of assets is important. In the top 0.1% these realized capital gains are on aver-
age 22 percent of total income and during the stock market booms the capital
gains share is as high as 38 %. In the rest of the top 1% the share of realized
capital gains varies from 4 to 16 percent.
The observation period includes periods of strong economic growth but
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Figure 4.3 The annual income composition for selected top groups.
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also deep economic crisis and subsequent recession. To reduce the annual
volatility in income, the ﬁgure 4.4 shows the evolution in top income thresh-
olds and income shares using individuals’ average income from the previous
three years. This reduces the height of the spikes in the data but the overall
trend remains: in the end of the 90s the incomes of the top increased rapidly
whether measured as income shares or looking at the thresholds for getting
in to the top group. After this period there has been very little movement in
either direction. The income shares are 2-3 percentage point higher than in
the beginning of the observation period.
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Figure 4.4 The income thresholds for 3-year average incomes above different income percentiles (left
panel) and income shares (right panel).
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4.3.2 Share of women at the top and their income composition
This section will focus on the share of women in top incomes. During the ob-
servation period the trends in the labour market between genders have been
similar so the observed differences between men and women are not stem-
ming from the increasing attachment of women to labour markets. The rapid
growth in the female participation in the labour markets already happened in
the 70s and 80s.
Figure 4.5 shows the share of women in different groups based on total
income excluding the realized capital gains10 (ﬁgure 4.A1 is appendix shows
10Figure 4.A2 in appendix shows the share with the income including the realized capital
gains. The realized capital gains do not affect the top 5% or 10% groups. However, women
share increase in the higher groups during a stock markets peaks. For example, before the IT
bubble, in year 2000 the top 0.1% had 22,5 % of women. This is natural as women in these
higher groups tend to have more capital income.
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Figure 4.5 Share of women in different income groups, years 1995-2012
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Notes: Income distribution based on gross individual income excluding realized capital gains.
the share with 3 year average income). In the broader top 10% and top 5%
groups the share was decreasing slightly during the rapid economic growth
in the late 90s. Overall the growth in the share of women has been quite ﬂat
but there is a clear jump, approximately 2 percentage points, in the aftermath
of the ﬁnancial crisis. The share of women in the top 10% group was almost
29% at the end of 2012 which was an increase of 4 percentage points from the
period’s lowest value. In the top 5% one in four have been women since 2009.
Looking at the top 1%, the share of women has increased steadily through-
out the period from less than 15 percent to almost 20 percent. Together with
the fact that the share of women in the overall top 10% was stagnant much
of the period, this means that the women within the top 10% have become
richer. In fact, during the observation period, the mean incomes in the top
1% percent grew 64,1 % for women and 74,7 % for men and in top 10% 50,2
and 62,0 respectively (table 4.1). Looking more closely at the yearly ﬁgures,
we can also notice that even though there are fewer women at the very top,
these women have incomes that compare to men’s. In the top 1% women have
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higher mean incomes for half of the observation years.
Table 4.1 Mean and median incomes (excluding realized capital gains) in top 10% and top 1% groups
Women Men
year median mean median mean median mean median mean
top 10% top 10% top 1% top 1% top 10% top 10% top 1% top 1%
1995 42 865.42 48 486.34 86 925.66 113 331.02 45 202.79 53 226.71 88 814.97 106 080.42
1996 43 860.08 49 501.97 89 211.32 112 535.49 46 344.94 54 521.82 90 716.10 108 185.36
1997 45 093.70 51 760.26 91 706.51 126 434.39 47 601.29 56 640.98 95 206.24 116 999.53
1998 46 743.75 53 847.42 97 389.35 130 917.24 49 420.13 59 489.32 101 165.81 128 891.79
1999 47 741.80 56 484.97 104 137.18 154 619.58 50 676.37 65 643.20 107 009.79 170 666.13
2000 48 835.91 58 924.01 107 041.02 169 315.67 51 822.78 68 418.53 110 748.82 187 668.23
2001 501 66.36 60 055.17 112 733.27 167 769.02 53 079.75 67 198.46 115 454.17 165 570.32
2002 51 048.28 61 665.55 113 692.44 177 764.67 53 928.85 68 786.91 117 357.97 172 137.60
2003 52 605.38 64 043.94 115 822.79 186 088.53 55 274.43 69 055.52 121 039.45 163 427.13
2004 54 415.07 67 231.12 127 687.14 203 540.26 57 640.75 72 933.66 128 523.52 178 333.82
2005 55 892.89 67 323.49 126 076.20 187 636.40 59 238.39 73 795.46 131 260.77 174 347.21
2006 56 723.49 68 180.99 128 271.76 183 619.09 60 030.33 75 717.40 135 291.06 183 987.29
2007 58 608.85 70 179.33 135 311.30 183 349.82 62 174.17 78 906.68 142 776.16 195 163.74
2008 59 091.62 70 551.68 135 793.30 182 043.61 62 387.21 78 919.01 141 582.80 191 658.16
2009 59 312.60 69 569.15 130 520.15 168 291.67 62 874.39 78 274.82 139 372.16 181 421.90
2010 60 713.94 72 151.46 136 847.48 187 694.69 63 990.84 80 148.82 143 076.29 188 163.93
2011 61 186.55 73 423.96 138 539.73 196 610.29 64 458.88 81 571.80 147 903.87 198 195.63
2012 61 267.30 72 841.05 137 933.30 186 011.96 64 380.55 80 052.94 143 935.06 185 279.08
growth %
1995-2012 42.93 50.23 58.68 64.13 42.43 50.40 62.06 74.66
Note: Incomes deﬂated to 2008 euros.
The ﬁgures 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 show the income composition in different top
income groups for men and women. While it is remarkable that wage share
is similar in the top 10% between men and women (around 75%), the higher
income group show clear differences, where women have less wage income
but more capital or self-employment income. In the top 10% group, women’s
share of transfer income has decreased over the years. The transfer income
in these income groups mainly consists of pension income and secondly dis-
ability beneﬁts for men and family and survivor’s beneﬁts for women. The
reduction in the share of survivor beneﬁts explain much of the decrease in the
overall transfer income.
The lower share of wage income in the higher income group could indi-
cate that becoming very rich by working for an outside ﬁrm is less common
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among women. The self-employment income in the top 1% is more impor-
tant for the women. The female entrepreneurship indeed is more common
in the top groups, however the share of female entrepreneurs among top 1%
has decreased while at the same time the wage share has increased towards
the end of the observation period. In 1995 within the top 1% females, approx-
imately one in four were self-employed while among men 14 percent were
self-employed. The male entrepreneurship at the top has increased around 4
percentage point while within women the share is almost the same. Despite
these trends the self-employment income has decreased in total. Partly this
could stem from the income shifting that the 1993 tax reform induced (Selin
and Pirttilä, 2011).
The most common socioeonomic status for men at the top was senior of-
ﬁcial and upper management. However, the females have taken over more
upper managers positions in the 2000s. At the end of the period there was
almost the same share (around 30%) of upper managers among women and
men top income receivers. This is also supported by the previous observation
that the wage income share has increased for women.
Figure 4.6 Income composition in top 10%
Wage income
Capital income
Self-employment income
Transfer income
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
%
1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
Top 10 %, men
Wage income
Capital income
Self-employment income
Transfer income
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
%
1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
Top 10 %, women
Notes: Income measure is gross individual income excluding realized capital gains.
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Figure 4.7 Income composition in 91-99 percentiles
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Figure 4.8 Income composition in 99-99.9th percentiles
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Figure 4.9 presents the top 0.1%. There is a dramatic change in the income
composition and a clear gender difference compared to the rest of the top 1%.
The wage share for men range between 38 and 55 percent while women’s
wage share is on average 22 % over the years observed. The share of self-
employment income is approximately 10-15 percent higher among women,
and the same is true for the capital income. Unfortunately the data does not
include inheritance information, so I cannot determine the role of bequests for
the capital share. In conclusion, it seems that the men in the overall top seem
to earn from working for somebody else, while women at the top either earn
by owning a company or get high returns from owning assets. The higher
share of capital also translate as a higher representation of women at the very
top of the income distribution including realized capital gains (ﬁgure 4.A2 in
the appendix).
Figure 4.9 Income composition in top 0.1%
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4.3.3 Who becomes a top income receiver?
In this section I study the background characteristics of the top income re-
ceivers. I estimate a logistic regression where the probability of being a top
income receiver is regressed separately for women and men on their own and
on their spouse characteristics. The regression equation is written as:
Di = α +∑ βoXowni +∑ βsXspousei + θsYdi + 
i, (4.1)
where Di is a dummy for being in the top income receiver group (top 10%
group in joint distribution)11 and Xi contains a vector with the background
variables for the individual herself and for the spouse if a spouse exists. I am
especially interested in which ﬁelds of work and education levels are asso-
ciated with a top income position and if there is an association between the
spouse’s income decile and women’s probability to be in the top group. The
background characteristics are education, ﬁeld of work, number of children,
marital status, mother tongue and region of residence. I also include spouse
income decile Ydi in one of the regression speciﬁcations. The dependent vari-
able is equal to 1 if the individual belongs to the top group in any year, and
zero otherwise and the parameters to be estimated are α, βo, βs and θs. The
industry and region variables are classiﬁed according to the TOL200812 and
education level is categorized in 6 categories. The regressions control also for
year ﬁxed effects, age and age square effects. The mother tongue variable is
recoded as Finnish speaking, Swedish speaking and other languages.
Table 4.2 shows the main estimated marginal effects from each regression
speciﬁcation. The full list of variables is shown in appendix 4.6. The ﬁrst
and second column show the association between different characteristics
and being in the top 10% for single-adult households separately for men and
women13. From the ﬁelds of work, ﬁnance sector is most strongly associated
with being in the top 10%. For women the legal sector also increases the prob-
ability to be in the top 10%. If an individual has studied in the STEM ﬁeld14,
11I have also estimated the model for top 1% but as this smaller group is more prone to small
sample bias in this logistic regression, I report here only the results for top 10%.
12http://www.stat.ﬁ/meta/luokitukset/toimiala/001-2008/index_en.html
13The pooled sample estimates available upon request from the author.
14STEM=Science, technology, engineering and mathematics.
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this is positively associated with high incomes but the marginal effect is small.
Education level consistently increases the probability to be in the top. For the
singles subsample the female entrepreneurship is not a strong correlate with
being in the top 10% and for men it is even negative. However, entrepreneur-
ship is associated positively and more strongly among the women who have
a spouse (columns 3 and 5).
Columns 3 to 6 present the estimated marginal effects for the subsample of
cohabiting individuals. For person’s own characteristics the coefﬁcients are
for the most part in line with the singles subsample. The last rows of the table
also show the marginal effects for the spouse characteristics. The last rows
show the estimates for association between being a top income receiver and
the spouse’s income decile. For women these coefﬁcients are also reproduced
conditional on woman’s own education level in ﬁgure 4.10. We see that there
is a strong positive association between having a spouse in the highest decile
and being in the top 10%. For women, this increases the probability by 3.9 per-
centage points and for men 5.1 percentage points (compared to the baseline
where the spouse is in lowest income decile).
The potential explanation for the strong positive correlation between a
spouse’s income decile and the probability to be in the top are assortative
mating (meaning the positive relationship between the couple’s income ranks
or education already before forming a joint household) or income shifting be-
tween spouses (especially through ﬁrm and asset ownership). The income
shifting from husband to wife gets less support from the estimated marginal
effects as the association decreases and gets close to zero if spouse is in the top
1%. With income shifting between spouses, the expected association should
be increasing in spouse’s income. There is also an asymmetry in the marginal
effects. If the woman is in the top 1%, the probability for the man to be in top
10% increases by 5.6 percentage points while women’s probability increases
by 0.5 percentage points.
In the current study the assortative mating hypothesis cannot be adequately
tested because the data does not show the spouse’s characteristics before the
joint household is formed. However, using the years before couple gets mar-
ried, there is some support for assortative mating. 34 % of individuals who
are in the top decile (measured with previous 3-year average income) of the
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Table 4.2 Marginal effects from logistic regression, dependent variable being in the top 10%
VARIABLES Women Men Women Men Women Men
(single) (single) (cohabiting) (cohabiting) (cohabiting) (cohabiting)
Working as professional in
ﬁnance 0.0533*** 0.0656*** 0.0599*** 0.122*** 0.0629*** 0.127***
(0.00457) (0.00814) (0.00338) (0.00793) (0.00385) (0.00827)
legal services 0.0187*** -0.00390 0.0225*** -0.0106*** 0.0219*** -0.0100***
(0.00274) (0.00254) (0.00217) (0.00265) (0.00243) (0.00290)
health services 0.0166*** 0.0189*** 0.0122*** 0.0368*** 0.0146*** 0.0391***
(0.00247) (0.00588) (0.00182) (0.00591) (0.00213) (0.00627)
Education level
secondary level 0.0123*** 0.0135*** 0.00989*** 0.0439*** 0.00607*** 0.0345***
(0.00180) (0.00297) (0.00140) (0.00317) (0.00168) (0.00368)
lowest level tertiary 0.0248*** 0.0364*** 0.0266*** 0.0731*** 0.0243*** 0.0634***
(0.00155) (0.00254) (0.00123) (0.00256) (0.00145) (0.00287)
lower-degree level tertiary 0.0400*** 0.0680*** 0.0498*** 0.140*** 0.0466*** 0.126***
(0.00225) (0.00341) (0.00187) (0.00333) (0.00205) (0.00358)
higher-degree level tertiary 0.115*** 0.122*** 0.141*** 0.250*** 0.137*** 0.227***
(0.00343) (0.00454) (0.00269) (0.00430) (0.00288) (0.00461)
doctorate or equivalent 0.205*** 0.192*** 0.255*** 0.386*** 0.251*** 0.359***
(0.0122) (0.0132) (0.00858) (0.00986) (0.00866) (0.0101)
education in STEM 0.0116*** 0.0116*** 0.0223*** 0.0211*** 0.0268*** 0.0268***
(0.00298) (0.00299) (0.00245) (0.00316) (0.00281) (0.00341)
Occupation
self-employed 0.00206 -0.0201** 0.0382*** 0.0130** 0.0405*** 0.0294***
(0.0159) (0.00854) (0.00625) (0.00616) (0.00698) (0.00715)
upper management 0.187*** 0.270*** 0.165*** 0.384*** 0.172*** 0.405***
(0.0176) (0.0115) (0.00736) (0.00706) (0.00803) (0.00799)
senior employees in R&D 0.0119 0.0379*** 0.0142** 0.119*** 0.0289*** 0.152***
(0.0160) (0.00931) (0.00617) (0.00669) (0.00696) (0.00767)
senior employees in education -0.0267* -0.0618*** -0.0239*** -0.0673*** -0.00872 -0.0364***
(0.0154) (0.00917) (0.00565) (0.00673) (0.00646) (0.00777)
Other senior employees 0.0448*** 0.0579*** 0.0537*** 0.172*** 0.0696*** 0.199***
(0.0158) (0.00997) (0.00611) (0.00741) (0.00690) (0.00831)
supervisors -0.0167 -0.00170 -0.00578 0.0217*** 0.0114 0.0503***
(0.0160) (0.00887) (0.00613) (0.00632) (0.00703) (0.00740)
clerical workers, independent -0.0647*** -0.0530*** -0.0503*** 0.0252*** -0.0345*** 0.0526***
(0.0152) (0.00851) (0.00549) (0.00649) (0.00631) (0.00751)
clerical workers, routine -0.0917*** -0.112*** -0.0628*** -0.0794*** -0.0503*** -0.0528***
(0.0155) (0.0103) (0.00591) (0.0111) (0.00683) (0.0122)
lower-level admin. & clerical occ. -0.0930*** -0.0797*** -0.0792*** -0.0930*** -0.0682*** -0.0672***
(0.0152) (0.00833) (0.00542) (0.00612) (0.00623) (0.00716)
workers in agriculture -0.101*** -0.150*** -0.0914*** -0.165*** -0.0801*** -0.132***
(0.0171) (0.00878) (0.00614) (0.00992) (0.00761) (0.0114)
manufacturing workers -0.0647*** -0.0572*** -0.0562*** -0.0559*** -0.0375*** -0.0245***
(0.0165) (0.00808) (0.00631) (0.00597) (0.00758) (0.00714)
other production workers -0.101*** -0.121*** -0.0851*** -0.146*** -0.0732*** -0.117***
(0.0155) (0.00828) (0.00577) (0.00649) (0.00675) (0.00770)
distribution and service workers -0.107*** -0.132*** -0.0837*** -0.162*** -0.0698*** -0.134***
(0.0152) (0.00800) (0.00549) (0.00621) (0.00637) (0.00740)
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Table 4.2: Marginal effects from logistic regression, dependent variable being in the top 10%, cont’d
VARIABLES Women Men Women Men Women Men
(single) (single) (cohabiting) (cohabiting) (cohabiting) (cohabiting)
spouse characteristics
self-employed 0.00418 -0.0145*
(0.00447) (0.00762)
upper management -0.0243*** -0.0380***
(0.00443) (0.00812)
senior employees in R& D -0.0230*** -0.0431***
(0.00441) (0.00769)
senior employees in education -0.0210*** -0.0480***
(0.00467) (0.00753)
other senior employees -0.0196*** -0.0391***
(0.00448) (0.00753)
education in STEM -0.00653*** -0.00297
(0.00186) (0.00507)
spouse income group
2nd decile -0.0133*** -0.0317***
(0.00270) (0.00326)
3rd decile -0.0150*** -0.0348***
(0.00269) (0.00333)
4th decile -0.0115*** -0.0334***
(0.00268) (0.00336)
5th decile -0.0130*** -0.0307***
(0.00268) (0.00343)
6th decile -0.0101*** -0.0247***
(0.00266) (0.00347)
7th decile -0.00538** -0.0201***
(0.00263) (0.00355)
8th decile 0.00103 -0.00445
(0.00260) (0.00369)
9th decile 0.0186*** 0.0186***
(0.00265) (0.00394)
10th decile 0.0392*** 0.0517***
(0.00280) (0.00453)
top 1% 0.00534** 0.0538***
(0.00269) (0.0108)
Observations 1,017,288 964,654 1,017,288 964,654 812,841 810,482
Sample mean prob.
to be in top 10% 0.0414 0.1159 0.0760 0.2448 0.0860 0.2656
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All predictors at their mean values. Year ﬁxed effects also included in the regression.
income distribution one year before marriage marry a person who is either
in the 9th or 10th decile. This is especially strong for women: 65 percent of
women in the top decile marry either from the same or 9th income decile
(while the same is true for 25% percent for men).
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Figure 4.10 Association between spouse’s income decile and probability of being in the top 10% for
women, conditional on own education.
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Notes: The ﬁgure displays the marginal effect on the baseline probability to be in the top 10%
conditional on spouse’s income decile. The coefﬁcients are based on the last two columns in
the table 4.2.
4.4 Gender-speciﬁc income distributions
While section 4.3 explored women at the top of the joint income distribution,
this section analyses the gender-speciﬁc income distributions. By analysing
the gender speciﬁc income distribution we can explore whether the inequality
process is similar between genders and do the gender speciﬁc distribution
become similar over time. First I present the income shares calculated from
the gender-speciﬁc distributions which tell about the income concentration
within each gender. After this I explore the shape of the gender-speciﬁc top
income distributions.
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4.4.1 Top income shares 1995-2012
Table 4.3 shows the income shares from the gender speciﬁc income distribu-
tion in the top decile. Looking at the gender differences in the top decile,
we notice that income shares in different years are 3.5 to 6 percentage points
higher within men’s distribution compared to women’s. While the top decile
collect on average 24.7 percent of total income in the female distribution over
the observation years, the top in the male distribution collect 29.4 percent.
That is, the top income distribution within men is more unequal.
Relative to the men’s top income shares, the changes in the income con-
centration within the top of the women’s distribution has been modest. The
increased inequality at the end of the 90s also shows up in the gender speciﬁc
distributions; there was a clear increase in the gender speciﬁc income shares in
the year 1999 and after, whether measured in absolute or relative terms. How-
ever, the increase in inequality was much higher in the men’s distribution. In-
come shares have been more volatile for men and have ranged between 26,5 %
and 31 %. During the years of strong economic growth (and high stock market
returns) the gap between women’s and men’s income shares in the top 10%
got larger.
A closer look within the top income decile reveals that much of the in-
crease or decrease in inequality between the years comes from the very rich
gaining or losing more over the years. There is extremely small movement in
the income share within the percentiles 91-9915. The movements in the income
shares of the top 0.1% and percentiles 99-99.9 explain much of the overall de-
velopments within the top decile. For example between 1998 and 1999 the
women’s top 10% income share increased 1,21 percentage point while there
was practically no change in the income share when the top 1% is excluded.
The same is true in the men’s distribution. The share of income for the top
excluding the top 1% actually shrank even while there was almost a 3 per-
centage point increase in the income share for the top 10%.
Together with the observations on the overall top income shares presented
in section 4.3.1 we can conclude that the growth in inequality especially dur-
ing the late 90s was driven in large part by the very rich men gaining more
15Tables available upon request from the author.
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from the economic growth. Beside growing inequality within the top 10%, at
the end of the 90s the gender differences in the income shares also got larger.
The economic growth periods have been more favourable for men. However,
this is not an indication of a more favourable labour market and saving op-
portunities for men. One needs to bear in mind that the incomes within the
top groups of the men’s distribution are higher than in the women’s income
distribution and thus the economic growth and downturn periods affect men
and women disproportionally. The next section explores the shapes of the
gender-speciﬁc tail distributions more closely.
Table 4.3 Top income shares from gender-speciﬁc income distribution
Women Men
year top 10% top 5% top 1% top 0.1% top 10% top 5% top 1% top 0.1%
1995 23,03 % 13,87 % 4,43 % 1,13 % 26,59 % 16,83 % 6,00 % 1,63 %
1996 23,07 % 13,82 % 4,31 % 1,00 % 26,63 % 16,88 % 6,09 % 1,74 %
1997 23,49 % 14,24 % 4,66 % 1,23 % 27,06 % 17,32 % 6,40 % 1,80 %
1998 23,87 % 14,60 % 4,92 % 1,34 % 27,97 % 18,27 % 7,32 % 2,39 %
1999 25,08 % 15,87 % 6,14 % 2,32 % 30,84 % 21,38 % 10,43 % 4,99 %
2000 25,72 % 16,51 % 6,67 % 2,65 % 31,81 % 22,40 % 11,40 % 5,80 %
2001 24,43 % 15,17 % 5,39 % 1,66 % 29,53 % 19,93 % 8,89 % 3,47 %
2002 24,46 % 15,26 % 5,49 % 1,75 % 29,45 % 19,85 % 8,78 % 3,44 %
2003 24,77 % 15,55 % 5,67 % 1,84 % 28,89 % 19,14 % 7,85 % 2,50 %
2004 25,12 % 15,88 % 5,98 % 2,06 % 29,86 % 20,12 % 8,70 % 3,10 %
2005 25,22 % 15,96 % 5,95 % 2,03 % 29,83 % 20,00 % 8,47 % 2,85 %
2006 25,58 % 16,30 % 6,28 % 2,27 % 30,87 % 21,19 % 9,72 % 3,89 %
2007 25,48 % 16,14 % 5,96 % 1,78 % 31,38 % 21,68 % 10,02 % 3,73 %
2008 25,16 % 15,85 % 5,79 % 1,83 % 29,94 % 20,18 % 8,67 % 3,06 %
2009 24,60 % 15,30 % 5,28 % 1,43 % 29,28 % 19,38 % 7,81 % 2,40 %
2010 25,24 % 15,91 % 5,81 % 1,82 % 30,07 % 20,19 % 8,48 % 2,84 %
2011 25,42 % 16,10 % 5,94 % 1,89 % 31,02 % 21,26 % 9,68 % 3,99 %
2012 24,88 % 15,53 % 5,40 % 1,43 % 29,14 % 19,21 % 7,54 % 2,19 %
Notes: income measure is individual gross income excluding realized capital gains.
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4.4.2 Pareto model for gender-speciﬁc income distributions
In modelling top incomes, a typical practice is to assume a Paretian distri-
bution. In a recent contribution by Atkinson et al. (2018), the Pareto Type I
assumption was used in order to estimate Pareto α parameters separately for
men and women. The differences in αs were deﬁned as sort of a "glass ceiling"
because with the Pareto curve estimation one can show how fast, compared
to men, the women disappear from the top. However, even when a Pareto
model might be a good approximation for the joint distribution, there might
be differences when we are looking at the gender-speciﬁc top income distri-
butions. Testing for the Pareto distribution hypothesis is often neglected even
when the estimation of the parameters is meaningful only if the used data is
drawn from the same distribution.
In the case of top incomes characterized with a Pareto model16, the com-
plementary CDF (survivor function) is in the form
S(y) = (
y
ym
)−α, when y > ym. (4.2)
In the notation y denotes the income, ym > 0 is the threshold where Pareto
assumption is valid and the parameter α is the shape parameter which indi-
cates how heavy the top tail in the distribution is. The smaller the α, the more
heavier top tail the distribution has. The α needs to be greater than 1 in order
to have a ﬁnite mean. In this case the mean is αymα−1 . The α parameter is easily
estimated if the lower threshold ym is known with OLS or using maximum
likelihood (ML) estimator.
Taking logarithm from each side of equation 4.2 results in
log S(y) = α log y − C, where C is a constant. We notice that the relationship
between the complementary CDF and income is linear in a log-log plot. The
usual ﬁrst test to see if data is Pareto distributed is to graph this relationship.
Left panel of the ﬁgure 4.11 shows the log-lot plot and the linear ﬁt for the
top 5 % for selected years17. In the beginning of the observation period the
ﬁt is worse in the women’s distribution (lower R-squared), but over time as
16Pareto model here refers to Pareto type I model.
17Other years available in the supplementary material at  	


.
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women have catched up with men, the ﬁt improves. Also the absolute slope
parameter for women is higher indicating that the upper tail is less concen-
trated. However, the log-log plots and the linear ﬁts are only necessary con-
ditions and are not sufﬁcient in their own (Clauset et al., 2009; Cirillo, 2013).
This type of analysis should be complemented with other graphical tools and
distributional tests.
One property of Pareto distribution is that if the minimum threshold is cor-
rect, the estimated α parameter should be stable above the threshold18. The
right panel of ﬁgure 4.11 plots the estimated α against the minimum thresh-
olds19. The vertical lines give the threshold for top 10%, 5% and 1% in the joint
distribution. The ﬁgure reveals that at the turn of the century and after, the
Pareto tail is more prevalent. Due to the smaller number of women at the top
the men’s distribution follows the joint distribution. In previous applications
the common practice has been to assume the Pareto tail to be a valid approx-
imation for incomes above the 95th or 99th percentile, however ﬁgure 4.11
reveals that especially for the female distribution, the threshold is higher than
the 99th percentile. Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-ﬁt test statistics indi-
cate that the estimated Pareto distributions ﬁts the data best when the lower
threshold is set approximately to 200 000 euros for years after 2000 and this
corresponds to 99.5th percentiles and above. However, the number of obser-
vations are small at the very top and so this result needs to be replicated with
the full population data in the future.
The estimation of alphas for years 1995-1999 break down in the upper tail
of the women’s distribution. This is because either there are too few obser-
vations or the tail indeed is not Pareto distributed for women. It is hard to
determine in a similar way to Atkinson et al. (2018) whether the "glass ceil-
ing" has got thinner over time in Finland. Comparing the most stable alpha
estimates show that in some years the female alpha has been below men’s
while for other years the opposite is true. However, from the overall analysis
we can conclude that women have caught up with men and in this sense the
"glass ceiling" has got thinner.
18The ratio y
∗
ym where the y
∗ is the average income above the threshold ym is constant for all
ym in Paretian distribution. The ratio equals α1−α and thus the α is constant.
19α parameter is estimated by maximum likelihood (Stata package paretoﬁt). The method of
maximum likelihood gives unbiased parameter estimates in the limit of large sample size.
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Figure 4.11 Fitting a Pareto distribution to the top of the income distribution: log-log plot (left panel) and
estimated alphas (right panel)
4.5 Income dynamics at the top by gender
There is relatively little research about the top income mobility beyond one
year. Jenderny (2016) studies the top income mobility within 3 years with tax
record data for Germany and ﬁnds that the top income mobility was fairly
constant over the period 2001-2006 and persistence rates for top were some-
what higher than in Canada, the US and France. Evidence from Norway in-
dicates that their top income mobility has increased somewhat in the 1990s
(Aaberge et al., 2013). For the US and Canada, the concentration over time of
income to the richest percent for the US and richest 0.01 percent for Canada
has been stable, being around 60-70 percent (Saez and Veall, 2005; Auten et al.,
2013).
The income mobility among the Finnish top is brieﬂy discussed in Suoniemi
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Figure 4.11 (Cont.) Fitting a Pareto distribution to the top of the income distribution: log-log plot and
estimated alphas
Notes: The income concept is gross income excluding realized capital gains. In the left panel:
vertical lines represent the top 1% threshold from joint, women’s and men’s distribution. The
linear ﬁt is estimated for top 5%. In the right panel: dotted line represents the income threshold
(from the joint distribution) for top 10%, dashed line for top 5% and solid line for top 1%. The
alpha parameters are estimated with maximum likelihood.
and Rantala (2010). The overall income mobility is shown to be signiﬁcant
but declining in the early 00s. In the top groups approximately 66 percent
were the same individuals after 5 years but this decreased to 54 percent in the
early 00s. However, the data used in their study is top-coded so they cannot
study the mobility within the top 1% group properly. This section tackles the
question of income mobility with an improved dataset for women and men
separately.
The income mobility measure here is deﬁned as the proportion of individ-
uals who stay in a certain income group after 1, 5 or 10 years and is called per-
sistence rate as in Jenderny (2016). This captures the movement downwards
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of the certain top income group. To avoid the sizes of the groups affecting the
results, I also use equal group sizes within the top 10% and top 1%20. The pro-
portion to stay in a certain group is conditional on being in the same income
group on all periods being studied. The income groups are deﬁned for both
genders from the joint income distribution.
In ﬁgure 4.12 the persistence rates after one year are presented. The pro-
portion of individuals above the highest percentile, 0.1%, is the most transi-
tory and volatile. For men, this rate has ranged from 60 percent to almost 75 %
while for women the very top membership is more volatile ranging from 50 %
and 75 %. The other groups are more stable and exhibit a clear difference be-
tween the genders in all groups. The top 10% consists 83 % of same men after
one year, while there are just below 80 % of same women in this group.
Figure 4.12 Persistence rates for top groups, after 1 year
Notes: Income measure is gross individual income excluding realized capital gains.
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 show the persistence rates for 5 and 10-year-periods
over time. For these longer time periods there is a stark difference between
20Jenderny (2016) also discusses this point and proposes to use equal sizes or use rank statis-
tics.
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Figure 4.13 Persistence rates for top groups, 5 years
Notes: Income measure is gross individual income excluding realized capital gains. Condi-
tional on being in the top group each year.
the genders and the picture from the one year mobility is somewhat different.
For women, the top 1% and top 0.1% are on average similar but for men there
is a large difference in the rates between these two groups. The difference
between the other groups are larger than in the previous ﬁgure. In the top
10% approximately 50 % of the women stay in this top group after 5 years but
for men this rate has increased from 56 % to 60 %. The persistence of men
at the overall top over the 10-year horizon has increased somewhat and in
the top 1% there were approximately 30 percent of same men each year since
2000. For women, there is no similar increasing trend in the persistence and
the respective persistence rate is much lower, in approximately 19 %.
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Figure 4.14 Persistence rates for top groups, 10 years
Notes: Income measure is gross individual income excluding realized capital gains. Condi-
tional on being in the top group each year.
In the above ﬁgures, one shortcoming is that the group sizes vary which
mechanically increases the downward mobility in the smaller groups. To see
if richer people are genuinely prone to more downward mobility, I split the
top groups to equal sizes and compare these persistences between genders.
The results are presented with respect to only downward mobility, that is I
calculate the individuals who has the same or higher rank in year t compared
to t-1 or t-5. These results are presented in tables 4.4 and 4.5.
The persistence in equal size groups within top 10% reveal that higher in-
comes are less mobile. Also the gender divide is present, women are more
likely to move downward. In the top 1% the gender differences are not so
clear but the mobility also decreases in the upper tail. It is noticeable that
since the equal size groups are formed from the joint distribution, the gender-
speciﬁc groups are not equal sizes as women are under-represented in the top.
However, from the overall analysis in this section we can conclude that there
is sort of a "paper ﬂoor effect" (Guvenen et al., 2014) for women present in
Finland which has not disappeared over time.
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Table 4.4 Persistence within top 10%, after 1 year (left) and 5 years (right)
Persistence between t and t-1
1996 2005 2012
Rank Women Men Women Men Women Men
1 .498 .5 .472 .518 .487 .534
2 .487 .496 .491 .509 .520 .529
3 .511 .523 .509 .543 .474 .550
4 .513 .511 .478 .513 .510 .544
5 .547 .530 .531 .542 .509 .549
6 .551 .534 .559 .566 .558 .566
7 .546 .547 .553 .579 .546 .581
8 .558 .579 .562 .605 .581 .609
9 .591 .656 .614 .647 .624 .654
10 .657 .731 .665 .745 .688 .764
Persistence between t and t-5
1996 2005 2012
Rank Women Men Women Men Women Men
1 .410 .418 .332 .411 .313 .401
2 .414 .406 .349 .392 .306 .402
3 .423 .406 .338 .400 .291 .396
4 .414 .418 .334 .396 .285 .372
5 .406 .414 .323 .395 .297 .397
6 .412 .401 .350 .394 .315 .387
7 .393 .422 .338 .410 .319 .384
8 .373 .423 .331 .428 .317 .418
9 .340 .460 .354 .433 .345 .44
10 .418 .510 .453 .537 .474 .553
Table 4.5 Persistence within top 1%, after 1 year (left) and 5 years (right)
Persistence between t and t-1
1996 2005 2012
Rank Women Men Women Men Women Men
1 .327 .332 .384 .424 .326 .451
2 .333 .405 .449 .421 .369 .409
3 .268 .385 .413 .442 .346 .456
4 .393 .403 .450 .448 .324 .437
5 .407 .425 .333 .418 .382 .436
6 .421 .437 .314 .4 .346 .399
7 .346 .469 .474 .423 .420 .453
8 .365 .478 .436 .480 .397 .495
9 .489 .577 .508 .546 .5 .492
10 .709 .676 .727 .648 .637 .716
Persistence between t and t-5
1996 2005 2012
Rank Women Men Women Men Women Men
1 .25 .356 .243 .306 .304 .310
2 .303 .348 .159 .298 .202 .256
3 .338 .347 .266 .304 .204 .303
4 .287 .319 .225 .309 .220 .275
5 .291 .365 .253 .286 .259 .284
6 .169 .351 .259 .294 .217 .255
7 .211 .352 .305 .271 .202 .269
8 .354 .359 .236 .303 .176 .338
9 .333 .355 .254 .322 .193 .372
10 .370 .381 .424 .363 .337 .450
4.6 Discussion
This paper has analysed Finnish top incomes from a gender perspective. The
analysis contributes to the literature by using a unique dataset without top-
coding and extending the top income literature to the direction of gender is-
sues. I discovered that the share of women in the top group (deﬁned as the
top 10%) is slightly less than 30 percent and there has been few changes in
this share during the period 1995-2012. However, within this group women
have got richer, which shows up as increasing representation in the top 1%.
Comparing to other countries (Atkinson et al., 2018; Roine et al., 2017) it is
interesting to remark that the gender divide at top is similar even though the
institutions differ. In an international comparison Finland does not outper-
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form the other countries even when in general Finland is considered as one of
the most gender-equal countries.
I also discovered that there are clear gender-speciﬁc differences in the indi-
vidual income composition, income distribution and income dynamics. In the
top 1% and above, capital income is on average more important for women.
However, in the most recent years, the share of wage income has increased at
the top for women. Women also held more upper management positions at
the end of the observation period compared to the 1990s. This indicates that
the share of women who work their way upwards in the income ladder is on
the rise. Nonetheless, women are also more likely to drop from the top income
groups than men but the downward mobility decreases for both genders in
higher income ranks. The gender-speciﬁc income distributions show that the
income among women is less dispersed but the inequality has increased over
time.
Several explanations for increased interest in top incomes can be offered.
Top incomes are an important research ﬁeld as high incomes relate to polit-
ical and bargaining power that affects other parts of the income distribution
as well and have global signiﬁcance. With the help of improved data it is
possible to explore the reasons behind growing disparities. From an overall
inequality perspective, Roine and Waldenström (2015) show that top income
shares are in fact associated positively and strongly with several inequality
measures. The gender aspects of top incomes is of great importance because
strong claims cannot be made about gender equality with respect to income
without studying the whole distribution. Also, even in a country like Finland,
gender equality is a topical question and thus needs to be monitored.
This paper, as a ﬁrst step, has provided descriptive evidence on income
and women. The next important question is to determine what lies behind it.
There are several theories explaining the growing inequality especially at the
upper end of the distribution (Alvaredo et al., 2013) but since the dynamics
of the phenomenon is complex, the precise quantiﬁcation of different causal
factors is difﬁcult. The gender dimension makes further analysis even more
of a challenge because there are many unobservable factors affecting the po-
sitions of women and men in the labour markets and in the economy. For
example, we do not know how the perception of success in the labour market
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differs between genders, a factor that might explain differences in incomes.
Also, even when we have some knowledge about the gender norm effects on
the labour market participation in the US (Bertrand et al., 2015), the Nordic
countries have very different institutions.
The extent of assortative mating is an important question but with the
current dataset the analysis of this theme was incomplete. Another poten-
tial mechanism in the evolution of female top incomes is the income shifting
within households. Yet another fruitful avenue would be to analyse the de-
pendencies between earnings and capital distributions, i.e. copulas theory.
These questions should be studied further in the future.
Appendix
Major changes in Finnish top income taxation 1995-2012
Between years 1995-2012 the personal taxation has faced several reforms. The
main trend in the tax reforms has been to reduce the tax rates and broaden
the tax base. While the labour income taxation concerning the top income
receivers has gone through a minor reforms over time, the capital and wealth
income taxation has faced a more signiﬁcant reforms.
From 1990 onwards until 2005, the corporation taxes were fully imputed
(avoir ﬁscal system). The meaning here was to remove the double taxation of
dividends and certain kind of interest incomes. In this system, the corporation
tax base included the dividends and interests which were payed out to the
owners. The individual receiving the dividend or interest payment could then
reduce his own tax burden with the same amount that the corporation had
paid. This meant that if the dividend was capital income (after 1993), the
individual did not have to pay any tax for this income, as the two tax rates
(capital and corporation) were at the same level.
In 1993 Finland started to apply the dual income tax system. The earned
income (wages, beneﬁts, pensions, transfers, earnings shares, i.e. items not
listed as capital) is taxed at a progressive tax rate and capital income (inter-
ests, part of dividends and realized gains, rents, insurance income, enterprise
capital share, forest capital share) at a ﬂat tax rate. The tax rate on capital (and
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corporations) was 25 per cent in 1995, 28 per cent between years 1996-1999, 29
per cent between years 2000-2004 and 28 per cent between years 2005-2011.
Since 2012 there has been two tax rates for capital income, ﬁrst set to 30 per
cent for income that was less than 50 000 €and 32 per cent for income that
was over the threshold.
After avoir ﬁscal system was abolished, there was a shift towards the par-
tial double taxation of dividends. Part of the dividends were tax-free under
personal taxation. 70 per cent of the dividends from publicly listed companies
were included in the personal capital income base and the rest was tax free.
Dividends from privately held businesses are assigned as capital or labour in-
comes depending on the amount of dividend and net wealth of the business.
If the return on the shares was less than 9 % of the ﬁrms net wealth and the
dividends was below 90 000€(60 000€after 2011), the receiver paid no taxes.
The dividends exceeding these thresholds were 30% tax-free and 70% taxable
under capital income taxation. If the return on the shares were more than 9
% of the net worth, the exceeding amount was taxable under labour taxation
for the 70% part and tax-free for 30%. Since 2005 the corporation tax rates and
capital income tax rates have not moved hand in hand anymore, in fact the
corporation tax rates are much lower.
The common interests are under tax-at-source since 1991. These are not
part of the income statistics. Wealth tax was abolished from the beginning of
2006.
Income concepts
The incomes are drawn from the Statistics Finland’s total statistics where the
disposable income concept differs from the income distribution statistics. The
primary difference is that the income concept used here includes the taxable
realized capital gains.
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Income items Notes
gross labour income
=regular wages and salary
+ beneﬁts in kind
+ overtime compensation
- pay generating costs excl. travel expenses
+ gross self-employment income
=income from agriculture incl. property income
+ net forestry income
+ other self-employment income incl. property income
+ income from immaterial rights
+ gross capital income excl. interests taxed
=dividends income
+ realized capital gains
- realized losses
= FACTOR INCOME
+ income transfers
=pensions private and public
+ sickness beneﬁts
+ insurance payments
+ unemployment beneﬁts
+ other transfers
= GROSS INCOME
- income taxes, social contributions excl. tithe
- labour income taxes in municipal and state taxation
- capital income taxes in state taxation
- taxes from self-employment
- other mandatory contribution
- wealth tax until 2005
= DISPOSABLE INCOME
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Additional tables
Table 4.A1 Descriptive statistics on income items
Men Women
mean standard deviation ind. mean standard deviation ind.
1995
Gross income 23 849.17 24 431.48 178 085 18 084.71 13 476.35 194 606
Disposable income 16 426.40 16 606.88 178 085 13 533.64 8 927.10 194 606
Wage income 14 485.12 18 323.17 178 085 9 876.44 12 290.99 194 606
Self-emp. income 2 330.47 9 755.95 178 085 824.15 6 162.23 194 606
Capital income 885.52 16 006.93 178 085 434.93 7 151.84 194 606
Realized capital gains (RCG) 322.15 12 438.97 178 085 134.82 4 737.44 194 606
Transfers 6 148.07 8 482.74 178 085 6 949.20 6 369.24 194 606
Gross income excl. RCG 23 527.03 19 822.56 178 085 17 949.89 12 337.22 194 606
1996
Gross income 24 442.94 26 776.74 178 432 18 418.17 13 033.53 194 860
Disposable income 16 813.55 18 069.90 178 432 13 752.92 8 207.80 194 860
Wage income 15 137.96 18 938.34 178 432 10 356.27 12 777.38 194 860
Self-emp. Income 2 120.13 9 025.01 178 432 758.60 5 853.67 194 860
Capital income 1 009.93 19 519.87 178 432 447.00 5 818.30 194 860
Realized capital gains (RCG) 363.85 16 272.35 178 432 113.21 2 813.06 194 860
Transfers 6 174.91 8 688.28 178 43 6 856.31 6 399.90 194 860
Gross income excl. RCG 24 079.08 20 140.47 178 432 18 304.95 12 474.84 194 860
1997
Gross income 25 373.32 27 035.91 179 433 18 831.36 14 757.12 195 508
Disposable income 17 753.63 18 834.32 179 433 14 227.19 9 711.26 195 508
Wage income 15 876.14 19 679.58 179 433 10 713.97 13 077.80 195 508
Self-emp. Income 2 344.89 10 378.41 179 433 816.22 7 169.64 195 508
Capital income 1 247.40 18 311.88 179 433 570.31 7 550.40 195 508
Realized capital gains (RCG) 473.01 12 856.40 179 433 194.71 3 578.34 195 508
Transfers 5 904.90 8 554.37 179 433 6 730.87 6 366.90 195 508
Gross income excl. RCG 24 900.31 22 612.70 179 433 18 636.65 13 972.74 195 508
1998
Gross income 26 532.13 36 266.37 180 221 19 314.02 16 812.73 196 261
Disposable income 18 487.14 23 696.88 180 221 14 533.96 12 019.16 196 261
Wage income 16 870.06 25 051.32 180 221 11 104.89 13 470.49 196 261
Self-emp. Income 2 303.59 10 247.49 180 221 797.32 5 693.20 196 261
Capital income 1 590.96 25 964.59 180 221 714.68 11 450.76 196 261
Realized capital gains (RCG) 683.47 21 973.56 180 221 272.96 6 228.91 196 261
Transfers 5 767.52 8 793.93 180 221 6 697.15 6 650.08 196 261
Gross income excl. RCG 25 848.66 27 503.61 180 221 19 041.06 15 060.64 196 261
1999
Gross income 28 316.34 84 430.28 180 964 20 027.44 33 567.54 197 197
Disposable income 19 698.52 46 370.54 180 964 15 114.56 23 416.11 197 197
Wage income 17 961.50 70 113.69 180 964 11 484.06 17 841.83 197 197
Self-emp. Income 2 331.71 11 666.58 180 964 808.73 5 918.34 197 197
Capital income 2 268.61 44 761.98 180 964 1 053.90 28 920.09 197 197
Realized capital gains (RCG) 1 176.74 40 157.79 180 964 534.44 24 956.79 197 197
Transfers 5 754.52 9 057.43 180 964 6 680.78 6 631.10 197 197
Gross income excl. RCG 27 139.59 71 674.95 180 964 19 493.01 19 961.04 197 197
2000
Gross income 29 295.78 158 111.70 181 960 20 351.85 41 220.93 197 671
Disposable income 20 343.87 75 889.04 181 960 15 350.01 28 725.41 197 671
Wage income 18 687.67 148 103.80 181 960 11 779.28 19 846.49 197 671
Self-emp. Income 2 355.33 10 547.42 181 960 827.68 6 059.22 197 671
Capital income 2 653.74 47 983.75 181 960 1 230.53 36 363.74 197 671
Realized capital gains (RCG) 1 386.22 44 295.56 181 960 632.57 31 762.64 197 671
Transfers 5 599.04 8 813.98 181 960 6 514.37 6 568.32 197 671
Gross income excl. RCG 27 909.57 149 444.90 181 960 19 719.29 21 738.05 197 671
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Table 4.A1: Descriptive statistics on income items, cont.
Men Women
mean standard deviation ind. mean standard deviation ind.
2001
Gross income 28 746.85 54 934.64 183 110 20 395.26 22 418.86 198 642
Disposable income 20 373.97 33 433.41 183 110 15 640.21 17 979.2 198 642
Wage income 18 778.18 39 896.15 183 110 12 173.30 14 692.82 198 642
Self-emp. Income 2 250.93 10 262.49 183 110 819.25 6 233.17 198 642
Capital income 2 058.83 35 507.53 183 110 866.43 17 711.16 198 642
Realized capital gains (RCG) 649.68 30 385.08 183 110 211.67 4 336.40 198 642
Transfers 5 658.97 8 863.02 183 110 6 536.26 6 713.41 198 642
Gross income excl. RCG 28 097.17 43 348.68 183 110 20 183.58 21 280.70 198 642
2002
Gross income 29 123.12 61 302.91 184 446 20 857.98 22 539.17 199 683
Disposable income 20 850.89 36 141.55 184 446 16 079.59 16 764.12 199 683
Wage income 18 872.72 51 584.28 184 446 12 483.00 16 378.91 199 683
Self-emp. Income 2 284.91 10 823.16 184 446 817.43 6 226.86 199 683
Capital income 2 070.74 31 392.89 184 446 890.63 16536.21 199 683
Realized capital gains (RCG) 532.67 21 793.02 184 446 205.30 6 947.577 199 683
Transfers 5 894.75 9 280.47 184 446 6 666.92 6 914.176 199 683
Gross income excl. RCG 28 590.45 56 221.53 184 446 20 652.68 20 847.02 199 683
2003
Gross income 29 439.35 38 088.16 185 621 21 431.54 35 630.47 200 724
Disposable income 21 282.85 28 059.99 185 621 16 596.92 31 713.02 200 724
Wage income 18 884.19 25 358.20 185 621 12 770.26 15 020.87 200 724
Self-emp. Income 2 231.93 10 833.19 185 621 821.89 6 347.59 200 724
Capital income 2 238.89 27 049.01 185 621 1 040.41 32 831.1 200 724
Realized capital gains (RCG) 519.06 13 011.86 185 621 240.77 4 649.47 200 724
Transfers 6 084.34 9 351.26 185 621 6 798.97 7 003.70 200 724
Gross income excl. RCG 28 920.28 34 042.34 185 621 21 190.77 34 333.1 200 724
2004
Gross income 30 774.13 54 233.35 186 835 22 239.27 34 705.44 201 587
Disposable income 22 389.6 41 978.93 186 835 17 290.21 29 936.48 201 587
Wage income 19 518.40 26 617.47 186 835 13 267.07 16 012.78 201 587
Self-emp. Income 2 226.92 11 438.36 186 835 823.58 6 303.94 201 587
Capital income 2789.28 459 59.11 186 835 1 199.67 31 447.27 201 587
Realized capital gains (RCG) 742.00 29 561.99 186 835 285.94 7 729.71 201 587
Transfers 6 239.54 9 500.58 186 835 6 948.95 7 058.77 201 587
Gross income excl. RCG 30 032.13 42 331.76 186 835 21 953.33 32 143.61 201 587
2005
Gross income 31 432.23 47 233.92 188 196 22 788.03 37 467.06 202 676
Disposable income 22 737.96 32 464.81 188 196 17 618.90 27 844.65 202 676
Wage income 20 104.56 28 194.18 188 196 13 678.13 16 365.57 202 676
Self-emp. Income 2 294.226 11 724.75 188 196 842.20 6 822.31 202 676
Capital income 2 734.68 36 493.14 188 196 1 230.217 34 309.48 202 676
Realized capital gains (RCG) 917.23 27 116.37 188 196 415.48 23 766.15 202 676
Transfers 6 298.76 9 598.30 188 196 7 037.47 7 169.50 202 676
Gross income excl. RCG 30 514.99 34 726.93 188 196 22 372.55 24 672.98 202 676
2006
Gross income 32 602.45 77 706.96 189 162 23 283.96 46 166.02 203 564
Disposable income 23 595.48 53 827.63 189 162 18 059.09 33 142.97 203 564
Wage income 20 784.22 34 946.61 189 162 13 984.39 17 240.99 203 564
Self-emp. Income 2 279.43 11 889.13 189 162 868.86 7 793.89 203 564
Capital income 3 192.87 68 265.04 189 162 1 342.80 43 178.40 203 564
Realized capital gains (RCG) 1 422.26 63 819.02 189 162 562.42 39 132.76 203 564
Transfers 6 345.94 9 761.04 189 162 7 087.89 7 282.32 203 564
Gross income excl. RCG 31 180.19 39 445.43 189 162 22 721.54 20 021.14 203 564
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Table 4.A1: Descriptive statistics on income items, cont.
Men Women
mean standard deviation ind. mean standard deviation ind.
2007
Gross income 33 878.47 61 372.77 190 225 23 741.41 22 234.53 204 479
Disposable income 24 694.12 41 259.53 190 225 18 513.12 15 218.33 204 479
Wage income 21 355.52 37 437.83 190 225 14 356.42 17 939.89 204 479
Self-emp. Income 2 576.14 13 033.17 190 225 944.13 7 503.72 204 479
Capital income 3 579.39 45 194.79 190 225 1 350.02 14 103.93 204 479
Realized capital gains (RCG) 1 618.48 35 647.42 190 225 538.25 8 910.60 204 479
Transfers 6 367.42 9 959.44 190 225 7 090.83 7 362.87 204 479
Gross income excl. RCG 32 260.00 45 148.83 190 225 23 203.16 19 059.69 204 479
2008
Gross income 33 183.39 52 508.13 191 631 23 881.18 33 250.17 205 709
Disposable income 24 376.7 36 049.08 191 631 18 725.67 23 599.75 205 709
Wage income 21 529.11 32 992.06 191 631 14 728.93 17 579.40 205 709
Self-emp. Income 2 361 11 707.65 191 631 914.99 7 477.75 205 709
Capital income 2 885.797 39 229.37 191 631 1 179.053 28 961.92 205 709
Realized capital gains (RCG) 827.77 27 413.85 191 631 359.70 26 790.21 205 709
Transfers 6 407.48 10 025.93 191 631 7 058.20 7 399.89 205 709
Gross income excl. RCG 32 355.62 42 405.03 191 631 23 521.48 19 130.40 205 709
2009
Gross income 32 538.35 41 686.72 192 781 24 402.18 22 242.49 206 678
Disposable income 24 315.83 28 567.63 192 781 19 357.87 15 633.54 206 678
Wage income 20 756.65 30 112.24 192 781 14 978.24 17 757.11 206 678
Self-emp. Income 2 039.986 10 468.38 192 781 843.40 7 118.38 206 678
Capital income 2 520.71 27 373.71 192 781 1 036.73 15 301.07 206 678
Realized capital gains (RCG) 571.55 15 534.11 192 781 259.41 11 424.75 206 678
Transfers 7 221.01 10 570.30 192 781 7 543.81 7 852.34 206 678
Gross income excl. RCG 31 966.80 36 678.86 192 781 24 142.76 18 263.93 206 678
2010
Gross income 33 444.27 46 387.91 194 116 24 955.60 30 209.25 207 939
Disposable income 24 926.83 32 977.38 194 116 19 711.78 21 609.74 207 939
Wage income 20 748 27 045.78 194 116 15 121.22 18 551.04 207 939
Self-emp. Income 2 162.58 11 936.91 194 116 878.46 7 740.90 207 939
Capital income 3 088.66 35 973.95 194 116 1 267.61 24 545.77 207 939
Realized capital gains (RCG) 941.51 24 013.86 194 116 403.72 17 747.64 207 939
Transfers 7 445.03 10 798.48 194 116 7 688.31 7 933.07 207 939
Gross income excl. RCG 32 502.76 36 154.23 194 116 24 551.88 20 650.54 207 939
2011
Gross income 33 948.14 104 285.10 195 295 24 971.76 27 059.80 208 923
Disposable income 25 275.19 75 195.20 195 295 19 711.07 19 235.51 208 923
Wage income 20 956.06 27 703.1 195 295 15 138.08 18 485.98 208 923
Self-emp. Income 2 196.028 12 254.84 195 295 909.79 7 869.95 208 923
Capital income 3 469.56 99 586.63 195 295 1 304.282 20 508.62 208 923
Realized capital gains (RCG) 1 189.019 88 146.57 195 295 388.45 14 324.62 208 923
Transfers 7 326.49 10 813.49 195 295 7 619.60 7 924.53 208 923
Gross income excl. RCG 32 759.12 41 015.78 195 295 24 583.30 21 803.60 208 923
2012
Gross income 33 092.08 40 783.97 196 967 25 032.32 22 195.65 210 288
Disposable income 24 572.82 28 086.85 196 967 19 732.23 15 082.27 210 288
Wage income 20 850.40 26 704.07 196 967 15 225 18 634.98 210 288
Self-emp. Income 2 051.664 11 383.39 196 967 877.20 7 992.11 210 288
Capital income 2 617.73 29 318.28 196 967 1117.12 13 660.51 210 288
Realized capital gains (RCG) 522.94 13 324.35 196 967 240.75 4 027.85 210 288
Transfers 7 572.28 11 040.32 196 967 7 813.00 8 104.217 210 288
Gross income excl. RCG 32 569.14 36 110.50 196 967 24 791.57 21 495.90 210 288
Observations over time 3 357 480 3 626 995
Notes: income items deﬂated to 2008 euros.
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Table 4.A2 Marginal effects from logistic regression, , dependent variable being in the top 10%, full list
VARIABLES Women Men Women Men Women Men
(single) (single) (cohabiting) (cohabiting) (cohabiting) (cohabiting)
Working as professional in
ﬁnance 0.0533*** 0.0656*** 0.0599*** 0.122*** 0.0629*** 0.127***
(0.00457) (0.00814) (0.00338) (0.00793) (0.00385) (0.00827)
legal services 0.0187*** -0.00390 0.0225*** -0.0106*** 0.0219*** -0.0100***
(0.00274) (0.00254) (0.00217) (0.00265) (0.00243) (0.00290)
health services 0.0166*** 0.0189*** 0.0122*** 0.0368*** 0.0146*** 0.0391***
(0.00247) (0.00588) (0.00182) (0.00591) (0.00213) (0.00627)
Education level
secondary level 0.0123*** 0.0135*** 0.00989*** 0.0439*** 0.00607*** 0.0345***
(0.00180) (0.00297) (0.00140) (0.00317) (0.00168) (0.00368)
lowest level tertiary 0.0248*** 0.0364*** 0.0266*** 0.0731*** 0.0243*** 0.0634***
(0.00155) (0.00254) (0.00123) (0.00256) (0.00145) (0.00287)
lower-degree level tertiary 0.0400*** 0.0680*** 0.0498*** 0.140*** 0.0466*** 0.126***
(0.00225) (0.00341) (0.00187) (0.00333) (0.00205) (0.00358)
higher-degree level tertiary 0.115*** 0.122*** 0.141*** 0.250*** 0.137*** 0.227***
(0.00343) (0.00454) (0.00269) (0.00430) (0.00288) (0.00461)
doctorate or equivalent 0.205*** 0.192*** 0.255*** 0.386*** 0.251*** 0.359***
(0.0122) (0.0132) (0.00858) (0.00986) (0.00866) (0.0101)
education in STEM 0.0116*** 0.0116*** 0.0223*** 0.0211*** 0.0268*** 0.0268***
(0.00298) (0.00299) (0.00245) (0.00316) (0.00281) (0.00341)
Other control variables (own)
married 0.00295 0.0342*** 0.00286** 0.0289*** -0.00217 0.0256***
(0.00204) (0.00280) (0.00129) (0.00203) (0.00158) (0.00229)
children 0.0194*** 0.0265*** 0.0116*** 0.0375*** 0.0107*** 0.0354***
(0.00142) (0.00256) (0.00114) (0.00183) (0.00134) (0.00208)
small children -0.0139*** -0.0171*** -0.0188*** 0.00314* -0.0216*** 0.0106***
(0.00212) (0.00490) (0.00113) (0.00181) (0.00130) (0.00197)
living in the capital region 0.0323*** 0.0303*** 0.0386*** 0.0752*** 0.0350*** 0.0708***
(0.00152) (0.00199) (0.00143) (0.00235) (0.00161) (0.00259)
age 0.00693*** 0.0101*** 0.0154*** 0.0243*** 0.0170*** 0.0212***
(0.000278) (0.000379) (0.000425) (0.000503) (0.000812) (0.00106)
age squared -4.69e-05*** -7.22e-05*** -0.000139*** -0.000203*** -0.000161*** -0.000181***
(2.90e-06) (4.29e-06) (4.75e-06) (5.42e-06) (8.66e-06) (1.12e-05)
native ﬁnnish 0.0314*** 0.0527*** 0.0449*** 0.144*** 0.0458*** 0.143***
(0.00303) (0.00397) (0.00249) (0.00468) (0.00341) (0.00616)
native swedish 0.0404*** 0.0609*** 0.0419*** 0.164*** 0.0391*** 0.149***
(0.00416) (0.00516) (0.00325) (0.00586) (0.00456) (0.00791)
self-employed 0.00206 -0.0201** 0.0382*** 0.0130** 0.0405*** 0.0294***
(0.0159) (0.00854) (0.00625) (0.00616) (0.00698) (0.00715)
upper management 0.187*** 0.270*** 0.165*** 0.384*** 0.172*** 0.405***
(0.0176) (0.0115) (0.00736) (0.00706) (0.00803) (0.00799)
senior employees in R 0.0119 0.0379*** 0.0142** 0.119*** 0.0289*** 0.152***
(0.0160) (0.00931) (0.00617) (0.00669) (0.00696) (0.00767)
senior employees in education -0.0267* -0.0618*** -0.0239*** -0.0673*** -0.00872 -0.0364***
(0.0154) (0.00917) (0.00565) (0.00673) (0.00646) (0.00777)
other senior employees 0.0448*** 0.0579*** 0.0537*** 0.172*** 0.0696*** 0.199***
(0.0158) (0.00997) (0.00611) (0.00741) (0.00690) (0.00831)
supervisors -0.0167 -0.00170 -0.00578 0.0217*** 0.0114 0.0503***
(0.0160) (0.00887) (0.00613) (0.00632) (0.00703) (0.00740)
clerical workers, independent -0.0647*** -0.0530*** -0.0503*** 0.0252*** -0.0345*** 0.0526***
(0.0152) (0.00851) (0.00549) (0.00649) (0.00631) (0.00751)
clerical workers, routine -0.0917*** -0.112*** -0.0628*** -0.0794*** -0.0503*** -0.0528***
(0.0155) (0.0103) (0.00591) (0.0111) (0.00683) (0.0122)
lower-level admin. & clerical occ. -0.0930*** -0.0797*** -0.0792*** -0.0930*** -0.0682*** -0.0672***
(0.0152) (0.00833) (0.00542) (0.00612) (0.00623) (0.00716)
workers in agriculture -0.101*** -0.150*** -0.0914*** -0.165*** -0.0801*** -0.132***
(0.0171) (0.00878) (0.00614) (0.00992) (0.00761) (0.0114)
manufacturing workers -0.0647*** -0.0572*** -0.0562*** -0.0559*** -0.0375*** -0.0245***
(0.0165) (0.00808) (0.00631) (0.00597) (0.00758) (0.00714)
other production workers -0.101*** -0.121*** -0.0851*** -0.146*** -0.0732*** -0.117***
(0.0155) (0.00828) (0.00577) (0.00649) (0.00675) (0.00770)
distribution and service workers -0.107*** -0.132*** -0.0837*** -0.162*** -0.0698*** -0.134***
(0.0152) (0.00800) (0.00549) (0.00621) (0.00637) (0.00740)
students -0.115*** -0.171*** -0.0863*** -0.223*** -0.0755*** -0.200***
(0.0152) (0.00770) (0.00559) (0.00625) (0.00644) (0.00736)
pensioners -0.108*** -0.155*** -0.0797*** -0.169*** -0.0676*** -0.136***
(0.0152) (0.00762) (0.00542) (0.00563) (0.00626) (0.00677)
unemployed -0.115*** -0.170*** -0.0913*** -0.214*** -0.0799*** -0.186***
(0.0151) (0.00757) (0.00540) (0.00554) (0.00621) (0.00665)
unknown -0.0925*** -0.146*** -0.0350*** -0.102*** -0.0195** -0.0685***
(0.0154) (0.00790) (0.00668) (0.00732) (0.00759) (0.00852)
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Table 4.A2: Marginal effects from logistic regression, dependent variable being in the top 10%, full list
(cont.)
VARIABLES Women Men Women Men Women Men
(single) (single) (cohabiting) (cohabiting) (cohabiting) (cohabiting)
spouse characteristics
self-employed 0.00418 -0.0145*
(0.00447) (0.00762)
upper management -0.0243*** -0.0380***
(0.00443) (0.00812)
senior employees in R& D -0.0230*** -0.0431***
(0.00441) (0.00769)
senior employees in education -0.0210*** -0.0480***
(0.00467) (0.00753)
other senior employees -0.0196*** -0.0391***
(0.00448) (0.00753)
supervisors -0.0250*** -0.0284***
(0.00451) (0.00797)
clerical workers, independent -0.0132*** -0.0261***
(0.00457) (0.00719)
clerical workers, routine -0.0130* -0.00932
(0.00734) (0.00845)
lower-level admin. and clerical occ. -0.0204*** -0.0423***
(0.00464) (0.00710)
workers in agriculture -0.0269*** -0.0638***
(0.00936) (0.0140)
manufacturing workers -0.0297*** -0.0350***
(0.00451) (0.00840)
other production workers -0.0269*** -0.0502***
(0.00521) (0.00860)
distribution and service workers -0.0231*** -0.0478***
(0.00490) (0.00765)
students -0.0127** -0.0506***
(0.00546) (0.00765)
pensioners -0.00570 -0.0140*
(0.00462) (0.00771)
unemployed -0.0133*** -0.0422***
(0.00459) (0.00733)
unknown -0.0254*** -0.0562***
(0.00539) (0.00837)
age -0.00171** 0.00361***
(0.000730) (0.00106)
age squared 2.24e-05*** -2.94e-05**
(7.43e-06) (1.16e-05)
native ﬁnnish -0.00147 0.0139*
(0.00521) (0.00727)
native swedish -0.000433 0.0370***
(0.00604) (0.00906)
education in STEM -0.00653*** -0.00297
(0.00186) (0.00507)
secondary level 0.00538** 0.0134***
(0.00256) (0.00347)
lowest level tertiary 0.00588*** 0.0261***
(0.00189) (0.00252)
lower-degree level tertiary 0.00308 0.0110***
(0.00206) (0.00299)
higher-degree level tertiary 0.000194 0.00766**
(0.00204) (0.00345)
doctorate or equivalent -0.00784** 0.00375
(0.00321) (0.00828)
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Table 4.A2: Marginal effects from logistic regression, dependent variable being in the top 10%, full list
(cont.)
VARIABLES Women Men Women Men Women Men
(single) (single) (cohabiting) (cohabiting) (cohabiting) (cohabiting)
spouse income group
2nd decile -0.0133*** -0.0317***
(0.00270) (0.00326)
3rd decile -0.0150*** -0.0348***
(0.00269) (0.00333)
4th decile -0.0115*** -0.0334***
(0.00268) (0.00336)
5th decile -0.0130*** -0.0307***
(0.00268) (0.00343)
6th decile -0.0101*** -0.0247***
(0.00266) (0.00347)
7th decile -0.00538** -0.0201***
(0.00263) (0.00355)
8th decile 0.00103 -0.00445
(0.00260) (0.00369)
9th decile 0.0186*** 0.0186***
(0.00265) (0.00394)
10th decile 0.0392*** 0.0517***
(0.00280) (0.00453)
top 1% 0.00534** 0.0538***
(0.00269) (0.0108)
Observations 1,017,288 964,654 1,017,288 964,654 812,841 810,482
Sample mean prob.
to be in top 10% 0.0414 0.1159 0.0760 0.2448 0.0860 0.2656
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All predictors at their mean values. Year ﬁxed effects also included in the regression.
150
Additional ﬁgures
Figure 4.A1 Share of women in different income groups, 1995-2012
10
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%
1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012
top 10% top 5%
top 1% top 0.1%
Notes: income distribution based on 3-year average gross income excluding the realized capital
gains.
Figure 4.A2 Share of women in different income groups, years 1995-2012
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Notes: income distribution based on gross income including the realized capital gains.
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5 THE EFFECTS OF WORKING HOURS
REDUCTION ON HEALTH AND LABOUR
MARKET EXITS: EVIDENCE FROM THE
FINNISH PART-TIME PENSION PROGRAM
Terhi Ravaska, Labour Institute for Economic Research, Helsinki, Finland
Abstract
In this essay1 I examine the effects of reduced working hours on health-related factors
such as purchase of prescription drugs, sickness absence days and labour market exits
of elderly workers. In assessing the causal relationships, I exploit the eligibility ages
and the changes in these age limits in a part-time retirement scheme and utilize a
difference-in-differences method and a ﬁxed effects instrumental variable estimation.
The eligibility age of part-time retirement was lowered by 2 years to 56 in 1998. In
the difference-in-differences setting the treatment group are those eligible for part-time
retirement in the age of 56 while the control group had eligibility age at the age of 58.
I ﬁnd that the mental illness drug purchases increased in the treatment group while
for other outcomes the results are imprecise. In the instrumental variable setting I
ﬁnd that the take-up of part-time pension decreased the probability to purchase any
drugs by 2.8 percentage points for the group of compliers while there is no evidence of
a relevant effect on the probability to buy mental illness drugs. The reduction in the
1I would like to thank Jukka Pirttilä, Jutta Viinikainen, Maarit Olkkola, Tuuli Paukkeri, Luke
Munford and Tuomas Kosonen for valuable comments as well as seminar participants in the
Labour Institute for Economic Research and Allecon seminars in 2017 and the discussants in
the Summer Meeting of Finnish Economist in Jyväskylä, IIPF conference in Tampere 2018 and
EuHea meeting in Catania in 2018. I also thank Kela for partly ﬁnancing this project.
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risk of early labour market exits were substantial, on average 5 percentage points, in
the group of compliers.
Keywords: Part-time pension, health, FE-IV, difference-in-differences
JEL classiﬁcation: J26, I10
5.1 Introduction
Ageing nations are struggling to ﬁnd ways to increase labour force participa-
tion. One of the policy responses has been to increase the retirement age but
the health and work ability of the elderly have been a concern. Beside the dis-
ability pension expenditure there are public expenses stemming from sickness
days, drug prescriptions and public health care and there are indirect costs in
the form of loss of output. Beside the adjustments in the retirement ages the
policy responses which aim to improve the health of the elderly workers are
also vital. One response has been to promote ﬂexible work conditions and
gradual retirement schemes, such as part-time pension schemes.
A part-time pension program aims to prolong working careers by reducing
work loads which in turn can improve health and work motivation. If it is
effective policy, this should reduce the number of disability pension spells and
sickness absences. It has also been proposed that decreasing the work burden
at the end of the career could ameliorate the well-being in the full retirement.
However, there is little knowledge of the actual effects of part-time work on
health and well-being.
In this study I explore whether the part-time pension program and work-
ing hours reduction affects the health outcomes of elderly workers and re-
duces the risk of early labour market exits. The Finnish part-time pension
scheme is suitable to study these questions because it certainly reduced the
hours worked and was very generous so it had very modest effects on the dis-
posable income or the future pension rights2. Also most of the part-time pen-
sioners continued in their career job, so the effects are not driven by changes
in the work community. The focus is on the short-term effects using register
2The scheme under study was abolished in the beginning of 2017 and replaced with ﬂexi-
ble partial old-age pension with permanent reduction in pension but without requirement of
reducing working hours.
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data on health and labour market outcomes for the years 1995-2004.
I study these question in two empirical settings. Firstly, I exploit the changes
in the eligibility age for the part-time pension. My control group are indi-
viduals who could retire at the age of 58 while in the treatment group the
individuals were able to retire from the age of 56 onwards. In a difference-
in-differences (DD) setting I am able to answer how the access (that is the
intention-to-treat effects) to part-time pension earlier affected different health
and labour market outcomes. I also study the take-up effect of part-time pen-
sion. As the part-time retirement decision is potentially endogenous, I in-
strument the decisions with the eligibility ages and account for the individual
unobserved effects. This individual ﬁxed effects instrumental variable (FE-IV)
method reveals the effects for subgroup of compliers.
The data include all part-time pensioners born between 1940-1947 and who
took part-time pension between 1998-2005. The primary health outcomes of
interest are sickness days and the purchase of prescription drugs. The drug
purchases and diagnosis data are on a monthly level and include the code for
the drug or disease. The different causes of illness are taken into account by
dividing the drug purchase data to represent the different aspects of mental
and physical health. The sickness day spells data cover sickness absences of
over 10 days. The dataset also includes administrative records on individual
demographics and data on other pension spells as well as earnings informa-
tion. I also study the effects of reduced hours on labour market exits via early
retirement schemes.
I ﬁnd that the drug purchases and the sickness absence spells respond to
the part-time pension program or hours reduction. The DD estimates are im-
precise but suggest that there was an increase in the drugs purchased due to
the reform. For the take-up effect of the part-time pension I ﬁnd that reducing
working hours decreases the probability to purchase any drugs by 2.8 per-
centage points in a short term within a sub-group of compliers. This group
has the worse health outcomes during the pre-pension period. In the num-
ber of packages purchased the average effect is a reduction of a quarter of a
package within a year. The probability of long sickness absence one year af-
ter part-time retirement is reduced by 6.9 percentage points. The effects are
stronger for women. The risk of early labour market exits is reduced by 5.5
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percentage points.
This paper contributes to the literature on the relationship between work
(or non-work) and health especially in the context of elderly workers. The
previous literature has focused on full retirement and there is little knowl-
edge of the issue at the intensive margin of working hours. The paper also
contributes by evaluating the Finnish part-time pension scheme thoroughly
with rich administrative data and with a suitable research design to estimate
the causal effects. The set goals for the part-time pension were to improve
health and work-ability and to reduce the risk of early labour market exits.
However, the empirical evidence is scarce.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 5.2 summarizes the relevant lit-
erature. Section 5.3 goes through the institutional setting and the data used.
Section 5.4 introduces the empirical strategies. Section 5.5 presents the results.
Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Previous literature
There is some evidence that long working hours are positively associated with
cardiovascular disease and stroke (Virtanen et al., 2012; Kivimäki et al., 2015),
worse life habits measured as physical activity, smoking, alcohol consump-
tion and diet (Taris et al., 2011) and depressive symptoms (Virtanen et al.,
2018). For causal estimates, Cygan-Rehm and Wunder (2018) instrument the
weekly working hours with statutory work-week hour regulation and show
that one hour increase has adverse effects on health while Ahn (2016) show
that reduced work week induce healthier life-style. Yet it is plausible that
work hours have a different effect on health in the interval of part-time and
normal work hours. The effects of reducing work hours from normal hours
are a less studied topic.
The previous literature on the health effects of working on elderly workers
mainly concern full retirement. However, there is at least one working pa-
per explicitly studying a part-time work scheme in the late career on health
(Kantarci and Kolodziej, 2017). In this study the ﬁnding is that part-time work
in late career has positive effects on health compared to full-time work. Re-
sults from Dave et al. (2008) indicate that part-time work has a less negative
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effect on the health outcomes relative to the full-time retirement. The out-
comes of these studies were survey answers so I contribute to this scarce liter-
ature by providing also evidence based on outcomes measured with register
data.
The most common identiﬁcation strategy in studies of retiring and health
is based on instrumental variables where the rules of the retirement eligibility
ages act as instruments. The identifying assumption is that health is affected
by the instrument only indirectly through the effect of the actual retirement.
The instrumental variable approach suggests that full-retirement has a neg-
ative effect on cognitive functioning (Rohwedder and Willis, 2010; Bonsang
et al., 2012)3, while Behncke (2012) ﬁnds negative health effects on general
health. The identifying assumption in the instrumental variable approach is
somewhat strong. Without a change in the age limit the individual can adjust
her behaviour already before the actual age is reached. That means that the
estimated effect is not a retirement effect per se. In the Finnish context there
is also a sudden change in the part-time retirement age which mitigates this
problem.
Another method recently used to reveal the causal effects between non-
work and health has been to utilize reforms in the pension schemes. Hallberg
et al. (2015) study the targeted early retirement offer in Sweden which enabled
some of the workers to retire at the age of 55 while others retired at the age
of 60. Their conclusion is that early retirement leads to a reduced probability
of dying conditional on age and reduced time spent in inpatient care. Peo-
ple with low pre-retirement incomes or low education beneﬁt the most from
the reduction in eligibility age. However, the reduction in the eligibility age
in Norway had no effect on mortality (Hernaes et al., 2013). The mixed re-
sults might be caused by the fact that the Swedish reform was targeted to a
speciﬁc group (the military personnel) while the Norwegian reform affected
a larger part of the population. Hagen (2018) studies retirement effects on
health among local government workers in Sweden. The reform he exploits
caused a two-year increase in the normal retirement age. He ﬁnds no retire-
ment effects on prescription drug purchases, mortality or hospitalizations.
3Rohwedder and Willis (2010) use cross-country data from several countries which limits
the interpretability of the results because the cognitive functioning and institutions might be
correlated and other unobserved differences between countries might inﬂuence the results.
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5.3 Institutional framework and data
5.3.1 Finnish pension system
Part-time pension program
The part-time pension program was introduced in 1987 for private sector
workers to increase the ﬂexibility at the end of their careers. The age limit
was set to 60 while old-age retirement age was 65. The public sector work-
ers have been eligible for part-time pension since 1989 but their age limit was
originally set to 58. In 1994 the eligibility ages were harmonized for both sec-
tors and set to 58. In July 1998 the age limit was temporary reduced to 56 until
the end of 2002 when the age was set back to 58.
The government lowered the age limit in 1998 in order to support the
labour force participation of the elderly. The target was to reduce labour mar-
ket exits through other pension programs. However, the reform was made
temporary in order to receive information on whether this policy was effec-
tive. The reform in 1998 also added a clause which obliged employers to
arrange part-time work whenever possible. (Government Bill HE 13/1998).
However, employers were not monitored or sanctioned if part-time work was
not made available.
Workers who fulﬁlled the working, pension accrual and age condition were
eligible for part-time pension if part-time work was available. For a private
sector worker the working condition required 12 months of full-time work
during the 18 months preceding the part-time pension take-up and for the
public sector the requirement was 6 months of full-time work during the pre-
ceding 18 months. The worker also needed to have been accruing pension
rights for 5 years during the preceding 15 years in the private sector and 3
years during the preceding 5 years for the public sector. Also the employer
needed to consent to the part-time work arrangement.
The pension provider monitored the income received during the part-time
pension spell. The hours worked and the earnings needed to decrease in the
same proportion being in the range of 30-75 percent from the previous levels.
Work hours had to be at least 16 but at most 28 hours per week. The decrease
in working time is not observable from the data. However, comparing the
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wage levels before and after part-time pension it seems that the reduction in
hours is about 45 percent. This is also in line with the results from surveys
done to the part-time pensioners (Takala, 2004).
The pension received during the part-time retirement was determined as
half of the difference in earnings between full-time work and part-time work,
however it couldn’t exceed 75 percent of the accrued pension. The reduc-
tion in disposable income was not proportional to the decrease in earnings
because the average tax rate for part-time pensioners was lower than for full-
time pensioners or full-time workers conditional on income4. The difference
also accrued future pension rights, with an accrual rate of 1,5 %. In full time
work (and for the wages earned as part-time pensioner) accrual rates were
1,5% for the individuals below the age of 60 and 2,5% for the individuals who
were 60 or older. All in all, the effect of part-time pension on life-time earnings
was modest.
The part-time pension system has been evaluated in Kyyrä (2015). As in
this study, he also exploits the changes in the eligibility ages. His ﬁndings sug-
gest that part-time pension did not lengthen the work career and if anything
slightly reduced the risk of unemployment or exit out of the labour market.
However, these results hinge on the eligibility effect and not on the actual
take-up of part-time pension. The current study can also look at the ones who
have taken the part-time pension.
Other pension programs
The pension system at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s included mul-
tiple labour market exit pathways. Before the early old-age retirement age
was achieved, individuals exited through disability, an individual early re-
tirement scheme or unemployment pension. Figure 5.1 presents the eligibility
ages by cohort for the different pension schemes5. For the cohort born in 1940
the eligibility age for individual early retirement had the same age limit as
part-time pension. Individual early retirement was granted for individuals
4From the data, the ratio of net incomes between one year before the start of the part-time
pension spell and one year after the starting year, conditional on being in the part-time pension
for the whole year, is 88%.
5As part-time pensioners had to fulﬁl the work condition, the changes in the unemployment
tunnel or unemployment pension are not shown or discussed.
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Figure 5.1 Minimum eligibility ages for different pension schemes.
with reduced work ability but the medical conditions were more lenient than
in the disability pension, which can be applied at any age. The pension re-
form in 2005 abolished the individual early retirement pension. However, it
was also legislated that individuals over the age of 60 were to be granted dis-
ability pension with similar conditions as previously in the individual early
retirement.
The individual early retirement scheme or the disability pension and the
part-time pension were most likely partial substitutes. Individuals with strong
preferences for working but limited work ability probably seek part-time pen-
sion possibilities. This fact already makes the part-time pensioners a selected
sample from the whole population of elderly workers. However, not all in-
dividuals were entitled part-time work by their employers. This is another
source of selection bias.
The major pension reform in the year 2005 affected the cohorts under study.
The 2005 reform decreased the full old-age retirement age from 65 to 63. This
reform might have had independent effects on health outcomes and it cer-
tainly affected labour market exit decisions. For this reason I focus on the
period of 1995-2004 in this study.
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5.3.2 Data sources
The data include various kinds of information collected from administrative
registers governed by the Social Insurance Institution of Finland, Statistics
Finland and Finnish Centre for Pensions for the years 1995-2014. The most im-
portant variables are drug purchases, including the code of disease, sickness
beneﬁt spells, pension beneﬁt spells, educational and demographic character-
istics as well as different income sources. The income measures are collected
from the Finnish Centre for Pensions database and Statistic Finland’s income
data. The industry classiﬁcation is based on the nationally modiﬁed version
of the European Union’s standard industrial classiﬁcation (NACE classiﬁca-
tion). The education information includes the level of education in one-digit
level.
The data include the exact date when the part-time pension spell has started
or ended. The main sample includes all part-time pensioners for the years
1998-2005 who were born between 1940-1947. There are approximately 52 000
individuals in the part-time pensioners sample. Approximately 95 percent of
the part-time pensioners have only one part-time pension spell and the aver-
age part-time pension spell is 4,4 years6.
The drug purchases and the sickness beneﬁt spells are retrieved from the
registers of the Finnish Social Insurance Institution. The information about the
drugs come from the purchase of prescription drugs -register which contains
all the information of the prescription drugs sold by Finnish pharmacies. The
information included is the drug code and day of purchase and covers the
whole observation period. The sickness beneﬁt -register includes the start and
end day of the sickness beneﬁt spell. Only sickness absences of over 10 days
are observed in the data because the ﬁrst 10 days are not covered by social
insurance. The sickness absence beneﬁt is earnings-related. For individuals
who are on part-time retirement, the sickness absence beneﬁt is calculated
based on the earnings from the part-time work. On sickness leave they can
continue taking the part-time pension.
The medicine data are classiﬁed with ATC (Anatomical Therapeutic Chem-
6Figure 5.A1 in the appendix shows the histogram of the length of the part-time pension
spells.
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ical) -codes. The outcome variables with respect to the drug data are the pur-
chases of any positive amount of medicine (referred to as extensive margin in
the result section) and the intensity of medicine purchased measured as the
number of packages purchased during a year (referred to as intensive margin in
the result section). The dataset is limited to observe the number of purchases
but not the deﬁned daily dose (DDD) which would more accurately describe
the intensity of a disease. Neither is the size of the package observed so if
drug companies have changed the sizes of the packages during the observa-
tion period this causes biases in the estimated effect at the intensive margin.
During the observation period, the remuneration system changed very little.
Work amount can be related to health via several channels. For example,
work can contribute to allostatic load which accumulates as an individual is
exposed to chronic stress. On the other hand the increase of professional work
has raised the question of how ofﬁce work affects the individual’s muscu-
loskeletal system. For this reason I divide the medical data in subgroups rep-
resenting different cause-speciﬁc sickness groups. Table 5.A1 in the appendix
lists the classiﬁcation used.
The part-time pensioners are not a representative subgroup of the popu-
lation of elderly workers. Tables 5.A2 and 5.A3 in the appendix compare the
part-time pensioners to a representative sample of workers from the same
cohort and gender distribution (∼ 150 000 individuals). On average, the part-
time pensioners are more educated and earn more than their peers from the
same cohorts. They are overrepresented in the ﬁelds of professional services,
administration jobs and education. The baseline health outcomes are also
more favourable for the part-time pensioners as they have fewer sickness ab-
sences and they purchase less medicine within a year.
5.3.3 Descriptives
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show descriptive statistics for the treatment and the control
groups which are used in the difference-in-differences regression models. The
treatment group is those born between July 1942 and 1946 (eligibility age at 56)
and the control group those born between 1940 and July 1940 (eligibility age at
58). These statistics concern the years 1995-1997 when nobody in the sample
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had taken the part-time pension yet and are measured when the individuals
were aged 54-55. There are statistically signiﬁcant differences in the income
variables and some industries or professions between the two groups. These
background variables will be controlled in the regression model.
The main health-related variables are sickness absences and any drug pur-
chases or mental illness drug purchases. The treatment group has somewhat
more sickness absences days before the part-time retirement period. Any drug
purchases are similar between the groups, over half of the individuals have
used some prescription medication at the ages of 54-55. These descriptives re-
veal that the two groups are quite similar but the parallel trends assumption
is further studied in the next sections.
Table 5.1 Descriptives: Pre-reform and pre-part-time pension spell, years 1995-1997, treatment and
control groups.
Control Treatment
Income and employment
Wage income***,€ 24 816.6 (11 600.5) 26 790.0 (15 521.3)
Net income***,€ 17 856.6 (7 615.9) 20 469.3 (47 504.8)
Pension income,€ 278.7 (1 560.5) 275.4 (1 559.8)
Health indicators
Sickness absence days* 3.57 (15.28) 4.34 (18.74)
Any drug 0.58 (0.49) 0.57 (0.49)
Nr of purchases, any drugs 2.94 (4.45) 3.09 (4.86)
Drugs for respiratory diseases 0.25 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43)
Nr of purchases, resp. dis. 0.59 (1.67) 0.62 (1.88)
Drugs for circulatory diseases 0.21 (0.41) 0.23 (0.42)
Nr of purchases, circ. diseases* 1.00 (2.40) 1.13 (2.65)
Heart disease drugs 0.21 (0.41) 0.22 (0.42)
Nr of purchases, heart conditions* 0.99 (2.40) 1.12 (2.64)
Drugs for cerebro-vascular diseases 0.013 (0.12) 0.01 (0.11)
Nr of purchases, cerebrovas. diseases 0.03 (0.25) 0.03 (0.31)
Drugs for musculo-skeletal diseases 0.27 (0.44) 0.27 (0.44)
Nr of purchases, musculo-skeletal dis. 0.54 (1.206) 0.54 (1.20)
Drugs for diabetes 0.017 (0.13) 0.02 (0.14)
Nr of purchases, diabetes 0.08 (0.78) 0.10 (0.85)
Mental illness drugs* 0.12 (0.33) 0.11 (0.31)
Nr of purchases, mental disease 0.38 (1.40) 0.39 (1.90)
Individuals 2 880 9 508
Means with standard deviations in parentheses. All variables are measured within a year. Unit
of measure for drug purchases is share of individuals with any purchases within a group and the
number of purchases is measured in packages. Sickness absence days represent the absence days over
10 days. T-test for the difference of means, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
The instrumental variable analysis estimates the effect for the compliers.
For this reason I also present descriptive statistics for the group of compli-
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Table 5.2 Descriptives: Pre-reform and pre-part-time pension spell, constant variables, treatment and
control groups
Control Treatment
Females, % 57.1 56.1
Living in the capital region***, % 27.3 23.5
Education, %
Upper secondary educ.*** 39.8 45.7
Short-cycle tertiary educ.* 26.7 24.5
Bachelor or equivalent 13.3 12.7
Master or equivalent** 17.5 15.2
Doctoral or equivalent** 2.7 1.8
Industry, %
Manufacturing** 6.9 8.6
Retail 7.8 6.9
Professional service 6.2 6.1
Public administration* 10.5 9.2
Education*** 15.2 11.3
Care taking 15.2 13.8
Occupations, %
Managers 5.6 5.2
Professionals** 22.1 19.3
Technicians and associate professionals 20.8 19.3
Clerical support workers 12.9 14.2
Service and sales workers 11.5 11.7
Skilled agricultural, forestry and ﬁshery workers 0.9 1.2
Craft and related trades workers*** 7.7 10.3
Plant and machine operators and assemblers** 6.6 8.2
Elementary occupations* 11.2 9.8
Individuals 2 880 9 508
Notes: Only the biggest industries and occupations are listed. Manufacturing here
combines pharmaceutical, electrical, machinery and vehicle industries. T-test for the
difference in shares, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
ers and others. The complier group is deﬁned as individuals who take-up
part-time pension within a year when becoming eligible (reaching the cohort-
speciﬁc eligibility age) while non-compliers take part-time pension spell at
later ages. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 shows these descriptives. There are ∼ 35% of
compliers in the sample. The compliers have more sickness days and drug
purchases for both at the extensive and at the intensive margin. These dif-
ferences are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% risk level apart from cerebro-
vascular diseases and diabetes. Women comply more with the statutory age
limits and compliers tend to be represented more in the public sector.
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Table 5.3 Descriptives on non-compliers and compliers, years 1995-1997
Non-compliers Compliers
Income and employment
Wage income***, € 25 604.2 (13 340.9) 25 048.8 (11 631.8)
Net income, € 18 800.8 (18 890.6) 18 565.0 (10 448.1)
Pension income, € 243.5 (1 467.2) 230.6 (1 419.8)
Months in empl.** 11.62 (1.92) 11.57 (2.10)
Months in unempl.*** 4.88 (3.68) 4.40 (3.48)
Health indicators
Sickness absence days*** 3.47 (15.78) 4.40 (17.77)
Any drug purchase*** 0.55 (0.50) 0.57 (0.50)
Nr of purchases, any drugs*** 2.69 (4.38) 2.91 (4.66)
Drug purchase for respiratory diseases* 0.24 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43)
Nr of purchases, resp. dis. 0.58 (1.71) 0.61 (1.75)
Drug purchase for circulatory diseases 0.20 (0.39) 0.20 (0.40)
Nr of purchases, circ. diseases 0.93 (2.38) 0.96 (2.42)
Drug for heart condition** 0.19 (0.39) 0.20 (0.40)
Nr of purchases, heart conditions 0.92 (2.38) 0.95 (2.41)
Cerebrovascular disease 0.01 (0.095) 0.01 (0.10)
Nr of purchases, cerebrovas. diseases 0.02 (0.27) 0.02 (0.27)
Musculo-skeletal disorder*** 0.25 (0.43) 0.27 (0.44)
Nr of purchases, musculo-skeletal dis.*** 0.49 (1.13) 0.54 (1.21)
Drugs for diabetes 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.13)
Nr of purchases, diabetes 0.09 (0.78) 0.09 (0.82)
Mental illness drugs*** 0.10 (0.30) 0.11 (0.32)
Nr of purchases, mental disease*** 0.32 (1.60) 0.42 (1.85)
Individuals 34 336 17 961
Notes: Means with standard deviations in parentheses. All variables are measured within a year. Unit
of measure for drug purchases is share of individuals with any purchases within a group and the number
of purchases is measured in packages. Sickness absence days represent the absence days over 10 days.
T-test for the differences in means, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
5.4 Empirical methodology
The main motivation for the part-time pension program was that it could re-
duce the risk of early labour market exit. Above all, it was expected that with
the help of part-time work, disability-related exits would decrease, thus part-
time pension scheme was based on the notion that work effort is related to
health outcomes. This indicates that part-time retirement could also affect
sickness absences and drug purchases beside the decrease in the number of
disability spells.
The goal of this paper is two-fold: ﬁrstly, to study what kind of effects the
change in the eligibility ages (reform effects) had on the health outcomes in the
population of part-time pensioners, and secondly, what effects the take-up
(take-up effects) of part-time pension had on the health outcomes of individu-
167
Table 5.4 Descriptives on non-compliers and compliers, years 1995-1997
Non-compliers Compliers
Females***, % 56 58
Living in the capital region***, % 24.6 22.3
Education, %
Upper secondary educ.* 43.9 44.9
Short-cycle tertiary educ. 25.1 24.7
Bachelor or equivalent*** 13.4 12.2
Master or equivalent** 15.5 16.4
Doctoral or equivalent** 2.17 1.81
Industry, %
Manufacturing*** 11.9 9,6
Retail* 4.45 3.98
Professional service* 6.24 5.79
Public administration 9.25 9.77
Education*** 10.3 15.5
Care taking*** 13.8 15.0
Occupations, %
Managers*** 5.88 4.14
Professionals*** 19.1 21.8
Technicians and associate professionals*** 20.2 18.3
Clerical support workers** 13.7 14.6
Service and sales workers 11.7 11.6
Skilled agricultural, forestry and ﬁshery workers 1.17 1.10
Craft and related trades workers 9.56 10.0
Plant and machine operators and assemblers*** 8.32 7.28
Elementary occupations** 9.62 10.5
Individuals 34 336 17 961
Notes: Only the biggest industries and occupations are listed. Manufacturing here combines phar-
maceutical, electrical, machinery and vehicle industries. T-test for the differences in proportions, *
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
als. For the ﬁrst question treatment and control groups are formed and their
drug purchases and sickness absences are compared before and after the age
limit reform in a difference-in-differences setting. These effects are intention-
to-treat effects as not all individuals took the part-time pension at the age they
were ﬁrst entitled to it. The second question also exploits the eligibility ages
but as an instrument for the actual retirement. This estimation strategy iden-
tiﬁes the local average treatment effect (LATE) for the compliers who retire
within the ﬁrst year of becoming eligible for the part-time pension.
These research designs can answer the question of the relationship between
health and labour market behaviour and work intensity from two perspec-
tives. Firstly, the reform effects take the perspective of the policy maker and
answer what kind of average effect the reform had and whether the reform
succeeded at reducing the disability spells and improving the work ability.
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The take-up effects have the perspective of the individual. As the IV design
can reveal effects only on the subgroup, these can be different from those av-
erage effect of part-time pension where we could move all elderly workers to
part-time pension.
5.4.1 Difference-in-differences setting
In July 1998 the eligibility age for part-time pension was lowered to 56. We can
form a treatment group to be those eligible for part-time pension at the age of
56 in year 1998, i.e. individuals born between July 1942 and December 1946,
and a control group, whose eligibility age remained at 58 and are so born
between January to June 19407. I use a regression difference-in-differences
method to estimate the reform effects. I will estimate the following equation:
Yi,t = α + β1Pt + β2Ti + β3(Pt ∗ Ti) + μb + γXit + 
it, (5.1)
where Yi,t is the outcome for individual i in year t, Pt takes value one for
years after 1998 and zero otherwise, Ti takes value one if the individual is
in the treatment group and zero otherwise and (Pt ∗ Ti) is their interaction
term. I also include a vector of control variables Xit, which are listed in the
descriptive tables. Also cohort ﬁxed effect μb are included. The coefﬁcient β3
is the estimated average effect of the reform.
The reform is identiﬁed in the difference-in-differences approach if cer-
tain assumptions are fulﬁlled. The main assumption is that there are paral-
lel trends before the reform. Figure 5.2 shows the raw means and conﬁdence
intervals for the main outcomes. From these ﬁgures it is visible that the par-
allel trends hold clearly only for any drug purchases in the intensive margin.
However, in the main regression speciﬁcation I control for the background
variables and show that the trend in the difference between the two groups is
not statistically different from zero.
Another important assumption in the difference-in-differences setting is
7I argue that the reform was exogenous because none of the background material I have
gone through preparing for this change in the legislation suggest anything of the kind that
these speciﬁc cohorts are in need of special treatment due to their health outcomes. Also to my
knowledge there are no common shocks that affect only the treatment group.
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Figure 5.2 Main outcome variables, by year and treatment status.
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Notes: Mean and 95% conﬁdence intervals.
that the reform cannot affect the control group. In this setting the reform is
based on birth cohorts so it is impossible to move from the control group to the
treatment group. However, the reform can affect the behaviour of the control
group. From the ﬁgure 5.2 we notice that there is a peculiar trend for the
control group with respect to sickness absences days. During the reform year
the sickness absence days increase in the control group. This can indicate that
either something happened between 1998-2001 that affected only the control
group or the increase in the sickness absence days for the control group is due
to the reform. For example, if the control group considered the decrease in
the age limit unjustiﬁable, this might have motivated some of them to seek
possibilities to extend their sickness absence leaves. The data I have cannot
solve this issue so the results with respect to the sickness absences should be
interpreted with caution.
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5.4.2 Fixed effects instrumental variables estimation
To determine the causal effects of working shorter hours on health is difﬁ-
cult because the work hours decision is endogenous to health which is un-
observed. Individuals with worse health outcomes are more likely to reduce
their work load or retire fully earlier. Estimating an OLS model of the form
Yi,t+k = βPRi,t + f (ai,t) + Xitγ + νi,t, (5.2)
where health outcome Yi,t+k for individual i in a future period t + k depends
on part-time retirement status PRi,t, age function f (ai,t), the vector of the in-
dividual’s characteristics Xit and an idiosyncratic error term νi,t, is biased if
part-time retirement decision and health are correlated. Another source of
bias is the individual speciﬁc unobservable factors which can be correlated
with both the part-time work decision and health. I tackle these problems
with ﬁxed-effects instrumental variable analysis.
The individual ﬁxed-effects estimates compare the full-time job and part-
time job status at the individual level and relate the change in the status to
the changes in the health outcomes at the individual level. This strategy elim-
inates any unobserved time-invariant factors. To account for the unobserved
heterogeneity and potentially endogenous decisions in the part-time retire-
ment timing, I estimate within-two-stage least-squares and use the eligibility
ages and the exogenous changes in these ages as an instrument for the part-
time retirement decision8. That is, the estimating equation includes within
transformation both in the ﬁrst and the second stage9.
The ﬁrst stage regression takes the form of a linear probability model:
PRi,t = γ1[ai = ei] + f (ai,t) + ρi + 
i,t, (5.3)
where the part-time retirement, PRi,t, takes values 0/1 indicating whether
individual has taken part-time pension or not, ei denotes the eligibility age
8The same kind of instrument is used for example by Bonsang et al. (2012), Kantarci and
Kolodziej (2017), Lucifora and Vigani (2018) among others.
9In health and employment literature FE-IV estimation procedure has been used by Bon-
sang et al. (2012), Frijters et al. (2014), (Ahn, 2016), Kantarci and Kolodziej (2017), Cygan-Rehm
and Wunder (2018) and Lucifora and Vigani (2018)
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for individual i and 1[ai = ei], the instrument, is an indicator function tak-
ing value 1 if individual has reached the age of eligibility in the same year10.
The γ measures the discontinuity in the probability to retire at this age. The
unobserved individual speciﬁc time-invariant variables ρi are abolished with
within-transformation.
For the instrumental variable to work, it is required that the instrument is
relevant for the actual part-time pension decision and satisﬁes the exclusion
restriction. Figure 5.3 shows the discontinuous change in the probability to
take up part-time pension with respect to years from the eligibility. About a
third of part-time pensioners take up the part-time pension during the year
they become eligible. Figure 5.A2 in appendix shows the retirement timing
separately for groups where the lowest eligibility age differs due to the re-
form taking place in 1998. While the reform made the programme more pop-
ular and the largest spike is at the age 56, the older cohorts also retire around
the year they become eligible. The identiﬁcation is based on this disconti-
nuity in the proportion of individuals reducing work load through part-time
retirement right at the eligibility age conditional on a polynomial function of
age.
While the speciﬁc eligibility ages have a direct effect on the decision to
take part-time pension, it is less probable that they have a particular effect
on the outcome variables except through the part-time retirement11. The re-
verse causality, that the health would affect the instrument, would happen for
example if the eligibility age is set to a certain age where health problems ac-
cumulate. I have gone through the government’s proposition for the bill and
the subsequent parliament discussion in order to see if these speciﬁc eligibil-
ity ages were chosen because of population’s health conditions. This seems
not to be the case.
The ﬁnal estimation is based on the following second-stage ﬁxed effects
10It is important to remember here that all individuals in the current sample take up part-
time pension at some age. However, the timing differs and this instrumental variable research
design is able to reveal the effects on the compliers who retire during the year becoming eligi-
ble. These are the local average treatment effects.
11This is supported by the fact that I have looked at the trends in the health-related factors
for the total population and the eligibility ages for part-time pension are not anomalous.
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Figure 5.3 Take-up of ﬁrst part-time pension spell since becoming eligible
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Notes: the estimates are based on a ﬁxed effects model where years from the eligibility act as
explanatory variables. The estimation is done for years 1995-2004 including the total part-time
pensioners sample. The vertical lines represents 95% conﬁdence intervals.
regression model
Yi,t+k = βPRi,t + f (ai,t) + μi + νi,t, (5.4)
where μi denotes the unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity and captures
all time-invariant characteristics that are associated with both the decision to
reduce work hours and outcome variables. The coefﬁcient β is the parame-
ter of primary interest and represents the impact that reducing work hours
through part-time pension has on Yi,t+k. The identiﬁcation of β is driven by
changes in the outcome variables for individuals whose part-time retirement
decision is affected by the eligibility age.
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Figure 5.4 Difference in outcomes between the treatment and the control group, with controls.
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Notes: Coefﬁcient for treatment group and 95% conﬁdence intervals. Sickness absence days
conditional on working. Standard errors are clustered at individual level.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Reform effects
I begin by estimating an event-study model in order to graph the differences
over time between the treatment and the control groups. The estimated equa-
tion is
Yi,t = αi +
2004
∑
t=1995
βtTi + γXit + μb + 
it, (5.5)
where βt is the estimated difference between the control and treatment group
in each year conditional on the vector of control variables and cohort ﬁxed
effects.
The ﬁgure 5.4 shows the results from this estimation with respect to the
174
main outcomes. The ﬁgures without controls are presented in the appendix
(ﬁgure 5.A3). The coefﬁcients pre-reform are close to zero and statistically we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two groups do not differ. We observe
from these ﬁgures that the drug purchases increase in the treatment group
after the age limit was lowered, most clearly for mental illness drugs. We also
observe that there is a reduction in the difference in the sickness absence days.
However, these estimates are rather imprecise.
In the ﬁgures the conﬁdence intervals are quite large so I next present
simple difference-in-differences estimates where years are pooled together. I
study the effects until the year 2001 and so I have 3 years before the reform
and 3 years after. Beside the sickness absence days, all coefﬁcients are positive
indicating that the reform increased the purchases of drugs by the treatment
group. One mechanism could be that individuals have more leisure during
the part-time pension and this time can be spent for example by going to see
a medical professional. However, as I have only certain type of register data I
cannot test different mechanisms. Also it is noticeable that the coefﬁcients are
imprecise when we include control variables, beside the results for the men-
tal illness drug purchases. For mental illness drug purchases the coefﬁcient
is large and statistically signiﬁcant also after including controls. After adding
controls, the coefﬁcient on the sickness absences also becomes signiﬁcant and
indicates that the reform had on average a reduction of 1.25 days in the sick-
ness absence spells for the treatment group. However, this is driven by the
change in the sickness absence of the control group and the meaning of this
result is unclear.
One of the goals set for the part-time pension scheme and the lowering
of the eligibility age was to increase old-age retirement age. Unfortunately
this is impossible to study because of the pension reform in 2005. The pen-
sion reform in the year 2005 lowered the retirement age for the cohorts born
after 1942 and also affected the ﬁnancial incentives. This reform intervenes
with the current study design and so I have focused on the period before the
pension reform. However, I have analysed the effect on the probability of
retiring through some early-retirement pension scheme (typically means dis-
ability pension or individual early retirement) before the year 2005. As shown
in table 5.6, the early exit actually increased in the treatment group by 5,5 per-
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Table 5.5 Difference-in-differences (DD) results on main outcomes
Any drug purchase Mental ill. drug purchase Any drug purchase Mental ill. drug purchase
DD estimate 0.0269*** 0.0181*** 0.0163 0.0231***
(0.0067) (0.0047) (0.0094) (0.0065)
Cohort & Gender YES YES YES YES
Controls NO NO YES YES
R2 0.027 0.0141 0.0852 0.0456
Observations 236 406 236 406 132 863 132 863
Individuals 39 422 39 422 22 449 22 449
Any drug purchase, int. Sickness abs. Any drug purchase, int. Sickness abs.
DD estimate 0.0296 -0.7394 0.0937 -1.2564**
(0.0711) (0.3803) (0.0905) (0.4753)
Cohort & Gender YES YES YES YES
Controls NO NO YES YES
R2 0.021 0.033 0.073 0.102
Observations 236 406 236 065 132 863 132 792
Individuals 39 422 39 422 22 449 22 449
Notes: Years in the estimation are 1995-2001. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at individual level). *,
**, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Table 5.6 Probability to retire through early-pension scheme
Early retirement
Treatment group 0.0555***
(0.0087)
Cohort& Gender YES
Controls YES
Observations 213 479
Individuals 22 482
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors are in
parentheses (clustered at individual level). *,
**, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
centage points compared to the control group. The longer period of reduced
work load did not lead to later labour market exits12.
12In the appendix ﬁgure 5.A4 shows further evidence that the part-time retirement scheme
was not successful in increasing the age of labour market exits. This descriptive evidence
shows average retirement ages by birth months for cohorts 1946 and 1947. The cohorts dif-
fer with regards to their part-time retirement eligibility age while their old-age statutory age
was the same. Cohort 1946 had the part-time pension age limit at 56 and for cohort 1947 the
part-time retirement age was 58. So there is a discontinuity in the part-time pension age and
observing the average retirement age for both sides of the threshold reveal that for cohort 1946
the average retirement age is clearly lower. I have also checked other observable background
variables for whether they differ around the threshold. This seems not to be the case but I
cannot do a formal regression discontinuity design analysis as above the threshold there are
only approximately 2000 observations over the whole 1947 birth cohort.
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5.5.2 Average effect on the compliers
In this section I study the short-term effects of taking-up part-time pension.
Here the outcomes are measured one year after taking up part-time retire-
ment. Figure 5.5 shows the change in the probability of purchasing a positive
amount of any medicine or mental illness drug with respect to years since
being eligible for the part-time pension. The ﬁgure points out that there is
a small change in the slope after being eligible for part-time pension. This
change is stronger for the mental illness drugs and is observed already in
the year of retiring. These changes are not long-lasting. As a placebo test I
graphed the same ﬁgures for the non-part-time pensioners sample (appendix
ﬁgure 5.A5). For any drug purchases there is no clear change in the slope so it
seems that the decrease in the probability to buy drugs is unique to the part-
time pensioners. However for mental illness drugs the picture is blurrier and
there seems to be more age-driven changes in the purchases.13
Figure 5.5 Change in the probability to buy any medicine (left ﬁgure) or mental illness drug (right ﬁgure)
during a year by distance from the eligibility age.
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Notes: the estimates are based on a ﬁxed effects model where years from the eligibility act as
explanatory variables excluding non-part-time pensioners’ sample. The vertical lines repre-
sents 95% conﬁdence intervals. Years in the estimation are 1995-2004.
While the previous observations tell the average outcomes within the total
population of part-time pensioners based on the eligibility age, running the
13Table 5.A6 in the appendix shows the ﬁxed effect model estimates based on take-up. The
change in drug purchases is clear in the year of taking the part-time pension. These are ef-
fectively the ﬁxed effects results without taking into account the endogeneity which is also
presented in the regression tables for comparison.
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regression model based on the equations 5.3 and 5.4 gives the estimates of the
effect within the group of compliers. Table 5.7 presents the ﬁrst set of these
results estimated by the two-stage least squares within estimator.
The ﬁrst column displays the coefﬁcients from the ﬁrst-stage regression
(eq. 5.3). The instrument, that is the eligibility age, has a large and highly
signiﬁcant effect on the probability of having reduced working hours (taken
part-time pension). The ﬁrst stage F-statistic is 43.31 which is well above the
value of 10 which is commonly used as a cutoff value for a good instrument
(Staiger and Stock, 1997).
The effect of transition to part-time retirement on the probability to pur-
chase any drug is negative and statistically signiﬁcant (column 2). The esti-
mate indicates that the working hour reduction due to part-time pension lead
to 2.8 percentage point lower drug purchases on average within the compli-
ers. This estimate is somewhat stronger than in the model where exogeneity
of retirement is assumed (column 3). The relative effect is a 4.9 % reduction
(compared to the sample average before part-time retirement). For the prob-
ability to buy mental illness drugs the effects are much smaller. Table 5.A4
in the appendix shows the estimation results by drug category. By subcate-
gory the estimated coefﬁcients from the IV-speciﬁcation are strongest for the
respiratory and musculo-skeletal diseases drugs at the 5% or 10% risk level,
respectively.
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 show the results for men and women separately. There
are noticeable gender differences. In the short-term, the part-time retirement
leads women to purchase 3.6 percentage point less (any) drugs while for men
the effect is 1.7 percentage points and this difference is statistically signiﬁcant.
These estimates mean that there is a strong 5.8% relative effect for women
while the relative effect is slightly smaller for men being 3.5%. Also it is no-
ticeable that for women there is also a statistically signiﬁcant and relevant
reduction of 1.3 percentage points for the purchases of mental illness drugs.
For robustness, I have also explored the effects of the choice of the func-
tional form for the age term. I tested linear, quadratic, cubic and quartic func-
tional forms. The part-time pension coefﬁcients are quite insensitive to the
functional form, however the standard errors increase quite a lot in the cubic
and quartic speciﬁcation. Also for the cubic and quartic functional form the
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Table 5.7 Number of purchases of any drug or mental illness drug and part-time retirement
Taken part-time Any drug Any drug Mental illness Mental illness
pension at t drug drug
First stage IV-FE linear-FE IV-FE linear-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
eligible 0.2174***
(0.0555)
age 0.2088* 0.0305*** 0.0264* 0.0334*** 0.0316***
(0.0839) (0.0078) (0.0085) (0.0040) (0.0045)
age2 -0.0017* -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0003***
(0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
part-time retirement, PR -0.0280*** -0.0114*** -0.0090*** -0.0019
(0.0067) (0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0010)
Constant -0.5552 -0.8414***
(0.2390) (0.1253)
Within R2 0.019 0.002
F-statistic 43.31 43.31
Observations 521 155 521 155 521 156 521 155 521 156
Notes: Years in the estimation are 1995-2004. Regressions include year dummies. Health outcomes
measured in period t+1. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered on birth cohort
level). *, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Table 5.8 Purchase of any amount of drug and part-time retirement, men
Taken part-time Any drug Any drug Mental illness Mental illness
pension at t drug drug
First stage IV-FE linear-FE IV-FE linear-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
eligible 0.2052***
(0.0294)
age 0.1454** 0.0210*** 0.0196*** 0.0102 0.0098
(0.0503) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0057) (0.0074)
age2 -0.0013** -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
part-time retirement, PR -0.0171* -0.0109** -0.0024 -0.0007
(0.0076) (0.0024) (0.0061) (0.0010)
Constant -0.5357*** -0.3007
(0.0919) (0.2034)
Within R2 0.027 0.004
F-stat 48.66 48.66
observations 226 878 226 878 226 878 226 878 226 878
Notes: Years in the estimation are 1995-2004. Regressions include year dummies. Health outcomes
measured in period t+1. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered on birth cohort
level). *, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table 5.9 Purchase of any amount of drug and part-time retirement, women
Taken part-time Any drug Any drug Mental illness Mental illness
pension at t drug drug
First stage IV-FE linear-FE IV-FE linear-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
eligible 0.2186***
(0.0347)
age 0.1637** 0.0376** 0.0314 0.0509*** 0.0480***
(0.0554) (0.0136) (0.0153) (0.0046) (0.0049)
age2 -0.0014** -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004*** -0.0004***
(0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
part-time retirement, PR -0.0361*** -0.0122*** -0.0138* -0.0029
(0.0081) (0.0021) (0.0061) (0.0018)
Constant -0.5640 -1.2477***
(0.4298) (0.1325)
Within R2 0.014 0.002
F-stat 39.79 39.79
observations 294 277 294 277 294 278 294 277 294 278
Notes: Years in the estimation are 1995-2004. Regressions include year dummies. Health outcomes
measured in period t+1. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered on birth cohort
level). *, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
coefﬁcients for ages are insigniﬁcant. I conclude that the quadratic speciﬁca-
tion I have used is satisfactory to capture the non-linearities in age.
In the intensive margin, the effects of part-time retirement on the amount
(in packages) of purchased drugs are shown in table 5.10 for the pooled sam-
ple and also for both of the genders separately. On average there is a quarter
of package reduction for the compliers due to the part-time retirement. The
gender decomposition shows that this effect comes from the women’s pur-
chases while for men working hours reduction does not have any effect. The
women’s point estimate -0.39 translates to 12% reduction of medicine use.
Most of this reduction comes from the reduction in the purchases of drugs for
musculo-skeletal and circulatory diseases14.
The distribution of sickness absence days is highly right-skewed. Within a
year approximately 85 percent of the individuals have zero days of long ab-
senteeism15 while there are very few with extremely long absenteeism. Over
the observation years, however, there are only about a quarter of the sam-
ple who do not have any sickness beneﬁt spells. As I am not familiar with
a non-linear estimator that would take into account the unobservable hetero-
geneity and endogenous covariate, I transform the sickness absence days data
14Results available upon request from the author.
15As mentioned in the section 5.3.2 only absences exceeding 10 days are covered by the social
insurance and are included in the data.
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Table 5.11 Probability to have over 10 days of sickness absences and part-time retirement
Overall Men Women
First stage IV-FE linear FE First stage IV-FE linear FE First stage IV-FE linear FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
eligible 0.2122*** 0.2049*** 0.2179***
(0.0318) (0.0288) (0.0341)
age 0.1314* 0.1561*** 0.1443*** 0.1187* 0.1185*** 0.1094** 0.1408* 0.1842*** -0.1705***
(0.0547) (0.0127) (0.0131) (0.0516) (0.0111) (0.0115) (0.0570) (0.0138) (0.0141)
age2 -0.0011* -0.0014*** -0.0013** -0.0010* -0.0011*** -0.0010*** -0.0012* -0.0017*** -0.0016***
(0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Part-time
retirement, PR -0.0691*** -0.0177*** -0.0509*** -0.0084* -0.0822*** -0.0253***
(0.0084) (0.0031) (0.0101) (0.0024) (0.0103) (0.0042)
Constant -3.7654*** -2.8948*** -4.4187***
(0.3623) (0.5211) (0.7375)
Within R2 0.007 0.006 0.012
F-stat 44.61 50.43 40.81
Observations 511 973 511 973 511 973 222 871 222 871 222 871 289 102 289 102 289 102
Notes: Years in the estimation are 1995-2004. Regressions control for year and previous sickness absence days while the outcome
(probability of having sickness beneﬁt spells) is measured in t+1. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered on
birth cohort level). *, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
to a binary variable indicating whether individual experience any duration of
sickness absence. These results are presented in the table 5.11.
The effect on probability of long sickness absence is negative and highly
signiﬁcant. The part-time retirement leads to a 6.9 percentage point reduction
in this probability. The effect is much larger than in the linear ﬁxed effects
speciﬁcation. The reason lying behind this direction of differences is prob-
ably that the IV-FE identify the effect on the compliers while in the model
where the retirement decision is considered to be exogenous the estimated ef-
fect is average effect in the sample. There is a statistically signiﬁcant difference
between men and women. Women’s probability reduces by 8.2 percentage
points while for men the effect is 5 percentage points.
As with the sickness absence the labour market exits are also modelled
as a binary variable. Here I am interested in how reducing the work hours
affects one’s probability to exit permanently out from the labour market via
an early retirement scheme. The outcome variable takes the value 1 if the
individual has an early exit. I also add sickness absence days (within a year)
as an explanatory variable since retirement literature has shown that health is
one primary explanatory variable in the retirement decision. Table 5.12 shows
the estimation results.
The ﬁrst 3 columns show the results based on the pooled sample while
the next 6 columns present results separately for gender. The point estimate
-0.051 suggests that there is a signiﬁcant reduction in the probability to tran-
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Table 5.12 Probability of early labour market exit and part-time retirement
Overall Men Women
First stage IV-FE linear FE First stage IV-FE linear FE First stage IV-FE linear FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
eligible 0.2122*** 0.2049*** 0.2179***
(0.0318) (0.0289) (0.0342)
age 0.1315* -0.0915*** -0.1009*** 0.1187* -0.0974*** -0.0618** 0.1410* -0.0872*** -0.0562*
(0.0547) (0.0138) (0.0127) (0.0517) (0.0115) (0.0163) (0.0571) (0.0164) (0.0194)
age2 -0.0011* 0.0009*** 0.0010*** -0.0010* 0.0009*** 0.0006** -0.0012* 0.0008*** 0.0005*
(0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Part-time
retirement, PR -0.0518*** -0.0108*** -0.0565*** -0.0082* -0.0485*** -0.0101**
(0.0142) (0.0016) (0.0161) (0.0025) (0.0134) (0.0021)
Within R2 0.091 0.029
F-stat 44.51 50.42 40.66
Observations 512 126 512 126 512 127 222 934 222 934 222 934 289 192 289 192 289 192
a Notes: Years in the estimation are 1995-2004. Regressions control for year and previous sickness absence days while the outcome
(probability of having sickness beneﬁt spells) is measured in t+1. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered on
birth cohort level). *, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
sit out of the labour market via early exit. An earlier study by Kyyrä (2015)
estimates the eligibility effects for the same observation period. His ﬁndings
with respect to part-time pension is that the eligibility caused a reduction in
the probability to transit to unemployment (especially for public sector work-
ers) but no statistically signiﬁcant results are found for disability pension. The
difference with the current study is that he considers the eligibility effect on
the overall population while here I account the take-up of part-time pension
and identify the work reduction effect on the complying individuals. In this
sense these studies complement one another.
While for the sickness absences and the drug purchases, women had larger
reductions than men, for the early market exits the effect is stronger for men
and this difference is also statistically signiﬁcant. The probability of women
to exit via early route is 4.8 percentage points lower while for men the ﬁgure
is 5.6 percentage points.
5.6 Conclusion
This paper studied the effect of working hours reduction on health-related
factors and early labour market exits for elderly workers. The working hours
reduction is studied in the context of the part-time pension which provides a
good setting as this pension scheme certainly affected the hours worked but
had a modest impact on the disposable income and future pension rights and
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generally did not change the work community. I studied ﬁrst the effect of the
change in the eligibility ages and secondly the effects of take-up of part-time
pension accounting for individual heterogeneity and the endogeneity of the
working hours decision.
The estimation results with respect to the reform effect are positive but im-
precise on the drug purchases. There is no evidence found for the hypothesis
that the part-time pension would prolong the work careers. The take-up of
part-time retirement decreased the drug purchases and the probability of be-
ing on long sickness absence and these effects were larger for women. There
seems to be a direct work-related aspect here as purchases of respiratory and
musculo-skeletal diseases decreased the most. Part-time pension also reduced
the probability of an early exit from the labour market. However, these results
are local average treatment effects and are not as such extendible to the larger
population.
The descriptive statistics showed that the compliers are negatively selected
with respect to their health. However, compared to the general public we ob-
served that the complying part-time pensioners are better educated and have
better health outcomes. In this respect these results can be thought of as lower
bounds or at least we cannot state that a work hours reduction would not be
beneﬁcial for some other subpopulation. It would be worthwhile to match
the part-time pension sample to the other employees to study the effects in a
larger population.
The limitation of the study is that I cannot explore the different mecha-
nisms behind observed patterns. Increasing leisure time can affect life habits
and health in various way. For example, in Ahn (2016) it is shown that a short-
ened work-week increases the likelihood of regular exercise and decreases
the likelihood of smoking. Regular exercise or other personal investments on
one’s own health could be behind the take-up effects. On the other hand, more
leisure available could lead to more doctor visits and more prescribed medi-
cation which can be either preventive care or curing. This could be behind an
observation that drug purchases increase.
Lastly, it should be mentioned that the part-time pension system studied
in this paper was abolished in the pension reform in 2017. The major reason
for this was that the past system was expensive and did not treat individuals
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in the same manner. A replacement scheme was created in which there are
no work-related conditions assigned for claiming part of the earned pension
rights beforehand. In the future, ﬁnding a good research design to study the
working hours effects for the elderly population will be slightly more difﬁcult.
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Appendix
Table 5.A1 Classiﬁcation of drug data
ATC-codes
physical conditions
Any disease all ATCs
Cancer L01
Respiratory diseases R
Circulatory diseases C
Heart related diseases C01, C02, C03, C04, C07, C08, C09, C10
Cerebrovascular diseases B01
Musculo-skeletal disorders M01, M03, A03D, M02A, A03EA
Diabetes A10
mental conditions
Any mental illness N05A, N05B, N05C, N06A
Anti-psychotics N05A
Anxiolytics N05B
Hypnotics and sedatives N05C
Antidepressants N06A
Sources: Hagen (2018), Leinonen et al. (2016), World Health Organization
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Table 5.A2 Descriptives, years 1995-1997, part-time pensioners sample and comparison group
Part-time pensioners Others
Income and employment
Labour income, € 25 412.9 (12 780.9) 20 095.2 (15 195.4)
Pension income, € 239.1 (1 451.1) 360.0 (1 652.5)
Net income, € 18 719.74 (16 485.12) 14 648.44 (15 583.30)
Months in empl. 11.60 (1.98) 8.61 (5.10)
Months in unempl. 4.75 (3.63) 7.99 (3.87)
Health indicators
Sickness absence days 3.78 (16.50) 6.37 (30.38)
Any drug purchase 0.55 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50)
Nr of purchases, any drugs 2.77 (4.48) 3.09 (5.59)
Drug purchase for respiratory diseases 0.24 (0.43) 0.21 (0.41)
Nr of purchases, resp. dis. 0.59 (1.72) 0.58 (1.93)
Drug purchase for circulatory diseases 0.20 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40)
Nr of purchases, circ. diseases 0.94 (2.40) 0.99 (2.56)
Heart condition 0.19 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40)
Nr of purchases, heart conditions 0.93 (2.39) 0.98 (2.55)
Cerebrovascular disease 0.01 (0.10) 0.01(0.11)
Nr of purchases, cerebrovas. diseases 0.02 (0.27) 0.03 (0.31)
Musculo-skeletal disorder 0.26 (0.44) 0.24 (0.42)
Nr of purchases, musculo-skeletal dis. 0.51 (1.16) 0.51 (1.33)
Diabetes 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.15)
Nr of purchases, diabetes 0.09 (0.80) 0.12 (0.93)
Mental illness drug 0.11 (0.30) 0.12 (0.33)
Nr of purchases, mental disease 0.36 (1.70) 0.57 (2.59)
Individuals 52 297 154 181
Means with standard deviations in parentheses. The ﬁrst column shows descriptive statistics for years
1995-1997 for individuals who take-up part-time pension some point after year 1998. The second column
shows the descriptives for comparison group who have not taken the part-time pension. All variables are
measured within a year. Unit of measure for drug purchases is share of individuals with any purchases
within a group and the number of purchases is measured in packages. Sickness absence days represent the
absence days over 10 days.
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Table 5.A3 Descriptives, years 1995-1997, part-time pensioners sample and comparison group, con-
stant background variables
Part-time pensioners Others
Females, % 56 56
Living in the capital region, % 23.8 18.5
Education
Upper secondary, % 44.2 55.0
Tertiary education, % 25.0 24.0
Bachelor, % 13.0 10.3
Master, % 15.8 9.2
Doctoral, % 2.0 1.5
Industry
Manufacturing, % 8,3 4,8
Retail, % 4.3 4.4
Professional service, % 6.1 3.7
Public administration, % 9.4 4.6
Education, % 12.1 5.7
Care taking, % 14.2 11.9
Occupations
Managers, % 5.3 4.8
Professionals, % 20.0 13.6
Technicians and associate prof., % 19.5 17.8
Clerical support workers, % 14.0 10.2
Service and sales workers, % 11.7 15.0
Skilled agricultural workers, % 1.1 8.4
Craft and related trades workers, % 9.7 9.4
Plant and machine operators and assemblers, % 8.0 10.1
Elementary occupations, % 9.9 9.0
Individuals 52 297 154 181
Notes: Only the biggest industries and occupations are listed. Manufacturing here combines pharma-
ceutical, electrical, machinery and vehicle industries. The ﬁrst column shows the part-time pensioners
sample and the second column shows the comparison group generated from the similar gender and
birth cohort distribution as the part-time pensioners.
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Table
5.A
4
P
urchase
ofany
am
ountofdrug
and
part-tim
e
retirem
ent,by
drug
category
Firststage
R
espiratory
dis.
R
espiratory
dis.
H
eartdis.
H
eartdis
C
erebro-vas.
C
erebro-vas.
M
usculo-ske.
M
usculo-ske.
D
iabetes
D
iabetes
IV
-FE
IV
-FE
linear-FE
IV
-FE
linear-FE
IV
-FE
linear-FE
IV
-FE
linear-FE
IV
-FE
linear-FE
eligible
0.2174***
(0.0555)
age
0.2088*
0.0280***
0.0265**
0.0005
0.0012
-0.0117***
-0.0119**
0.0629***
0.0585***
-0.0045
-0.0051
(0.0839)
(0.0051)
(0.0052)
(0.0060)
(0.0059)
(0.0031)
(0.0032)
(0.0043)
(0.0051)
(0.0023)
(0.0023)
age
2
-0.0017*
-0.0003***
-0.0003***
0.0003***
0.0003**
0.0001***
0.0001**
-0.0006***
-0.0005***
0.0001***
0.0001**
(0.0008)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
part-tim
e
retirem
ent,PR
-0.0162**
-0.0103***
-0.0003
-0.0032**
-0.0021
-0.0010
-0.0254*
-0.0079*
-0.0019**
0.0005
(0.0059)
(0.0013)
(0.0041)
(0.0008)
(0.0014)
(0.0007)
(0.0101)
(0.0028)
(0.0006)
(0.0003)
W
ithin
R
2
0.012
0.117
0.009
0.001
0.021
F-stat
43.31087
43.31087
43.31087
43.31087
43.31087
observations
521
155
521
155
521
156
521
155
521
156
521
155
521
156
521
155
521
156
521
155
521
156
aN
otes:
Years
in
the
estim
ation
are
1995-2004.
R
egressions
include
year
dum
m
ies.
H
ealth
outcom
es
m
easured
in
the
next
period.
C
luster
robust
standard
errors
are
in
parentheses
(clustered
on
birth
cohortlevel).*,**,and
***
indicate
statisticalsigniﬁcance
atthe
0.1,0.05,and
0.01
levels,respectively.
190
Figure 5.A1 Length of the part-time pension spell
Figure 5.A2 Age distribution of part-time retirement by eligibility ages. The age at the starting day of the
ﬁrst part-time pension spell.
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Figure 5.A3 Difference in outcomes between the treatment and the control group, without controls.
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(b) Mental illness drug purchases, exten-
sive margin
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(c) Any drug purchases, intensive margin
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Notes: Coefﬁcient for treatment group and 95% conﬁdence intervals. Standard errors are clus-
tered at individual level.
Figure 5.A4 Descriptive evidence of average retirement age for two cohorts.
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Figure 5.A5 Change in the probability to buy any medicine (left ﬁgure) or mental illness drug (right ﬁgure)
during a year by distance from the eligibility age. Placebo, non-part-time pensioners.
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Notes: the estimates are based on a ﬁxed effects model where years from the eligibility act
as explanatory variables. The estimation is done for years 1995-2004 for the total part-time
pensioners sample. The vertical lines represents 95% conﬁdence intervals.
Figure 5.A6 Change in the probability to buy any medicine (left ﬁgure) or mental illness drug (right ﬁgure)
during a year by distance from the take-up year.
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Notes: the estimates are based on a ﬁxed effects model where years from the take-up act as
explanatory variables. The estimation is done for years 1995-2004 for the total part-time pen-
sioners sample. The vertical lines represents 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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